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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine Edward Bond’s plays, theoretical 
writings, and productions from the 1990s to the present. Since the early 
1990s, Bond has been theorizing a new theory of subjectivity as a response 
to the ‘post-Auschwitz’ world as well as to the logic of neoliberalism. I will 
critically examine how Bond develops his theory and place this theory in a 
broader philosophical context of post-Auschwitz ethics defined by Adorno 
and Levinas. As the Bondian subject is a self-dramatizing subject, this 
conception of subjectivity also influences how Bond conceives his 
dramaturgy. Instead of treating characters as self-contained autonomous 
individuals, Bond’s new dramaturgy substantiates an examination of 
different possibilities of subjective configurations and their ethical 
significance. By examining Bond’s plays, I argue that Bond’s dramaturgy, 
instead of expressing his theory in dramatic form, further complicates his 
conception of subjectivity. Moreover, over the past thirty years, while 
distancing himself from mainstream British theatre, Bond has developed a 
sustained and creative collaboration with Big Brum, a Birmingham-based 
TIE company, and Alain Françon, one of the most prestigious contemporary 
French directors. Bond has written more than ten plays for Big Brum and 
dedicated five plays, The Paris Pentad, to Françon and these works clearly 
mark a dynamic new phase within Bond's playwriting career. Along with 
these collaborations, Bond has also developed a post-Brechtian theory of 
theatre and performance. Therefore, I will also analyze how Bond 
reconceives the role of theatre and performance and how his ideas can be 
concretized and enacted on stage.  
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Introduction 
 
Before I came to London to conduct my research on Edward Bond, I studied 
playwriting in Taipei and wrote several plays. When I studied playwriting in 
graduate school, I started to study contemporary British drama, which was 
renowned worldwide for its quality and diversity. Among the plays I read, 
Bond’s The War Plays overwhelmed me by its versatile use of dramatic 
forms and its profound exploration of modern human conditions. Since then, 
I started to read Bond’s other plays and his theory although I was more 
often than not baffled by the obscurity and complexity of his dramatic and 
theoretical writings. Intriguingly, I also sensed that he might have created a 
new approach to playwriting and a new way to understand theatre. This 
thesis is thus prompted by my intention to understand Bond’s dramaturgy, 
theory, and how his plays have been performed.  
In the article ‘Whatever Happened to Edward Bond?’ in The 
Independent on 2 November 2010, Mark Ravenhill writes: 
 
I’d assumed that Bond’s major work was behind him, 
accepting the view widely held in English theatre circles that 
he was now a cantankerous man producing ever more erratic 
and irrelevant plays.  
So it was a huge shock for me to see a production of Bond’s 
2005 play The Under Room in the basement of that same pub, 
the Cock Tavern in Kilburn, a couple of weeks ago as part of 
a six-play retrospective of the writer’s work. 1  Written 
originally for a tour of Birmingham schools, it is as good as 
anything as Bond has ever written. By the end of the 
performance I was shaken and tearful, not only because the 
play had asked such troubling questions about the way we live 
our lives, but because of an overwhelming sadness that such a 
significant play can be so marginalised.  
 
It is interesting to observe that, although Ravenhill shared the view that 
                                                
1 The plays featured include: The Pope’s Wedding (1962), The Fool (1976), Red, Black 
and Ignorant (1985), Olly’s Prison (1993), The Under Room (2005), and There Will Be 
More (2010). The season, presented by Adam Spreadbury-Maher and Berislav Juraic, ran 
from 14 September to 13 November 2010. Bond later incorporated There Will Be More as 
the first act of Dea, produced at Sutton Theatre in 2016.  
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Bond’s later work may be irrelevant to contemporary English theatre 
audiences, he discovered in fact how relevant The Under Room could be 
because of its effectiveness in addressing ‘troubling questions about the way 
we live our lives’. The Under Room is set in a dystopian future in 2077, and 
by centering the play on an illegal immigrant who wants to escape from a 
totalitarian regime to seek asylum, Bond interrogates the possibility of 
accepting the other in a state permeated by xenophobic ideology. Bond’s 
use of a Muslim headscarf, though it is only used at the very end of the play, 
clearly exhibits his intention to engage with ethics in the age of the ‘War on 
Terror’.  
 However, Ravenhill’s impression that Bond has become irrelevant is 
not surprising. From the late 1980s, Bond was becoming more and more 
alienated from mainstream British theatre, as indicated in the beginning of 
his letter to Katharine Worth on 4 December 1985: ‘I think Im [sic] coming 
to the end of my time in the theatre’ (Stuart 1996a: 57). His disappointment 
with the National Theatre, the Royal Court, and the Royal Shakespeare 
Company was evident in his letters of this period.2 As a consequence, he 
started to build a long-term relationship with Big Brum, a TIE company 
based in Birmingham that has commissioned Bond to write ten plays for 
teenagers, and Alain Françon, who has directed nine of Bond’s plays from 
1992 to the present.  
It is important to note that the period of the late 1980s to the early 
1990s also marks a watershed in Bond’s theoretical and dramaturgical 
development: until then, Bond had fully elaborated his Marxist criticism of 
modern society and ideology; at the same time, Bond was also writing 
‘Commentary on The War Plays’ (1991), in which he conceived the concept 
of ‘radical innocence’ as the foundation for his later understanding of 
human nature and moral psychology. In other words, Bond’s concern 
                                                
2 Though Bond was not satisfied with British mainstream theatre, his works have still been 
produced on stage. Main productions after 1985 include Restoration by the RSC in 1988, 
The Sea at the National Theatre in 1991, Bingo by the RSC in 1995, In the Company of 
Men by the RSC in 1996, The Sea at the Theatre Royal Haymarket in 2008, Bingo at the 
Young Vic, and Saved and The Chair Plays at the Lyric Hammersmith in 2012. It should 
also be noted that, except The Chair Plays, these were productions of Bond’s early plays. 
Bond’s new plays have usually been premiered by Big Brum or by French theatres since 
the 1990s.  
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shifted from the interplay between drama and society to that between drama 
and human subjectivity – or, more accurately, Bond aimed to incorporate 
the role of human subjectivity into the interplay between drama and society.  
Bond’s dramaturgical transitions from the 1980s to the 1990s can be 
best illustrated by comparing two excerpts, one of which is from ‘The 
Activists Papers’ (1978-80):  
 
Instead of history being filtered through an individual, 
reduced to him (as in King Lear), the play’s figures and 
incidents would embody and demonstrate the total historical 
movement. History wouldn’t be shown as immanent in an 
individual, individuality would be transcended by the 
historical pattern which it represented. […] The characters 
wouldn’t be moved by personal motives but by the forces of 
history. (Bond 1992: 129) 
 
The other is from a letter to Michael Fuller in 1988: 
 
I try to establish a scheme for theatre practice based on an 
understanding of the way the mind works, knows, experiences 
and creates anything. Theatre is concerned in a special way 
with the functioning of consciousness. […] [T]heatre work 
must be based on an analytical understanding of the mind’s 
working before it can be about anything else. (Stuart 1994a: 
20) 
 
In ‘The Activists Papers’, Bond’s emphasis on ‘the forces of history’, 
suggestive of Brecht’s emphasis on historicization, explains the intentions 
of his plays during the late 1970s and early 1980s to present a grand picture 
of society in order to demonstrate a rational understanding of the human 
condition through class analysis. Through rational dramatization, Bond 
believes that spectators are able to gain a better understanding of how 
society and ideology work. In the second excerpt quoted above, Bond turns 
his attention to the interplay between drama and human mind – while this is 
not totally contradictory with ‘The Activists Papers’, it indicates that, in 
addition to rational understanding, Bond intends to enlarge dramatic power 
to penetrate into the more complex and delicate workings of human 
consciousness. Although this does not mean that Bond decided to renounce 
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social realism, it is observable that, since the 1990s, Bond’s dramaturgical 
focus has veered from the display of social panorama to the exploration of 
extreme situations that challenge spectators with ethical paradoxes.  
In analyzing the dramaturgical shift from the state-of-the-nation play to 
the play of globalization in contemporary British playwriting, Dan Rebellato 
argues that, partly because agitprop failed to coordinate our understanding 
of the world with direct experience and partly because realism failed to 
frame individualized characters within a broader historical background, the 
task of the state-of-the-nation play was to construct socialized realism that 
situates characters against the backdrop of social and historical dynamics 
(2008b: 248). Rebellato contends that, since the nation-of-the-state play 
presupposes that the state as a unit of political organization coincides with 
the nation as a community of shared values, in the era of globalization and 
devolution, when the coincidence of the state and the nation collapses, the 
state-of-the-nation play is inadequate to reflect the feelings of dissonance 
generated by the process of deterritorialization (248-57). Rebellato 
concludes by stating that globalization has created new conditions that 
demand new experimental dramatic form as an effective response to a world 
of globalized market and consumer culture (259).  
Rebellato’s analysis acutely captures how the politics of theatre derives 
from its aesthetic form as a response to the structure of political reality. It is 
not difficult to decipher from the above two excerpts that Bond’s 
dramaturgy in the 1980s also underwent a shift from the objectivity of 
socialized realism to a dramaturgy centered around the working of 
subjectivity. Based on the logic of Rebellato’s argument, in the following 
section I will recontexualize Bond in the scenario of contemporary British 
theatre by arguing that Bond’s later theory and dramaturgy should also be 
considered as his response to the new socio-economic-political conditions 
that have shaped the world order since the 1990s: mainly the globalization 
of neoliberalism and the permanent ‘War on Terror’. 
 
Contextualizing Bond in Contemporary British Theatre 
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Bond’s playwriting career started with his joining the Royal Court’s Writers’ 
Group in 1958; and the staging of The Pope’s Wedding in 1962 marked the 
beginning of his first cycle of plays, which ‘started with The Pope’s 
Wedding and ended with The Sea’ (Bond and Loney 44). Saved (1965) was 
the most infamous among the first cycle of plays for the violence of its 
baby-stoning scene, and it also became the point of contestation over theatre 
censorship since its staging was not licensed by the Lord Chamberlain’s 
office. Despite the controversy of censorship, William Gaskill, the then 
Artistic Director at the Royal Court, supported Bond’s plays and staged 
Saved in 1965 and Early Morning, on which a total ban was imposed, in 
1968. During the same year, the Theatres Act of 1968 was passed, and Early 
Morning became the last play banned by the Lord Chamberlain’s office.3 
The controversy caused by Bond’s plays partly derives from his audacious 
use of violence in his plays – violence also abounds in other plays in the 
first cycle: Narrow Road to the Deep North (1968), Lear (1971), and The 
Sea (1973). Regarding violence, Bond states: ‘I write about violence simply 
because it’s the defining characteristic of a modern, technological society. It 
creates violence’ (Bond and Loney 39). Bond also states that ‘[v]iolence is 
the problem that has to be dealt with’ (Stoll 415). Therefore, Bond’s use of 
violence is never for the sake of violence, but it is because violence 
accurately reflects the problems of society that in any play about society 
violence cannot be avoided.   
According to Bond, in the first cycle, the plays became more and more 
articulate: while, in The Pope’s Wedding, there is no communication 
between Scopey and Alen, The Sea ends with Evens talking to Willy about 
the meaning of being human (Bond and Loney 45). However, Bond was not 
satisfied with only presenting the symptoms of social problems through 
violence, but he intended to dramatize and interrogate these problems in a 
more dramaturgically effective way. Therefore, Bond’s second cycle of 
plays consists of three ‘problem plays’ – Bingo (1973), The Fool (1975), 
                                                
3 For detailed discussions on the controversy of censorship caused by Saved and Early 
Morning, see Terry W. Browne’s Playwrights’ Theatre: The English Stage Company and 
the Royal Court Theatre (1975): 62-71, and Philip Roberts’s The Royal Court Theatre and 
the Modern Stage (1999): 108-128. 
 13 
and The Woman (1978). Through these plays, Bond intends to deal with ‘the 
problem of the burden of the past which makes a change so difficult’ (qtd. 
in Hay and Roberts 266). In Bingo, Bond uses Shakespeare as an iconic 
artist to foreground the impotence of art, or, the artist’s complicity, in 
relation to the early seventeenth-century movement of enclosures, which 
epitomizes the nascence of capitalism. In The Fool, through the character of 
the poet John Clare, Bond engages with the social changes during early 
industrial expansion in Britain and its impact on the dispossessed 
agricultural workers. In The Woman, through rewriting a range of classical 
Greek tragedies and myths, Bond intends to deal with the problems of 
power from women’s point of view.  
Following the second series of problem plays is Bond’s third cycle of 
‘answer plays’, through which Bond aims to find ‘what answers are 
applicable’ (qtd. in Hay and Roberts 266) to the problems that are already 
specified. The Bundle (1978) suggests that social justice can be obtained by 
revolution, while The Worlds (1979), in a more cautions manner, implies 
that the answers to social injustice reside in the conditions that produce 
revolutionaries and terrorists who claim to fight for social justice. 
Restoration (1981), the final play of the ‘answer plays’, indicates that social 
justice can be made possible only through the awakening of 
class-consciousness among the oppressed. After the cycle of ‘answer plays’, 
Bond started to feel alienated from mainstream British theatre – Summer 
(1982) was his last play staged at the National Theatre, and his 
dissatisfaction with the production of The War Plays (1985) by the RSC 
marked the end of his collaboration with mainstream British theatre, with 
only a few exceptions.4 However, Bond’s ‘Commentary on The War Plays’ 
signals a new phase of his theory and dramaturgy, and, during the 1990s, he 
began new collaborations with French directors, especially Alain Françon, 
and British TIE theatre practitioners, especially Big Brum. The research of 
my thesis starts with this period, and in the following I aim to situate the 
                                                
4 For example, he directed the RSC production of In the Company of Men in 1996, and 
Coffee was presented at the Royal Court by a Welsh community theatre company, Rational 
Theatre, in 1997. 
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later Bond in the context of contemporary British theatre.  
Since Bond started to distance himself from mainstream British theatre 
during the late 1980s, his plays gradually fell off the radar of scholars.5 
However, contrary to the view that Bond’s plays are erratic and irrelevant, 
Bond shares similar sentiments with other contemporary playwrights 
regarding the aggravating crises such as wars, globalization, and terrorism 
faced by the West from the 1990s. On 28 January 1995, Bond published an 
article in The Guardian to defend Sarah Kane’s Blasted (1995), and the 
opening of the article is exemplary of Bond’s worldview in a post-Cold War 
era:  
 
I was a child of dark times. The new capital cities of history 
were Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Auschwitz, Dresden, Babi 
Yar…Surely no time could be darker? But the debris of those 
places are now spread thinly over the whole world. In war we 
hope for peace. What do we hope in now? 
Communism is defeated. The West is triumphant. We do not 
need to ask how are we to be human. We only have to solve 
the problems of the economy and all will be well. (1995: par. 
1-2) 
 
Bond’s diagnosis of the conditions of the West is reminiscent of political 
scientist Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History?’ (1989), in which 
Fukuyama claims that the ideological death of Marxism-Leninism implies 
that the ‘common marketization’ of international relations would produce a 
new world wherein the ideological conflict would be replaced by ‘economic 
calculation […] and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands’ 
(18). Twenty years after Fukuyama’s announcement of the end of history 
and the start of global marketization, cultural theorist Mark Fisher proposed 
                                                
5  Amelia Howe Kritzer’s Political Theatre in Post-Thatcher Britain: New Writing: 
1995-2005 (2008) completely bypasses Bond’s work in this period although this book 
tackles issues that pervade Bond’s later plays such as wars and terrorism. Julia Boll’s The 
New War Plays from Kane to Harris (2013) only mentions in passing Bond’s Chair Plays 
when she discusses the plays that deal with the camp. However, The Paris Pentad is 
ignored although it constitutes a much more complex response to the same crisis of the 
political-juridical structure of the modern state.  
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‘capitalist realism’ to designate ‘the widespread sense that not only 
is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it 
is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (2; original 
emphasis). For Fisher, Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no alternative’ turns 
out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy that establishes neoliberalism as the 
boundary of the thinkable order of the world (7). The naturalization of 
neoliberalism as an established fact instead of being one of many alternative 
values is the reason why Fisher regards it as ‘realistic’ (15). Fisher also 
contends that the appearance of the hegemonic order of neoliberalism 
secures the disengagement of politics since it seems impossible to envision 
an ideological alternative in a post-political era (Fisher and Gilbert 90).  
Fisher’s ‘capitalist realism’ encapsulates the Zeitgeist experienced by 
the so-called ‘Thatcher’s children’, the term theatre critic Aleks Sierz uses 
to designate the ‘in-yer-face’ playwrights. Sierz points out that Thatcherite 
market economics is one of the targets attacked by in-yer-face theatre in the 
1990s (237). Nevertheless, as Rebellato argues, people had already reacted 
against Thatcher in the 1980s (Aragay et al. 163). For example, although 
Bond’s apocalyptic The War Plays might seem irrelevant to domestic 
politics, his critique of the logic of late capitalism that reduces human 
beings into calculable entities and fails to create alternative values could be 
read as his response to Thatcherism. Another play that recognizably 
exemplifies Bond’s reaction to the social conditions that sustained the 
Conservative government is The Worlds, which incorporates discernable 
situations such as strikes and terrorist activities that contributed to 
Thatcher’s ascent to power (Spencer 185). In his notes on The Worlds, Bond 
states: ‘An unjust society, protected by law and order, will increase violence 
and antisocial behaviour within the community. It will also increase 
political violence against it, in the form of terrorism’ (Stuart 2001b: 117).  
While Bond in The Worlds uses terrorism in order to expose the 
structural injustice of society governed by strong law and order, ten years 
later, in ‘Notes on Post-Modernism’ (1989), Bond analyzes the enduring 
ideological impacts of Thatcherism, especially market-oriented 
consumerism, within British society. He defines post-modern society as ‘a 
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society of wants’ (1996: 24), and declares: ‘It destroyed utopian vision and 
put consumption in its place. […] What we have now are wants and markets. 
Utopia would be more wants’ (29). In response to the exhaustion of utopian 
visions by consumerist ideology, Bond started to articulate the relationship 
between the subject’s subjection to authority and the subject’s capacity to 
interrogate the boundary defined by authority. By defining authority as the 
organizing force of society and the boundary as ‘the source of meaning and 
value’, Bond states that while ‘authority claims to speak to and for the 
boundary’, people still can use their capacity to ‘interrogate the nature of the 
boundary’ (1). While Bond tries to formulate a mechanism between 
authority and people in which the boundary of the thinkable can be 
interrogated and transformed, he continues to sketch a more complex 
picture of the system:  
 
It is important that in its relation to the boundary authority 
uses the boundary to legitimize people’s needs. Ultimately the 
legitimization depends on the need of the mind’s 
over-capacity to interrogate. Authority’s story tells 
why people are entitled to their needs, how having them is 
evidence of their humanness. People relate to their needs in 
accordance with the boundary’s approval or condemnation of 
their needs. […] Legitimizing authority cannot act arbitrarily; 
its story is defined by people’s needs and the possibilities of 
technology and organisation. (3) 
 
According to Bond, although authority defines and legitimizes the boundary 
of people’s needs, this act is no by means an enforcement. On the contrary, 
the ideological narrative that authority uses to legitimize its legitimacy must 
comply with people’s needs – however, what people seemingly need might 
have been determined by the boundary approved by authority. In the 
reciprocal interaction between authority and people, it is more and more 
difficult to point out who defines the boundary and how it is defined. 
Therefore, the mind’s over-capacity should not be romanticized as what the 
mind desires might have been regulated by authority; also, authority should 
not be demonized as it might legitimize what people feel they really need.  
 Although Bond does not clarify concretely what ‘authority’ refers to, 
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his analysis of ideology can be seen as his response to Thatcherism. In ‘The 
Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among Theorists’ (1988), cultural theorist 
Stuart Hall defines Thatcherism as a combination of neoliberal free-market 
ideology and traditional values of Toryism that transforms the former 
Keynesian ideologies (39). For Hall, the significance of Thatcherism resides 
in the way it filters through every level of society:  
 
Where previously social need had begun to establish its own 
imperatives against the laws of market forces, now questions 
of “value for money,” the private right to dispose of one's 
own wealth, the equation between freedom and the free 
market, have become the terms of trade, not just of political 
debate in parliament, the press, the journals’, and policy 
circles, but in the thought and language of everyday 
calculation. (40; my emphasis) 
 
As Hall maintains, the ideological power of Thatcherism was manifest in 
the way it transformed preceding ‘social need’ into the need defined by ‘the 
laws of market forces’. When this new ideology pervaded people’s thought 
and language, in Bond’s words, it delimited the boundary of the thinkable. 
Confronted with Thatcherism, Hall found that the traditional Marxist 
concept of false consciousness fails to account for the fact that the 
unemployed, even though they had awakened to the inconvenient 
consequences of Thatcher’s policies, did not turn to laborism or socialism 
(43). In order to account for the operation of Thatcherism, Hall proposes 
that it is necessary to combine the analysis of ideology and the production 
of the subject. Drawing on Louis Althusser’s theory of ideological 
interpellation, Hall states: ‘Thatcherism has been able to constitute new 
subject positions from which its discourses about the world make sense, or 
to appropriate to itself existing, already formed interpellations’ (49). In 
other words, the traditional Marxist category of the subject in terms of class 
consciousness is insufficient to account for the subject instituted by 
Thatcherism, which entails a more complex network of values by which the 
world is defined.  
 The affinity between Bond’s argument and Hall’s is obvious: 
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Thatcherism, as authority, operates legitimately either by producing subjects 
to whom the worldview defined by it is taken for granted or by reproducing 
existent values to continue to maintain its authority. It is in this context that 
we should understand Bond’s concept of ‘radical innocence’, an idea that 
Bond proposes in order to account for the subject’s potential to imagine an 
alternative world different from the one defined by existing authority. In a 
note entry dated 29 April 1987, Bond writes: ‘Radical innocence is 
presumably […] creativity? […] So art recreates the neonate’s 
confrontations – impulsed [sic] by radical innocence, now – but within the 
carapace of the economic-manipulating world’ (Stuart 2001b: 270). It is 
important to note that, from the stage of its inception, the concept of ‘radical 
innocence’ has already been defined as creativity that confronts with the 
‘economic-manipulating world’ – that is, Bond intends to react against the 
totalizing ideological network of neoliberalism by conceiving the mind’s 
over-capacity as radical innocence, which can by no means be compromised 
with ideologized reality. Moreover, radical innocence is not merely a 
concept of subjectivity, but it is also a counter-hegemonic aesthetic 
sensibility.  
In a revealing text, ‘The Mark of Kane’ (2010), Bond demonstrates the 
relationship between dramatic form and radical innocence through 
discussing Kane’s Blasted. Bond regards Blasted as composed of two parts: 
the first part is ‘sanitised, institutionalized, fictionalized and made normal,’ 
while the second part discloses ‘society’s reality unsanitised’ (2010: 216). 
Accordingly, for Bond, the structure demonstrates that Blasted ‘is radical 
innocence talking directly to its corrupt society’ (ibid). In Bond’s theory, 
radical innocence is defined as the existential imperative to seek justice, and 
it is the most fundamental logic of the human psyche structured like drama. 
Therefore, in Bond’s idiosyncratic interpretation, the structural rupture of 
Blasted is regarded as the psychic working of Kane’s quest for justice: the 
first part, as the ‘sanitised’ and ideologized representation of corrupted 
society, is affronted by radical innocence and results in the ‘unsanitised’ 
second part that reveals the truth of how violence is permeated in 
contemporary society. The structural meaning of Blasted resides not only in 
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its revelatory power of social criticism but also in its expression of how the 
human psyche responds to outer reality dramatically. Only by situating 
dramatic form (aesthetics) in a mimetic relationship with the human psyche 
(subjectivity) can Bond’s interpretation of Blasted, based on radical 
innocence, be understood.6  
In Bond’s later work, one of the sources for him to test the limits of 
humanity is the dystopian ‘technomachia’, an imagined systematically 
totalized world controlled by consumerist ideology and technological 
reason:  
 
The Technomachia is faceless. Communities will be divided. 
People will live in rich ghettos or prisons, both as big as cities. 
They will be administered efficiently. The violence needed 
will pass as normal. […] Fighting will be formalized into 
execution. The consumer economy has no structural need of 
justice and as long as it can administer crime efficiently 
society has no need of humanness. (2000b: 160)  
 
Such a description of the world dominated by a severe system of 
administration is not only dystopian, but it is also a critique of contemporary 
consumer society, whose logic of administration, once radicalized, will turn 
out to be totalitarian. In the dystopia, the unequal power structure of politics 
and economics is so omnipotent that the individual has been completely 
incorporated into the structure of the market and any hope of revolution has 
been dissipated.  
Another source of Bond’s dystopian imagination in his later work 
originates from his experience during the Second World War and his 
understanding of the totalitarian state. By forcing his characters to face 
extreme situations and ethical dilemmas, Bond enters into a dialogue with 
nightmarish twentieth-century European history in the twilight of the 
Enlightenment. As I will argue in Chapter Three, in Bond’s later work, the 
term ‘Auschwitz’ refers to a political-juridical structure defined by the state 
                                                
6 I analyze the dramaturgical and theoretical affinities between Bond and Kane in more 
detail in ‘The Hidden Dialogue between Sarah Kane and Edward Bond: The Dramaturgy of 
Accident Time and Ethical Subjectivities’, which is collected in After In-Yer-Face: 
Remnants of a Theatrical Revolution (forthcoming), edited by William Boles. 
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of exception, wherein human beings are stripped of their political status and 
can be murdered as ‘bare life’.  
It is not difficult to see why the dramaturgical logic of Bond’s later 
work has been dominated by the totalization of neoliberalism and the 
permanent state of the exception – these dystopian worldviews correspond 
to the two events that have determined the contemporary world order: the 
end of the Cold War and the beginning of the ‘War on Terror’. Bond’s 
sentiments regarding the new global order is consonant with what Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri declare in Empire (2000): ‘Empire is materializing 
before our very eyes. […] Along with the global market and global circuits 
of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule 
– in short, a new form of sovereignty’ (2000: ix). According to Hardt and 
Negri, the new imperial sovereignty is composed of nations and 
supranational institutions (xii) – this new sovereignty realizes a capitalist 
project through which the process of globalization is not only an economic 
fact but a source of juridical order that endows empire with political power 
(9). One of the symptoms of the new imperial order, Hardt and Negri argue, 
is the emergence of the concept of ‘just war’ [bellum justum], which was 
invoked in the Gulf War to legitimize the conflict – the source of legitimacy 
originated from the ethical appeal and the effectiveness of the military force 
(12-13). In other words, the sovereign power of the new global order derives 
both from the reproduction of the neoliberal economic order and from its 
incessant arbitration of military conflicts. In Multitude: War and Democracy 
in the Age of Empire (2004), Hardt and Negri clearly state that ‘[t]he world 
is at war again. […] War is becoming a general phenomenon, global and 
interminable’ (2004: 3). For them, the September 11 attacks were not 
anomalous in the new global order (4) – the announcement of the ‘War on 
Terror’ only made explicit the general condition of the imperial order that 
has already been maintaining its power by exercising global police action 
and violence.  
It is against this historical and theoretical backdrop that I want to 
reconsider two remarks in Bond’s article on Kane published in 1995: first, 
‘In war we hope for peace. What do we hope in now?’ Bond’s question 
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betrays the ambivalence of contemporary warfare that not only transcends 
the territories of traditional political sovereign entities but also blurs the 
distinction between war and peace. Second, ‘Communism is defeated. The 
West is triumphant. We do not need to ask how are we to be human.’ For 
Bond, the ethical nature of the new global order can never be self-justified, 
although the imperial power keeps distributing and reproducing the values 
that could sustain the operation of the global Empire. Therefore, despite the 
fact that his later work remains underestimated, Bond is indeed our 
contemporary, who keeps reacting to contemporary crises through his 
dramaturgy and theory.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Before Bond started to exile himself from British mainstream theatre in the 
mid 1980s, his plays attracted enormous scholarly attention. Since my thesis 
focuses on Bond’s later work, I will selectively review four monographs 
that represent Bondian scholarship up to the 1990s: Malcolm Hay and Philip 
Roberts’s Edward Bond: A Study of His Plays (1980), Daivd L. Hirst’s 
Edward Bond (1985), Jenny S. Spencer’s Dramatic Strategies in the Plays 
of Edward Bond (1992), and Ian Stuart’s Politics in Performance: the 
Production Work of Edward Bond, 1978-1990 (1996).  
 In Edward Bond: A Study of His Plays, Hay and Roberts analyze 
chronologically Bond’s plays from The Pope’s Wedding (1962) to The 
Bundle (1979). They state that Bond’s plays ‘reflect a continual process of 
analyzing the nature of modern problems’ (22), and they contextualize and 
analyze each of Bond’s plays in great detail. Although their analysis is still 
pertinent in understanding Bond’s early plays, they neither analyze how 
these plays were performed nor do they provide any critical framework to 
define the nature of Bond’s plays. In comparison, Hirst’s Edward Bond 
demonstrates a more critically engaged attempt to approach Bond. He 
argues that, through the use of paradox and exploration of various dramatic 
forms, Bond succeeds in developing his own epic theatre that can dramatize 
his analysis of ethical issues within broader social and political contexts. 
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Hirst also discusses how Bond’s theatrical practices were influenced by 
Brecht and William Gaskill, the Artistic Director of the Royal Court from 
1965-1972, who was renowned for his Brechtian approach to directing and 
directed the premieres of Bond’s early plays. According to Hirst, Bond 
aimed to achieve the kind of acting that surpasses the limits of the 
psychology of the individual in order to address the problems of certain 
social and political circumstances. Hirst’s two strands of research – Bond’s 
engagement with dramaturgy and theatre – were later elaborated 
respectively by Spencer and Stuart.  
 In Dramatic Strategies in the Plays of Edward Bond, Spencer states 
that Bond’s drama is post-Brechtian. She claims that using Brechtian 
strategies to understand Bond is insufficient since the diversity of Bond’s 
devices requires a more sophisticated treatment. Therefore, she divides her 
book according to different dramatic strategies adopted by Bond (9-11). In 
comparison to Hay and Roberts’s chronological study and Hirst’s Brechtian 
reading, Spencer’s critical calibre lies in her ability to deploy a variety of 
critical frames to demonstrate the complexity of dramatic form and the 
breadth of thematic concerns in Bond’s plays. However, since Spencer’s 
book was published in 1992, at the time when Bond just started to theorize 
his idea of radical innocence, her study does not provide an adequate 
analysis of Bond’s later theory of subjectivity; neither does her study deal 
with how Bond’s plays were performed.  
 The first book that focuses on Bond’s theatrical practice is Ian Stuart’s 
Politics in Performance: the Production Work of Edward Bond, 1978-1990, 
in which Stuart examines Bond’s directorial involvement in six productions 
– The Woman (National Theatre, 1978), The Worlds (Newcastle and Royal 
Court, 1979), Restoration (Royal Court, 1981), Summer (National Theatre, 
1982), The War Plays (RSC, 1985), and Jackets (Lancaster and Bush 
Theatre, 1989/90).7 Stuart concludes that, according to Bond’s theory of 
                                                
7 Bond’s first directorial debut was in 1973, when he directed Lear at the Burgtheatre in 
Vienna, but he did not regard it as a positive experience (Stuart 1996b: 9). His first British 
directorial debut was in 1978, when he directed The Woman on the Olivier stage at the 
National Theatre. From then on, Bond continued to direct his own plays, including The 
Worlds at the Royal Court in 1979, Restoration at the Royal Court in 1981, Summer at the 
National Theatre in 1982, and the RSC production of In the Company of Men at the Pit in 
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acting, ‘[t]he actor must apply his concept or interpretation of the dramatic 
situation to the emotion. It is this concept or interpretation which must be 
acted out and not the emotion of the character’ (1996b: 171). Although 
Stuart’s study provides invaluable reconstruction of Bond’s early 
productions, he seems to take Bond’s criticism of Stanislavsky and Brecht 
for granted and appropriates Bond’s own vocabulary without critical 
engagement. In addition, Bond’s recent development of his theory of 
subjectivity and dramaturgy also complicates his theory of acting. In 
Chapter Six, I will address Bond’s theory of acting both in a broader context 
of modern theatre and in the context of his theoretical and dramaturgical 
development.  
Peter Billigham’s Edward Bond: A Critical Study (2013) is the only 
monograph in the new millennium dedicated to Bond’s recent work. 
According to Billingham, the aim of the study is to investigate and 
interrogate Bond’s new political drama that centers around the problem of 
defining humanness (17). Billingham observes that, from the 1970s to the 
mid 1980s, Bond’s dramaturgy embodied Marxist understandings of social 
and economic structures, whereas, from the 1990s, Bond started to explore 
the role of imagination partly through Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. He 
states that it is through the paradoxical tension between Marxist materialism 
and Kant’s transcendentalism that Bond is able to outline his theory and 
dramaturgy as that which constructs a space for the interrogation of radical 
innocence and material reality (34). Although Billingham intends to focus 
on Bond’s later dramaturgical and theoretical development, the first half of 
the book is devoted to analyzing Bond’s early plays. In the rest of the book, 
Billingham analyzes Bond’s later plays more descriptively than analytically. 
In addition, in spite of the fact that Billingham spasmodically incorporates 
Bond’s theoretical terms into his analysis, it remains obscure how Bond has 
developed his new theory and how Bond’s theory has influenced his 
dramaturgy.  
                                                                                                                       
1996. It should be noted that he assisted directing the RSC production of The War Plays in 
1985. In the new millennium, he has directed The Fool at the Cock Tavern in 2010; Chair 
and The Under Room at the Lyric Hammersmith in 2012; and, in 2016, he directed Dea at 
Sutton Theatre. 
 24 
In The Politics and Poetics of Contemporary English Tragedy (2013), 
Sean Carney includes Bond’s plays in his broader project of analyzing the 
idea of the tragic in contemporary English political plays. Like Billingham, 
Carney observes that Bond’s dramaturgy underwent a decisive shift that sets 
apart his early and later plays, and he locates this shift in the context of the 
election of Thatcher in 1979. He argues that, from then, Bond started 
complex theorization, initiated self-exile from British mainstream theatre, 
and abandoned realism in favor of poetic formalism (145).8 Compared to 
Billingham, Carney’s use of tragedy as a critical lens to examine Bond’s 
plays, especially his later ones, yields more insights. Drawing on Bond’s 
theory of subjectivity, Carney states that Bond’s tragedy ‘replicates the 
childhood encounter with nothingness and dramatizes the radical innocent’s 
tragic interrogation of the boundary’ (158). He further observes that Bond’s 
socialist tragedy is ‘an assertion of the contours of the core self, the tragic 
human, within late capitalist postmodernity’ (174). These statements 
accurately capture the relationship between Bond’s tragedy and his theory 
of radical innocence. However, Carney also tends to directly apply Bond’s 
own vocabulary to examine his plays without problematizing Bond’s 
theoretical idiom.  
A more critical engagement with Bond can be found in Karoline 
Gritzner’s Adorno and Modern Theatre: The Drama of the Damaged Self in 
Bond, Rudkin, Barker and Kane (2015), in which she scrutinizes Bond’s 
drama through Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy of subjectivity and 
aesthetics. Gritzner begins her analysis by stating that, while Bond’s 
dramaturgy of presenting liberated subjectivity resonates with Adorno’s 
                                                
8 I have reservations about Carney’s observation. Although Thatcherism exerted a great 
impact on Bond’s dramaturgy and theory, it may be a simplification to attribute Bond’s 
dramaturgical and theoretical shift only to the election of Thatcher. First, while Bond’s 
‘Note on Post-Modernism’ (1989) is one of his major theoretical writings on late capitalist 
consumerism, ‘Commentary on The War Plays’ is a reflection on human nature and the role 
of theatre based on Bond’s experience of the Second World War and the Cold War. Second, 
regarding Bond’s relationship with British mainstream theatre, he almost parted company 
with the Royal Court after 1975 (Mangan 32), and he left the RSC’s rehearsal of The War 
Plays in 1985 mainly because of his disagreement with the nature of the company’s acting 
and his frustration with the management of the actors’ workload (Stuart 1996b: 138). Third, 
‘poetic formalism’ is a rather obscure, if not inaccurate, term in defining Bond’s later plays, 
especially when we take into account some of his TIE plays that resemble his early realist 
dramaturgy such as A Window, Edge, and Tune. 
 25 
conception of art as a medium to express the autonomy of the subject, 
Bond’s theatre ultimately relies on the reason of the Enlightenment, which 
is critiqued by Adorno (2015: 46). However, Gritzner also notes that Bond’s 
recent work reveals ‘a sense of openness to the unpredictable’, which 
challenges Bond’s emphasis on rational understanding in his previous work 
(82). Gritzner relates this feature of openness to the metaphor of Auschwitz 
in Bond’s later plays in which the individual’s struggle against the 
oppressive totality is articulated through formal innovations, and she states 
that Bond’s presentation of non-totalizable radical innocence is his response 
to the problem of representation after Auschwitz (83-85). Overall, 
Gritzner’s argument remains ambiguous as to whether Bond’s dramaturgy 
reflects his Marxist humanism that upholds the power of reason or Adorno’s 
aesthetics of negativity that is critical of rationality. As Gritzner indicates, 
the dramaturgical shift in Bond’s recent plays makes it difficult to see these 
plays as propelled by a rational Marxist-humanist vision although Bond 
never discards his Marxist-humanist sentiments. Contrary to Gritzner’s 
statement that this recent shift ‘weakens’ Bond’s insistence on the power of 
rationality, I will argue that this dramaturgical shift demonstrates a 
necessary continuation of Bond’s theoretical exploration that posits the role 
of reason in a more complex structure of subjectivity. Considering Bond’s 
new conception of subjectivity based on his reflections on the Holocaust, 
the way he incorporates his theory of subjectivity into his dramaturgy, and 
his conscious dismissal of Beckett, I agree with Gritzner that Adorno’s 
theory can be fruitful in evaluating the significance of Bond’s recent work 
and theory.  
Another study that examines the relationship between dramaturgy and 
Auschwitz is Élisabeth Angel-Perez’s Voyages au Bout du Possible: Les 
Théâtres du Traumatisme de Samuel Beckett à Sarah Kane (2006). 
Angel-Perez bases her analysis of British contemporary ‘post-Auchwitz’ 
drama on the idea of Auschwitz as traumatism instead of a historical event, 
and she states clearly that what interests her is ‘the decontexualization of 
Auschwitz’ that endows the works with ‘transgression, contraint and 
novelty’ (2006: 16). For her, the task of post-Auschwitz drama is both to 
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find a new dramatic language that exposes the dehumanizing horror and to 
use Auschwitz as a parable to remember the atrocities in our recent history 
(20). Angel-Perez’s research covers Bond’s The War Plays and At the 
Inland Sea. Although both Gritzner and Angel-Perez point out that the 
chronotope of ‘after Auschwitz’ is indispensable in understanding Bond’s 
later work, how this chronotope operates requires further examination.  
In addition to Auschwitz, the prominence of the war as a dramatic 
trope in Bond’s work also aroused the attention of scholars. In David 
Lescot’s Dramaturgies de la Guerre (2001), he analyzes Bond’s The War 
Plays and Coffee as exemplary of plays that, instead of representing ‘the 
action of war’ on stage, engage with ‘the state of war’ to critically reflect 
and scrutinize broader social and political circumstances entailed in war. 
Lescot’s study keenly captures the configuration of the state of war as the 
essential driving force of Bond’s later dramaturgy. According to Lescot, 
Bond’s dramaturgy of war exemplifies his critique of liberalism, in which 
economic activity and the process of production are intrinsically dominated 
by the principle of war (230). However, since his study was published in 
2001, the same year as the September 11 attacks, Lescot does not examine 
how Bond’s later plays respond to the ‘War on Terror’. In Julia Boll’s The 
New War Plays from Kane to Harris (2013), despite the fact that she only 
mentions briefly that Bond’s The Chair Plays (Chair, Have I None, and The 
Under Room) illustrate a dystopian future when the camp becomes the 
political space in which the state of exception is already normalized (76), 
her inclusion of Bond’s later plays within the post-Cold War ideological 
contexts represented by the New World Order and the ‘War on Terror’ 
deserves further inquiry.9 
 
Methodology 
 
Considering that Bond’s early plays have been thoroughly discussed by 
                                                
9 For my analysis of Bond’s The Chair Plays, see ‘Edward Bond’s Dramaturgy of Crisis in 
The Chair Plays: The Dystopian Imagination and the Imagination in Dystopia’ (2016) in 
Platform 10:2: 32-50.  
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scholars, I focus my research on the theory, dramaturgy, and theatre practice 
of the later Bond, the area that has been comparatively neglected. As Jenny 
Spencer points out, to theorize Bond’s dramatic practice requires a method 
that neither bypasses Bond’s theory nor takes it for granted, and she states 
that Bond’s plays themselves are richer than his theory (3). Although 
Spencer suggests that it is impossible to ignore Bond’s theory, instead of 
providing a detailed account of Bond’s theory, she focuses on analyzing 
Bond’s dramatic strategies. Since Bond only began to articulate his theory 
of subjectivity when Spencer made her observation in the early 1990s, 
Spencer could not foresee the complexity and significance of Bond’s 
subsequent theoretical writings. Hence, given the fact that Bond’s later 
dramaturgy is deeply permeated by his theory of subjectivity, it is vital to 
explicate the interdependent relationship of Bond’s later theory to his 
dramaturgy.  
However, I need to unravel some intricacies of explicating Bond’s 
theory of subjectivity. First, in his early writings, Bond already articulated 
his conception of the self, especially how the self is related to violence and 
society. The particularity of his later theory resides in the fact that he 
consistently uses self-coined terms such as ‘neonate’ and ‘radical innocence’ 
to construct a comprehensive discourse. Second, while Bond never 
explicitly states the chronological trajectory of his theoretical development, 
it is obvious that he is concerned with different aspects of subjectivity in 
different periods. Therefore, in order to understand the hidden logic of this 
theory, it is necessary to attend to the chronological order of Bond’s 
theoretical writings. Third, Bond does not reveal his entire theory in any 
specific writing; therefore, it is usually necessary to draw on several 
writings written during the same period of time for clarification. Finally, in 
addition to explicating Bond’s theory, I need to point out the contradictions 
and problems in it. In order to do this, my approach is two-fold: I will reveal 
the hidden conceptual sources drawn on by Bond and situate Bond’s theory 
within the context of theorizing post-Auschwitz subjectivity. Granted that 
subjectivity is a highly-contested concept in contemporary European 
philosophy and may bear different meanings in different philosophers’ 
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theories, there are many possible frameworks to contextualize Bond’s 
theory. Nevertheless, I choose to underscore Bond’s theory as his response 
to the problem of post-Auschwitz subjectivity in relation to the theories of 
Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas because I will argue that this 
contextualization can best bring out the intricate relations of the theory of 
subjectivity to ethics and aesthetics in Bond’s later writings.  
Instead of analyzing his later plays according to chronology, thematic 
concerns, or dramatic strategies, I divide my analysis into three parts: 
Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, the structure of Bondian 
trauma-tragedy, and the ethics in Bond’s TIE plays. Since Bond articulates 
his theory of subjectivity as his response to Auschwitz, it is important to 
evaluate if and how his theory is incorporated with and demonstrated 
through his dramaturgy. Moreover, since Bond’s later plays are not limited 
to representing Auschwitz but are more concerned with a new contemporary 
form of tragedy, I will analyze Bond’s exploration of contemporary tragedy 
through the concepts of the Tragic and trauma in his theory of subjectivity.  
Regarding Bond’s TIE plays, I will analyze the ethical implications of 
these plays through Bond’s theory of subjectivity and his post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy. Although I am aware that these plays could also be studied in 
the context of Theatre in Education in Britain, the approach of applied 
theatre, which may require completely different methods such as 
practice-based research, fieldwork and participatory observation in schools, 
is beyond the purpose and scope of this thesis.10 It is also notable that, 
                                                
10 I visited Big Brum’s office in Birmingham in February 2015. Dan Brown provided me 
with unpublished documents and allowing me access to their archives. I also conducted an 
interview with Chris Cooper about Bond’s dramaturgy and theory. Although these 
materials, due to the reason I stated above, cannot be included in the thesis, they give me 
invaluable insight into how Big Brum uses Bond’s TIE plays in their TIE programmes. For 
research on Bond’s TIE plays and theory in the context of Theatre in Education, see the 
essays collected in Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child: Edward Bond’s Plays for Young 
People (2005), edited by David Davis. Davis also discusses Bondian drama as a new form 
of Drama in Education in Imaging the Real: Towards a New Theory of Drama in Education 
(2014). Roger Wooster situates Big Brum in the context of British TIE history and 
discusses Bond’s latest TIE play, The Angry Road (2015), in Theatre in Education in 
Britain: Origins, Development and Influence (2016). Helen Nicholson’s Theatre & 
Education (2009) discusses Bond’s viewpoints on education and situates his TIE plays in a 
wider context of Theatre in Education. For book chapters on Bond and TIE, see Chris 
Cooper’s ‘The Imagination in Action’ (2013a) and ‘Performer in TIE’ (2013b). Journal for 
Drama in Education Vol. 20, Issue 2 is a special issue dedicated to Bond. For other journal 
articles, see Helen Nicholson’s ‘Acting, Creativity and Social Justice in Edward Bond’s 
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although Bond has been writing TIE plays for Big Brum, he does not 
participate in designing TIE programmes based on his plays. In addition, his 
TIE plays are not only intended to be used for TIE but can also be staged for 
public performance in theatre. In other words, since Bond never conceives 
his TIE plays as solely being part of TIE programmes, it is possible to 
analyze these plays independently of the practical context of Theatre in 
Education. However, since Bond conceives these plays for the purpose of 
education, I will define Bond’s TIE plays as new learning plays after 
Auschwitz that respond to Adorno’s ideas on post-Auschwitz education.  
In addition to analyzing Bond’s theory and dramaturgy, I will also 
analyze performances of Bond’s plays by drawing on archival materials and 
my live theatrical experiences. Although my research focuses on the later 
Bond, it is impossible to understand the later Bond without comprehending 
the early Bond. In addition to relying on existing published materials, I 
visited archives to familiarize myself with Bond’s early theatrical 
involvements. The English Stage Company/Royal Court Theatre Archive 
held at the V&A Theatre and Performance Collections in London includes 
documents, correspondence, and photographs related to the productions of 
Bond’s plays from The Pope’s Wedding (1962) to Restoration (1981) at the 
Royal Court. William Gaskill’s documents archived at the University of 
Leeds Special Collections in Leeds is informative about Gaskill’s early 
cooperation with Bond and his reception of Brecht. The productions of The 
Woman (1978) and Summer (1982), both of which were directed by Bond, 
are archived at the National Theatre Archive in London and are valuable for 
assessing Bond’s directorial practice. I also consulted archival materials of 
the RSC productions of Bingo (1976), The Bundle (1978), The Fool (1981), 
Lear (1982), The War Plays (1985), Restoration (1988), and In the 
Company of Men (1996), held by the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust in 
Stratford-upon-Avon, and the television recordings of Bingo (1990) and 
Tuesday (1993), archived at the BFI National Archive in London. While I 
may not directly refer to these early materials in my thesis, they have 
                                                                                                                       
The Children’ (2003), and David Allen’s ‘“Going to the Centre”: Edward Bond’s The 
Children’ (2007). 
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consolidated and enriched my understanding of Bond’s theatre. In fact, 
considering that Bond always conceives his plays based on concrete 
theatrical images and that part of his theory revolves around mise-en-scène, 
performance, and spectatorship in theatre, these archival materials provide 
invaluable information about Bond’s early theatre practice in relation to his 
dramaturgy and theory.  
I also consulted some more recent video recordings that are directly 
related to my thesis. These include: Françon’s The War Plays (l’Odéon, 
1995), Coffee (la Colline, 2000), The Crime of the Twenty-First Century (la 
Colline, 2001), and Have I None (la Colline, 2003), archived by Ina 
THEQUE; Françon’s Born (2006) and Chair (2006), archived at the Theatre 
de la Colline in Paris; the RSC’s The Great Peace (1985) and In the 
Company of Men (1996), held at the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust; Sean 
Holmes’s Saved (Lyric Hammersmith, 2011) and Jonathan Kent’s The Sea 
(Royal Haymarket, 2008), archived at the V&A’s National Video Archive 
of Performance; and Chris Cooper’s The Under Room (2005), The Edge 
(2011), and The Broken Bowl (2012), archived by Big Brum in Birmingham. 
Although these recordings are useful for reconstructing the past 
performances, they can never replace live experiences. My reflections on 
Bond’s theory of theatre will draw on both these recordings and my 
experiences of attending Big Brum’s production of The Angry Roads at mac 
in Birmingham in 2015 and Dea, directed by Bond at Sutton Theatre in 
2016. Although my performance analysis is primarily based on my 
experience as a spectator, in order to consolidate my analysis, I will also 
draw on press reviews, interviews, and other production documentation.  
 
Thesis Overview 
 
One of the premises of this thesis is that ‘Commentary on The War Plays’ 
marks a watershed in both Bond’s theory and dramaturgy. In this 
commentary, Bond proposes two essential ideas that will define his later 
theory, dramaturgy, and theatre practice: radical innocence and the Theatre 
Event. The aim of this thesis is to trace how Bond starts with the ideas 
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conceived in this commentary to develop his theory of subjectivity, a new 
form of contemporary tragedy, and a new approach to staging. However, 
this does not mean that this watershed is a complete break from his early 
work – rather, in order to fruitfully engage with his later theory and 
dramaturgy, it is important to point out the continuity and discontinuity 
between the early Bond and the later Bond.  
Therefore, in Chapter One, ‘Towards the Later Bond’, I provide a 
narrative to bridge these two phases by analyzing Bond’s relationship with 
Brecht and Bond’s dramaturgy of the Holocaust. Given the fact that Bond is 
usually considered to be one of the British playwrights influenced by Brecht, 
it may seem curious that he harshly criticizes Brecht’s alienation effects – 
which emphasize the role of reason over that of affect – as the ‘Theatre of 
Auschwitz’ in his later writings.11 More intriguingly, Bond explicitly bases 
his later dramaturgy on his reflections on the problem of ‘Auschwitz’ – a 
chronotope that, instead of referring to any specific historical event, denotes 
a general political-juridical structure in which the human subject is 
confronted with extreme ethical difficulties. Moreover, Bond associates the 
ethos of Auschwitz with that of neoliberal capitalism – a theoretical 
stipulation characteristic of the Frankfurt School. In other words, Bond’s 
criticism of Brecht is not arbitrary, but it can be logically deduced from his 
later theory in which he regards the role of reason as instrumental and 
ideologically corrupt, a concept that is also reminiscent of the Frankfurt 
School’s critique of Enlightenment rationality. To balance the role of reason 
as a human faculty, Bond proposes imagination as another faculty essential 
for the human subject to create ‘humanity’. Parallel to the shift of Bond’s 
critical engagement with Brecht is his evolving dramaturgy of the Holocaust 
– that is, the framework through which the Holocaust is represented is 
determined by how the relationship between self and society is defined. 
Bond’s evolving dramaturgy of the Holocaust reflects how he changes his 
conception of the subject. Therefore, I will bring into focus Bond’s theory 
                                                
11 Both Janelle Reinelt’s After Brecht: British Epic Theatre (1996) and Michael Patterson’s 
Strategies of Political Theatre: Post-War British Playwrights (2003) include Bond as an 
example to demonstrate Brecht’s influence on post-war British playwriting. Hirst’s and 
Spencer’s monographs also discuss Brecht’s influence on Bond.  
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of subjectivity and its relation to ethics and dramaturgy by situating the later 
Bond in the context of post-Auschwitz ethics and aesthetics. I will also 
foreground the biopolitical implication of Bond’s conception of the subject 
in his later theory and dramaturgy.  
Based on the contextualization in Chapter One, in Chapter Two, 
‘Understanding Humanness: Theorizing and Dramatizing Subjectivity’, I 
will explore Bond’s theory of subjectivity in more detail. In fact, Bond’s 
theorization of subjectivity is intertwined with his conception of 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, the subject of the next chapter. In order to 
facilitate my use of Bond’s theoretical terms, first I need to analyze Bond’s 
theory of subjectivity and critically contextualize my deployment of it. My 
analysis starts with Bond’s articulation of radical innocence in 
‘Commentary on The War Plays’ and how radical innocence is related to the 
concept of justice. In Bond’s subsequent writings, he complicates his theory 
of subjectivity by conceiving two models: the developmental model and the 
structural model. While the developmental model consists of three phases of 
the development of the subject – the neonate, the core self, and the 
socialized self – the structural model emphasizes that the subject is 
determined by the interaction between reason and imagination. Bond’s two 
models are conceived to understand how the subject is formed within a 
broader social-political-economic structure and the possible agency of the 
subject within the structure. I will demonstrate that Bond’s theory derives 
from Kant and Sigmund Freud, and then I will examine this model in the 
context of theorizing post-Auschwitz subjectivity by drawing on Adorno 
and Levinas to problematize Bond’s theory of the subject. Finally, I will 
analyze Have I None (2000) and The Crime of the Twenty-First Century 
(2001) to demonstrate how Bond’s theory of subjectivity, wherein there 
may be self-contradiction, is incorporated in his dramaturgy.  
Following the explication of Bond’s theory of subjectivity, in Chapter 
Three, ‘Aesthetics and Ethics in Bond’s Post-Auschwitz Dramaturgy’, I will 
demonstrate that the Palermo improvisation, the improvisation conducive to 
the concept of radical innocence, is also a dramaturgical unit. I will analyze 
the significance of the Palermo improvisation as the dramaturgical 
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prototype of Bond’s later work by drawing on Adorno’s and Levinas’s 
theories of aesthetics and ethics. By bringing their theories and Bond’s 
drama into a critical dialogue, I will advance a tentative 
Adornian-Levinasian model to understand Bond’s post-Auschwitz 
representation. Based on this model, I will discuss Bond’s Coffee and Born, 
both of which represent the Holocaust based on his unique conception of 
human subjectivity. 
Continuing my discussion of Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, in 
Chapter Four, ‘The Structure of Bondian Trauma-Tragedy: Justice, Truth, 
and Madness’, I aim to explore how his theory of subjectivity is realized in 
his tragedy through the concept of trauma. Although Bond asserts that 
drama must start from Auschwitz, in his later plays he by no means 
addresses the problem of Auschwitz explicitly in every play. Instead, 
tragedy is a more appropriate term to describe his later plays. Bond’s 
tragedy is based on his concepts of ‘the Tragic’ and trauma articulated in his 
theory of subjectivity as well as on his reconfiguration of archetypal 
characters such as Antigone, Oedipus and Medea. In answering how this 
dramaturgy responds to the problems of the contemporary world, I will 
analyze Chair (2000), People (2005), and Dea (2016) to demonstrate how 
Bond’s theory of subjectivity is structurally related to his dramaturgy of 
trauma-tragedy, which revolves around the problems of justice, truth and 
madness.  
In Chapter Five, ‘Approaching Otherness: Storyability, Spectrality, and 
Hospitality in Bond’s TIE Plays’, I will investigate how Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity is incorporated within the dramaturgy of his TIE plays. As I 
mentioned previously, Bond does not dramaturgically differentiate his TIE 
plays from other plays – in fact, they usually share similar traits in terms of 
dramaturgy and thematic concerns. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Bond 
has in mind his young audiences when he writes his TIE plays. Therefore, in 
order to address the aspect of education in these plays, and to bring into 
focus the relationship between Auschwitz and education, I will define 
Bond’s TIE plays as new learning plays after Auschwitz that are responsive 
to Adorno’s ideas on education and autonomy after Auschwitz. In particular, 
 34 
I will focus on how the ethical concern for the other as a specific mode of 
teaching and learning operates in Bond’s TIE plays by interrogating 
storyability, spectrality, and hospitality – three interrelated concepts that are 
conducive to addressing the problem of otherness. This chapter examines 
the TIE plays that exemplify Bond’s dramaturgy of otherness: At the Inland 
Sea (1995), The Under Room (2005), A Window (2009), The Hungry Bowl 
(2012), The Edge (2012), and The Angry Roads (2014).  
While the preceding chapters revolve around Bond’s theory and 
dramaturgy, in the final chapter, Chapter Six, ‘Theatre Event: Performing 
Subjectivities’, I will explicate Bond’s concepts of subjectivity and the 
Theatre Event as concepts applicable to theatrical practice by analyzing how 
Bond’s later plays have been performed. First, I will explicate Bond’s 
theory of theatre be analyzing ideas such as ‘Theatre Event’ and ‘accident 
time’. Second, I will clarify the ethics of spectatorship in Bond’s theatre – 
based on my spectating experience, I will reflect on how Bond’s dramaturgy 
of paradox invites the spectator to engage with ethical problems without 
giving definite answers. Moreover, since this ethics of spectatorship is 
decided not only by Bond’s dramaturgy but also by directorial choices and 
the actor’s approach to performance, the third aim of my performance 
analysis is to examine how concrete performances are involved in the 
production of the ethical dimensions of Bond’s theatre. 
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Chapter One 
Towards the Later Bond  
 
In order to understand the continuity and discontinuity between the early 
Bond and the later Bond, re-examining Bond’s engagement and 
disagreement with Brecht is a suitable point of departure. In fact, in 
defending Bond’s new political aesthetic, Kate Katafiasz bases her 
argument on differentiating the later Bond from Brecht and argues that the 
later Bond is not well understood. While Katafiasz acknowledges that 
parallels between Bond and Brecht exist, and that Bond’s criticism of 
Brecht may be based on misunderstanding, she argues that Bond’s radical 
shift away from Brechtian aesthetics resides in ‘understanding our own 
unconscious impulses in a personal confrontation between experience and 
consciousness’ rather than relying on any existing standards of judgment 
(250).12 Although I agree that the later Bond is different from Brecht in 
terms of theory and dramaturgy, I will argue that it is equally important to 
clarify Brecht’s influences on Bond and Bond’s misunderstanding of Brecht. 
In addition, I also find Katafiasz’s description of the later Bond could be 
nuanced further – it is questionable whether Bond’s later theory of 
subjectivity can be defined by terms such as ‘unconscious impulses’ and 
‘personal confrontation’. Although Bond is influenced by Freud’s theory, he 
never explicitly uses the concept of the unconscious; instead, he focuses on 
the roles of consciousness and self-consciousness in shaping human 
subjectivity. When he uses the term ‘the unconscious’, this concept is 
related to the process of how the unconscious is incorporated into 
consciousness. Furthermore, since ‘personal’ implies the concept of 
‘personhood’ or ‘the individual’, it may not be the most accurate term in 
describing Bond’s post-Auschwitz theory of subjectivity, which emphasizes 
how the constant confrontation between the inner potential of the self and 
                                                
12 Katafiasz’s article, ‘Quarrelling with Brecht: Understanding Bond’s Post-Structuralist 
Political Aesthetic’ (2008), is mainly a critical response to David Allen’s ‘“Going to the 
Centre”: Edward Bond’s The Children’ (2007) and ‘Between Brecht and Bond’ (2005). It is 
apparent that critical attempts to align Bond and Brecht or differentiate them still constitute 
a major strand of Bondian scholarship.  
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the ideologized world is a constituting force that keeps transforming the self 
and the world.  
 Moreover, whereas Katafiasz regards Bond’s relationship with Brecht 
as a ‘quarrel’, I will argue that Bond’s criticism of Brecht’s theatre as the 
‘Theatre of Auschwitz’ is a misjudgment. By ‘Theatre of Auschwitz’, Bond 
means that Brecht’s theatre is dominated by rationality and therefore 
duplicates the similar logic of instrumental rationality in operation in the 
Holocaust. However, this interpretation of Brecht is highly simplified and 
incorrect. In Brecht’s early writings on epic theatre, especially in ‘Notes on 
the Opera Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny’ (1930), in order to make 
a contrast with dramatic theatre, he adopted a simplified and usually 
misunderstood dichotomy between feeling and rationality to foreground the 
distinct features of acting in epic theatre. From the late 1930s, however, 
Brecht started to revise his theory and treat emotions in a dialectical relation 
with rationality. For example, in ‘Short Description of a New Technique of 
Acting That Produces a Verfremdung Effect’ (1940), Brecht states:  
 
[T]he technique producing a V-effect is the exact opposite of 
that aiming at empathy. The actors applying it are bound not 
to try to bring about the empathy operation.  
Yet in their efforts to reproduce particular characters and 
show their behaviour, the actors need not renounce the means 
of empathy entirely. (2015: 184) 
 
Also, in a conversation with Friedrich Wolf in 1949, faced with Wolf’s 
question about the role of emotions in theatre, Brecht remarked that epic 
theatre ‘by no means renounces emotions […]. The “critical attitude” that it 
tries to awaken in its audience cannot be passionate enough for it’ (264). In 
other words, except some of his early writings, Brecht never excludes the 
existence of feelings and emotions in his theatre. Instead, what he resists is 
‘the double identification of spectator with actor and actor with role’ 
(Gordon 231). In Brecht’s theatre, the interruption of this ‘double 
identification’ does not exclude emotions but places emotions under the 
critical judgment of the actor and the spectator. In this regard, Bond’s 
theatre that emphasizes the combination of imagination and reason is not 
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theoretically different from Brecht’s.  
Moreover, not only theoretically, but also practically it is impossible to 
regard Brecht’s theatre as devoid of emotions – especially when we 
consider the emotional power aroused by his 1949 production of Mother 
Courage and Her Children that was played before German audiences who 
had just experienced the atrocities of war.13 In addition, as John Fuegi’s 
study of Brecht’s productions demonstrates, although various techniques of 
Verfremdung may be deployed in rehearsals, they may possibly be invisible 
once the play is mounted on stage (146). We should therefore be cautious 
about the gap between Brecht’s theory and practice since some of the acting 
exercises may only be used during rehearsals to help actors to gain objective 
and critical distance towards a play.  
Although I regard Bond’s criticism of Brecht as a misjudgment, a 
clarification of Bond’s relationship with Brecht can still be fruitful in 
delineating how Bond moves towards his later stage of dramaturgy and 
theory. In fact, the importance of Bond’s critical engagement with Brecht 
resides in the fact that it demonstrates Bond’s changing view of human 
nature and its relation to dramaturgy. In the following, I will first explicate 
Bond’s relationship to Brecht, and then I will analyze Bond’s evolving 
dramaturgy of the Holocaust. Since Bond’s disagreement with Brecht 
originates from his understanding of the Holocaust, instead of relying on 
Bond’s simplified criticism of Brecht, it is more productive to analyze how 
Bond dramatizes the Holocaust. Based on this analysis, I will proceed to 
place this dramaturgy in the intersection of post-Auschwitz theories of 
subjectivity, ethics, and aesthetics by drawing on Adorno and Levinas. I 
conclude this chapter by incorporating these strands of analysis and 
proposing that Bond’s later theatre is based on his understanding of 
Auschwitz, rather than as a singular historical event, as an exemplary 
structure of biopolitics, manifested as the camp and neoliberal capitalist 
system. 
 
                                                
13 For a detailed account of this production and its reception, see John Fuegi’s Bertolt 
Brecht: Chaos, According to Plan (1987: 110-31).  
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1.1. Bond and Brecht 
 
In order to understand Bond’s relationship to Brecht, I will argue that, since 
this relationship is a dynamically evolving process, it is more appropriate to 
adopt a genealogical approach that traces the trajectory of this dynamism 
instead of trying to present a static description. Bond’s first detailed account 
of his Brechtian influence is ‘On Brecht: a Letter to Peter Holland’ (1972), 
in which he acknowledges his indebtedness to Brecht. Nevertheless, 38 
years later, in ‘Letter on Brecht’ (2000), he unrelentingly denounces 
Brecht’s theatre as the ‘Theatre of Auschwitz’ (2000b: 171). To fully 
understand why Bond changed his attitude towards Brecht in such a drastic 
manner, I will start with the analysis of his 1972 letter.  
This is how Bond ends the letter: ‘Brecht’s contribution to the creation 
of a marxist theatre is enormous and lasting, but the work is not yet finished’ 
(1972: 35). Bond indicates that he and Brecht share a common theatrical 
project of constructing a ‘Marxist’ theatre, and he considers his drama as the 
continuation of this project. For Bond, a ‘Marxist’ theatre approaches and 
represents reality through the lens of the social instead of the individual. He 
disagreed with one of the actors in Saved who remarked that his character is 
a nice person who could never commit murder since he thought this remark 
suggests that ‘no nice guys fought for Hitler or helped to run Auschwitz’ 
(ibid.). Bond is aware of the fact that, in order to represent the structural 
causes of historical events such as Auschwitz, psychological realism is 
insufficient because this type of theatre tends to focus on the psychology of 
the individual instead of foregrounding social structures. It is Brecht’s epic 
theatre that Bond regards as the appropriate dramaturgy to account for how 
the individual is determined and structured socially. Despite his 
acknowledgment of the strength of epic theatre, Bond questions the 
effectiveness of Verfremdung and proposes ‘aggro-effects’ as a more 
efficient device to commit the audience (34).  
Regarding aggro-effects, Bond states: ‘In contrast to Brecht, I think it 
is necessary to disturb an audience emotionally […], so I’ve had to find 
ways of making that “aggro-effect” more complete’ (Bond and Innes 113). 
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The use of ‘aggro-effects’, which Bond defines as a dramatic device to 
disturb audiences emotionally, is a means to dramatize the symptoms of the 
inherent violence of a suppressing society. In ‘Author’s Note: On Violence’ 
(1977), Bond proposes that ‘[v]iolence is not a function of human nature but 
of human societies’ (1977: 17). By ‘function’, Bond refers both to the 
violence used by the ruling class to maintain the unjust structure of society 
and to the violence used by the oppressed in resistance to structural 
inequality. By defining violence sociologically instead of biologically, Bond 
dismisses the idea that human beings are innately violent, an idea that he 
regards as the excuse of authorities to construct law and order to perpetuate 
the status quo. Bond thus defines human nature: ‘Human nature is not fixed 
at birth, it is created through our relation to the culture of our society’ (12). 
In this regard, the teenagers stoning a baby to death in Saved are not 
intrinsically aggressive. Their crime is only symptomatic of an indifferent 
society, and their aggression is the result of their interaction with the culture 
that imposes structural violence on the oppressed.  
Bond’s conception of ‘human nature’ at this early stage is also 
illustrated in his ‘Author’s Preface’ to Lear (1972), in which he relates the 
concept of justice to that of human nature: ‘Justice is allowing people to live 
in the way for which they evolve. Human beings have an emotional and 
physical need to do so, it is their biological expectation’ (1978: 10; my 
emphasis). He also states that ‘[a]ny organization which denies the basic 
need for biological justice must become aggressive’ (9; my emphasis). The 
connotations of terms such as ‘biological expectation’ and ‘biological 
justice’ seem at odds with Bond’s suggestion that aggression should be 
understood sociologically instead of biologically, and this explains why he 
later coined the term ‘radical innocence’ to evade explicit biological 
connotations. Furthermore, Bond’s initial conception of human nature, 
defined as ‘biological expectation’ to seek ‘biological justice’, explains the 
violence erupting out of ‘an unidentified discontent’ (Bond 1977: 15) in 
Saved. It should be noted, therefore, that Bond’s use of ‘aggro-effects’ is a 
device to theatricalize his conception of human nature, the biological 
undertones of which correspond to ‘environmental determinism’ (Lacey 149) 
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as the underlying dramaturgical logic.  
Bond’s use of violence was the first of his attempts to construct a 
theatrical theory different from Brecht’s. In opposition to Brecht’s analysis 
demonstrated by the V-effect, Bond argues that his use of shock ‘is justified 
by the desperation of the situation or as a way of forcing the audience to 
search for reasons in the rest of the play’ (ibid.; my emphasis). As Michael 
Patterson observes, the disconcerting power of the baby-stoning scene 
mainly derives from the way the violence is presented as if it is only a game 
out of control (412). Without making any comments or even condemnation, 
Bond’s dramaturgical strategy is to reveal the violence as a symptom of the 
indifference permeating society in an objective manner so as to make 
audiences ‘search for reasons’ behind the violence. Hubert Zapf also 
correctly points out that, in contrast to Brecht's depiction of class inequality 
in the personalized form of the exploiter and the exploited, Bond’s 
symptomatic representation of violence which originates from increasing 
impersonality and rationalization reflects the phenomenon of alienation in 
contemporary Western society in a more accurate manner (356).  
From the mid-1970s, contrary to the expectation that Bond might 
develop from the device of aggro-effects a new post-Brechtian theory of 
theatre, his theory turned out to be more and more influenced by Brecht and 
Karl Marx. One of the most important pivotal points around which Brecht 
and Bond think about theatre is the relationship between human nature and 
society. For Brecht, ‘[t]he human essence is, as the classics put it, the 
ensemble of all societal relations of all times’ (2014: 92). The ‘classics’ 
refers to Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (1845), in which he states that ‘the 
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations’ (172). In German Ideology 
(1846), Marx and Friedrich Engels continue this strand of thinking by 
declaring that ‘men, developing their material production and their material 
intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the 
products of their thinking’ (Marx 180-1). Therefore, for Marx and Engels, it 
is the development of material production that determines human 
consciousness. If the transformation of consciousness presupposes the 
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alteration of material conditions, how does theatre facilitate such 
transformation? This is the principal task of Brecht’s construction of a 
Marxist theatre, the dramaturgical logic of which is that, although theatre 
can hardly intervene to change material production in a concrete sense, it is 
capable of demonstrating the possibilities of change. In ‘Short Organum’ 
(1949), Brecht states that ‘materialist dialectic […] treats social situations as 
processes and seeks out their contradictory nature’ (2015: 242). Therefore, 
the V-effect presents an object in a strange way that prevents empathy in 
order to historicize the driving forces of society and relativize the 
‘naturalness’ of certain behaviours to make them manipulable (241). The 
expected effect is to stimulate change in reality by shifting interpretations of 
reality in the analogous theatrical world (Brooker 210).  
As Brecht’s theory and his aim of theatrical practice are thus 
understood, it is not difficult to decipher how Bond inherits Brecht’s 
theoretical legacy in ‘A Note on Dramatic Method’ (1978), in which Bond 
attempts to connect his Marxist idea of human consciousness with the aim 
of theatrical art. Bond defines the nature of human consciousness as the 
consequence of a particular society and assumes that the change of society 
requires the change of human consciousness (1996: 123). Moreover, he 
specifies that the new self-consciousness is created by the working class 
because only through the interaction between workers and established 
institutions can the accepted values of the ruling class be questioned and 
confronted (124-5). Regarding how theatre can influence the transformation 
of human consciousness, Bond argues as follows:  
 
Theatre can validate human standards, ways of living, ethical 
decisions, understanding, by demonstrating the relation of 
cause and effect in practical human life and not merely in 
concept or theory. […] In this way experience is not merely 
recorded randomly but is set in a moral order of reason and 
judgment. An audience can then see what human beings are 
and what are the standards, practices and concepts by which 
they should live. In this way human consciousness is changed. 
(127-28; my emphasis)  
  
Like Brecht, Bond emphasizes that, instead of duplicating human 
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experience, the task of theatre is to demonstrate a specific analysis of 
society in terms of how human beings are defined socially. Successful 
theatricalization of social analysis can develop self-consciousness ‘into 
political consciousness, into class consciousness, in working people’ (134). 
As indicated by Wang’s final remark in The Bundle (‘We live in a time of 
great change. […] To judge rightly what is good – to choose between good 
and evil – that is all that is to be human’ (Bond 1996: 218)), at this stage 
Bond was confident that it is possible to change the audience’s 
consciousness by demonstrating moral judgment and choice.  
In order to facilitate such transformation, Bond was aware of the 
necessity of creating a new acting method. In contrast to the acting method 
of representing a character ‘not so much as an individual but as a class 
function’ (1996: 135), Bond intended to demonstrate his analysis of class 
consciousness by retaining the complexity of the individual experience. In a 
notebook entry on 19 March 1976, Bond states: ‘It’s a mistake to show 
people as entirely embodied in their function. One must also show their 
irrationality’ (Stuart 2000: 179). In ‘The Rothbury Papers’ (1978-79), while 
Bond clearly supports Brecht’s idea that human behaviour is determined by 
their class position, what concerned him is how to avoid reducing an 
individual to a ‘façade’ and how to make a class-role ‘truly 
three-dimensional’ (Stuart 2000: 190-91).  
In ‘The Activists Papers’ (1978-80), Bond further interrogates the 
problem of representing class functions in relation to socialist consciousness: 
how can an individual demonstrate the possibility of transforming 
consciousness if that individual has always already been conditioned by 
‘false consciousness’? In order to resolve the difficulty, Bond started to 
deploy a new dramatic device: the public soliloquy, the idea of which 
derives from Bond’s understanding of Shakespearean soliloquies. For Bond, 
in opposition to theocratic determinism prior to Shakespeare’s age, in a 
soliloquy a character can start to reflect on the world from his or her 
subjective self, and this testifies to the birth of a new subjectivity (Bond 
1992: 134). In other words, Bond regards the device of the soliloquy as a 
suitable means to manifest individual autonomy. However, Bond thinks 
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there is a dilemma: 
 
I wanted to give the characters a means of informed, personal 
comment in the play. At the same time I wanted to show the 
force of history, the causes of historical change. This is the 
dilemma. If the working class character isn’t politically 
conscious his subjectivity is false. (137-38) 
 
In order to resolve the dilemma, Bond states that characters should speak 
public soliloquies with historical hindsight and political self-awareness. 
Moreover, he emphasizes that, when characters deliver public soliloquies, 
they should not become the author’s spokesperson but exhibit their potential 
self (139-40). The transition of the use of aggro-effects to the use of the 
public soliloquy is exemplary in demonstrating the shift of Bond’s 
dramaturgy from realism to Brechtianism: while the former is more 
symptomatic of the social structure of oppression, the latter is more 
demonstrative of the potential to alter the structure.  
Another major shift can be discerned in ‘Commentary on The War 
Plays’, in which Bond proposes two ideas essential to his later theory: 
radical innocence and the Theatre Event. Whereas the idea of radical 
innocence lays the foundation for Bond’s later development of his complex 
theory of subjectivity, the idea of the Theatre Event clearly demonstrates 
Bond’s attempt to formulate a new theory of theatre to replace the Brechtian 
V-effect. In fact, however, in this commentary Bond relates radical 
innocence to the Theatre Event only provisionally, and it is not until Bond 
thoroughly formulated his theory of subjectivity in ‘Notes on Imagination’ 
(1994) and ‘The Reason for Theatre’ (1998) that he can synthesize his 
theory of subjectivity and that of theatre to fully reveal the significance of 
the Theatre Event. In other words, it took Bond around twenty years to 
arrive at the point where his theory can differentiate itself from other 
theories as distinctively ‘Bondian’. 
 
1.2. Evolving Dramaturgy of the Holocaust  
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Judging from Bond’s changing relationship with Brecht, it is obvious that 
Bond’s theory and dramaturgy advance according to how he defines the 
relationship between human nature and society. This logic is also reflected 
in Bond’s evolving dramaturgy of the Holocaust. Although the conspicuous 
images of and references to the Holocaust in Bond’s later plays testify to 
how his reflection on Auschwitz is acutely inscribed within his dramaturgy, 
Bond had already started to explore the possibility of dramatic 
representation of the Holocaust when he wrote the libretto for We Come to 
the River (1976), an opera he collaborated on with the German composer 
Hans Werner Henze.  
Henze comments that Bond’s dramaturgical simultaneous juxtaposition 
of the dance music, the execution of the deserter, and a woman in search of 
her husband’s body is reminiscent of the image of a camp orchestra in 
Auschwitz (Hirst 18). At the start of Part Two, the people in the madhouse 
garden sing monologues, one of which explicitly refers to the Holocaust:  
 
I then walked round the mound and found myself in front of a 
large grave. People were closely wedged together and lying 
on top of each other. Only their heads were visible. Nearly all 
had blood running from their heads over their shoulders. […] 
The pit was already two-thirds full. I estimated that it held a 
thousand people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. 
He was an SS man […]. (Bond 1976: 124) 
 
Since this is only one of the six monologues sung by the mad people, it is 
doubtful whether the details can by conveyed clearly to the audience. As 
Malcolm Hay and Philip Roberts point out, the details of the words may 
lose their power when action and music are simultaneously presented (175). 
In addition, since We Come to the River is an opera of political allegory on 
oppression and revolution without identifying clear historical references, the 
image of the Holocaust is only one of the many sufferings presented on 
stage. However, Bond was aware of the particularity of the Holocaust, as he 
states at the end of his introduction to The Fool (also written in 1976): 
‘What Adorno and Auden said about poetry and Auschwitz misses the point. 
They would have hit it only if Auschwitz had been the summing up of 
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history – and of course it wasn’t’ (1987: 79). Obviously, Bond already knew 
Adorno’s dictum that writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric (Adorno 
2003: 162), but he disagreed with Adorno’s dictum because Auschwitz did 
not end history. Bond’s statement implies that it is precisely because people 
are still living after Auschwitz that Auschwitz must be written about and 
represented. After We Come to the River, Summer (1982) is the first play in 
which Bond explicitly deals with the representation of the Holocaust.  
Summer is set in a cliff house facing the sea in Eastern Europe in the 
1980s. It begins with Xenia’s visit to Marthe, who used to be Xenia’s 
servant during the Second World War and now suffers from reticulosis; the 
play ends with Marthe’s death and Xenia’s departure. The play mainly 
revolves around the characters’ recollections of the German invasion of the 
area during the Second World War and how they interpret the events 
according to their class and social status. Marthe, especially, is haunted by 
the traumatic memory, and her impending death aggravates her anxiety 
about the possibility of reconciling with the past.  
Marthe treats death as the most unavoidable thing in human life that 
makes her last chance of happiness possible. Facing death, she seems to 
decide to make the most of the rest of her life; however, after Marthe’s son 
David, who is a doctor, explains details of the disease and its treatment in a 
highly impersonal and specialized medical language, Marthe pleads with 
David to let her kill herself and accuses him of being cruel. She complains 
about the ignorance of younger generations: 
 
Your generation will have no memorial. The sound of a 
whirlwind, the name of a skull: Hiroshima, Nagasaki. People 
turned into shadows on their doorsteps. Human negatives. The 
dead living. (Bond 1992: 367)  
 
In invoking historical atrocities such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, 
Marthe evades what should really be named: Auschwitz. Understandably, 
since the experience of the Holocaust constitutes the core of her trauma, she 
can only expose it by surrogating. Moreover, though unnamed, Auschwitz is 
still evoked through the images of ‘human negatives’ and ‘the dead living’.  
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In contrast to Marthe, Xenia is from the local upper class family, and 
her relatives cooperated with the Germans to establish concentration camps 
on their islands during the war. Marthe was exempted from being sent to the 
camp because of Xenia’s request that she should be saved. The German 
soldiers consented to spare Marthe’s life lest they would be embarrassed by 
the fact that they had murdered Xenia’s servant when they visited Xenia’s 
house. Moreover, Xenia’s father obtained the information about the 
Germans when he dined with them and surreptitiously passed this 
information through Marthe to local partisans. While Xenia regards her 
father’s involuntary cooperation with the Germans as heroic, Marthe deems 
Xenia’s family as structurally complicit with the enemy. She is tormented 
by the guilt of becoming an accomplice of the upper class.  
Later, when Xenia visits the island where there used to be 
concentration camps, she meets a German tourist who was a soldier serving 
on the island during the war. The German tourist also recounts his memory 
of the Holocaust from the perspective of a perpetrator. He remembers there 
was ‘a girl in white’ who used to stand on the terrace and stare at the sea. 
For him and his fellow soldiers, the girl in white – that is, the young Xenia – 
was a symbol of civilization they were fighting for. Troubled by her 
encounter with the German tourist/soldier, Xenia wants to know the exact 
reason why Marthe despises her. Marthe reveals how she understands her 
relation with Xenia: 
 
The foundations of your world were crooked and so 
everything in it was crooked. Your kindness, consideration, 
consistency were meaningless. […] The confusion and 
competition led to such panic and madness that in the end 
there was war. […] Your world was a puppet show. [….] 
They were moved by strings: the factories, banks, 
governments that control our lives. What we do, what we are, 
depends on the relationship between us and such things. […] 
But when those relations are just we will live justly. Kindness 
will have its meaning. Justice and mercy will be one. (Bond 
1992: 392-93) 
 
Marthe’s response functions as the mouthpiece for Bond’s political 
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perspective based on a Marxist analysis of class structure. She attributes the 
war to the distortion of class structure – therefore, any personal mercy or 
kindness exercised under the structure is ‘meaningless’ since mercy and 
kindness must be founded on justice.  
As Bond describes, Summer is ‘a pattern play […] where events are 
plotted so as to be a diagram of history, where the characters represent 
forces’ and ‘an examination of a real event, where the historical forces can 
be seen’ (Stuart 2001b: 52-3). Jenny Spencer, however, characterizes the 
play as ‘Chekhovian’ (205), and points out that ‘the problem of representing 
the Holocaust in a naturalistic manner has to do with the impossibility […] 
from a liberal humanist perspective that focuses so intently on the individual’ 
(213). However, Summer undeniably is also a Brechtian play, and Bond 
acknowledges that the way he treats ‘the individual as a social subject’ was 
influenced by Brecht (Stuart 1994a: 86). Instead of ‘focusing intently on the 
individual’, the dramaturgical tension between Chekhovian individuation 
and Brechtian abstraction is consciously maintained by Bond in this play. 
Each character’s perspective mainly stems from their class position 
concerning the Holocaust (Patraka 32). Although the dramaturgy of 
representing collectives through individuals may schematically represent the 
conflicts between classes, this dramaturgy may well evade the conflicts 
within classes. Moreover, even if Summer succeeds in demonstrating 
collective forces behind history through individual actions, it is still dubious 
to restrict the cause of the Holocaust only to class structure.  
About ten years later, Bond wrote Coffee (1994), which also deals with 
the Holocaust – specifically, the Babi Yar massacre in 1941. However, in 
contrast to Summer, there is hardly a coherent narrative to be assembled in 
Coffee. Rather, although there are still some historical snippets of the 
Holocaust, history is destabilized by the workings of imagination and 
fictionalization. In Coffee, the characters are summoned more like human 
figures who embody the possibilities and limits of subjectivity. The most 
important distinction between Coffee and Summer lies in their presupposed 
epistemological models: while Summer is constructed as a message about 
the structural affinity between the Holocaust and class, Coffee consists of a 
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series of extreme situations and ethical decisions without suggesting any 
definite answers. Regarding massacres and drama, Bond states:  
 
Massacres are occasional. But they are decisive – they turn 
place into theatre – and later, from them, distant people learn 
the lessons of general humanness. And so, in time, people 
behave more humanely – among other things they do not 
listen to the orator and so no longer give the leaders power to 
order soldiers to send children to be killed. (2000b: 80) 
 
For Bond, historical events are like theatrical events, which might serve as 
lessons of humanity for later generations. Drama, in this regard, is important 
since it is the means of redramatizing the events and activating the ethical 
sensibility of the audience. Representing historical events, therefore, is not a 
question of historical accuracy but a question of urgency and efficiency in 
implicating the audience into the paradox of extreme situations – there is no 
difference between reality and imagined history in such urgency once the 
spectator’s mind is dramatized. As Bond states, ‘[t]he dramatist’s skill is […] 
enacting situations which are critical to “being”’ (186).  
In ‘Notes on Coffee for le Théâtre National de la Colline’ (2000), Bond 
states that the dramaturgy of Coffee is governed by two logics: the logic of 
imagination and the logic of reality (165). These two logics determine the 
formal construction of Coffee: the normal world of the protagonist, Nold, is 
interrupted by Gregory, who leads Nold first to the imaginative world of the 
forest and then to the ravine of the Babi Yar massacre. History in Coffee is 
not to be recounted and worked through as in Summer – rather, history itself 
returns as an extra-ordinary experience that not only questions the 
self-identity of Nold but fractures the dramatic structure as in Kane’s 
Blasted. Since Bond focuses on how these two logics intervene with each 
other through dramatization, it is inappropriate to separate these two worlds 
(168). By subjecting reality to the inversion of imagination, Bond intends 
for us to ‘see our prison from the outside’ (169). Therefore, the significance 
of the fracture of dramatic form resides in the fact that it transforms both the 
epistemological model and ethical relations within representation.  
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In ‘The Third Crisis: The Possibility of a Future Drama’ (2013), Bond 
defends the responsibility of drama to represent Auschwitz in a more 
sophisticated manner:  
 
Auschwitz can’t be remembered but can’t be discarded. The 
psyche of drama can’t countenance it, face it, to integrate it 
into our present reality, to collectively give it a cultural 
countenance, a human face. Yet it must be given a human 
face. It is unimaginable and since drama is the imagined, then 
Auschwitz never happened. This is one of the ambiguities of 
the psyche of drama, but its ambiguities are what give it its 
power: if Auschwitz did not happen in the past it must be 
happening now and is already happening in the future. (2013: 
16) 
 
When Bond defines Auschwitz as ‘a collective name for all the 
extermination camps’ (18), it implies that he is less concerned with 
Auschwitz as a historical fact than with the camp as a general phenomenon 
determined by particular political-juridical structures. This political-juridical 
structure for Bond is ‘happening now and must be happening in the future’ 
– such transhistorical understanding of Auschwitz is comparable with the 
argument in Giorgio Agamben’s ‘What is a Camp?’ (1994). Agamben, 
instead of investigating the events that take place in the camp, explores the 
political-juridical structure of the camp, which he defines as ‘the space 
that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule’ (2000: 
39; original emphasis). While ‘the state of exception’ refers to a state in 
which laws are temporarily suspended, the singularity of the camp resides in 
the fact that it normalizes the political space that should be instigated only 
for a short period. In the camp, since the normal law is suspended, the acts 
of sovereign power are manifest through the acts of the police (42). For 
Agamben, the camp is embedded in the political matrix of contemporary 
nation states and may take different forms.  
In The State of Exception (2005), Agamben extends his analysis of the 
camp to the ‘War on Terror’ and points out that the indefinite detention of 
suspected terrorists authorized by the American government during the 
‘War on Terror’ in fact produces the political space of the camp, in which 
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the detainees are stripped of the normal political rights protected by the 
Geneva Convention or American laws (2005: 3). Moreover, Agamben 
considers Bush’s declaration of the ‘War on Terror’ to be an attempt to 
construct circumstances wherein ‘the emergency becomes the rule’ (22). As 
Agamben defines the state of exception as ‘an anomic space in which what 
is at stake is a force of law without law’ (39), the ‘War on Terror’ has been 
producing such anomic spaces where imperial sovereignty exercises its 
power through violence imposed on human beings who have been stripped 
of their human rights.  
While Bond never explicitly theorizes the political nature of the camp, 
dramaturgically he applies the logic of the state of exception defined by 
Agamben in his dystopian imagination. His first major play that explores the 
dystopian future when the camp becomes the norm is The Crime of the 
Twenty-First Century (1999), in which the protagonist, Sweden, is 
repeatedly tortured and dismembered by the soldiers who are absent 
throughout the play but whose force is abominably felt by Sweden’s body 
tormented by exacerbating abuses. The explicitness of the violence inflicted 
on the body exceeds any of Bond’s previous plays and is reminiscent of 
Sarah Kane’s Cleansed (1998), in which a derelict university has been 
converted into a camp. It is not accidental that both Bond’s and Kane’s 
dramaturgy is determined by the conception of the camp as a place in which 
everything atrocious is possible: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out 
that torture is the point of contact between war and police action that 
exemplifies how political power can be exercised outside the norm (2004: 
19).  
From We Come to the River, Summer, Coffee, and The Crime of the 
Twenty-First Century, it is possible to delineate how Bond’s dramaturgy of 
the Holocaust evolves. In We Come to the River, the Holocaust is 
represented as one example of the catastrophes Europe witnessed from the 
late nineteenth century. In Summer, Bond presents his Marxist analysis of 
the Holocaust as the inevitable result of expansionist capitalism, in which 
the upper class is structurally complicit in the act of oppression. In Coffee, 
Bond draws on the history of the Babi Yar massacre and incorporates it with 
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his theory of subjectivity. Through the protagonist, Nold, Bond investigates 
how the return of the repressed historical trauma haunts Nold and how he 
must confront various ethical dilemmas in the extreme situations of the 
Holocaust. In The Crime of the Twenty-First Century, the Holocaust is not 
represented as a historical fact; instead, the camp as a political-juridical 
paradigm becomes the logic by which the dramatic world is constructed.  
Therefore, when Bond states that drama must give Auschwitz ‘a 
human face’, it is important to investigate what Auschwitz is. My discussion 
of Bond’s evolving dramaturgy of the Holocaust above has partly answered 
this question. But still, there are other questions: what does this face looks 
like? What is human? What is a face? Under what conditions can this face 
be encountered? All of these questions revolve around how Bond 
understands human subjectivity, ethics, and aesthetics. In the next section, I 
will give a preparatory framework through which the problem of ‘giving a 
human face to Auschwitz’ can be critically addressed.  
 
1.3. Subjectivity, Ethics, and Aesthetics 
 
In a note entry ‘On Dramatic Method’, dated 25 November 1982, Bond 
distinguishes the subjective self from subjectivity:  
 
[T]he subjective self (that the writer creates and the actor 
seeks) should not be psychology, motive or even subjectivity. 
What is being played subjectively is the situation. […] 
Subjectivity is given its own value as experience but is made 
concrete because it is inimitably bound up with the objective 
[…]. (Stuart 2001b: 140; original underline)  
 
Although in this note Bond sought to define the role of the individual as the 
agent of history, a view that he kept interrogating in the early 1980s, his 
definition of subjectivity as mediated by objectivity still operates in his later 
theory.14 For Bond, it is inadequate to understand the subject as purely 
                                                
14 In this note, Bond curiously defines ‘the subjective self’ as conditioned by the objective 
while he regards ‘subjectivity’ as a synonym for psychology. Although Bond’s use of 
terminology seems ambiguous here, what should be noted here is that Bond is aware of the 
conceptual difference. In this thesis, my references to Bond’s ‘theory of subjectivity’ refers 
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subjective – any conception of the self or subjectivity must be coupled with 
objective conditions that determine the formative process of the subject. 
While in the early 1980s Bond’s theory focused on the subject as the agent 
of history through his analysis of class structure, his later theory conceives 
the subject as determined by continuous interaction between the inner 
structure of the psyche and outer ideological apparatuses. It is in this sense 
that the Palermo improvisation is pivotal in Bond’s later theory since this 
improvisation throws into relief the relationship between self and society by 
exploring the possible resistance of the self against the military demand.  
In ‘Commentary on The War Plays’, Bond describes that, in a 
workshop improvisation held at Palermo University in 1983, when the 
participants who played the role of the soldier were forced to determine 
whether they should kill their mother’s baby or their neighbor’s baby, they 
all decided to kill the same one: their mother’s baby (1998: 246). In addition, 
Bond describes another episode: in a concentration camp in Russia in 1942, 
a Nazi guard was commanded to kill a communist, who turned out to be his 
brother, but the Nazi guard refused to kill. As a result, both of them were 
killed by the commandant (248-49). For Bond, these results reveal that, in 
extreme situations, decision-making is unpredictable, and the ethical 
paradox demonstrates how the individual is in conflict with the society 
(249).  
According to Bond, for the neonate (Bond’s term for the newborn 
infant) prior to socialization, radical innocence is manifested through the 
imperative that one has a right to be in this world; for the socialized self, 
radical innocence involves the universal imperative to seek justice, which, 
according to Bond, means that every human being should have the right to 
live. This intrinsic human faculty to perform the imperative is free from any 
ideological corruption and remains intact in the deepest level of the human 
psyche. Bond proposes that ‘[w]e are born radically innocent, and neither 
animal nor human; we create our humanness as our minds begin to think our 
instincts’ (2003: 251). Radical innocence as human nature is a process of 
                                                                                                                       
to his theory in which he interrogates the human subject’s inner potential in relation to 
external social conditions and restraints.  
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self-creation in order to assert one’s right to be in the world. It is ‘innate’ in 
the sense that it is intrinsically creative rather than biologically determined. 
Bond’s theoretical hesitation between nature and culture has been pointed 
out by Terry Eagleton (1984: 129) and such hesitation is reminiscent of 
Kant’s philosophical task of reconciling human freedom with determinism. 
In fact, Bond’s conception of radical innocence is highly influenced by 
Kantian ethics.15  
The theoretical paradox in Bond’s conception of radical innocence is 
obvious: must one sacrifice the other in order to assert one’s right to be? If 
radical innocence seeks justice, which means that everyone can be at home 
in the world, how should we resolve the inevitable conflict between free 
agents, all of whom act in the name of the right to be? Bond is aware of the 
problems of egoism and altruism – therefore, his developmental model of 
the human psyche differentiates the neonate from the core self: the ‘neonate’ 
lives in a world of egoism while the ‘core self’ tends to live in accordance 
with altruism.16 Bond states that ‘[e]goism is the only possible origin of 
altruism’ (2000b: 138), which implies that the existential imperative to seek 
one’s right to be is the foundation for the universalization of this right to be. 
If this is the case, then this theory fails to explain why the Nazi guard 
refused to kill his brother – that is, if the imperative that one has a right to 
live can be universalized, the Nazi guard should follow the order and kill his 
brother. In fact, this theoretical insufficiency turns out to be the 
dramaturgical driving force in structuring Bond’s later drama. The 
variations of this kind of extreme situation persist from The War Plays to 
The Paris Pentad, in each play of which Bond engages with different 
aspects of the same human dilemma: the conflict between the elemental 
imperative of radical innocence and the structure of social obligations 
imposed upon the individual.  
                                                
15 Though Bond mentions Kant only spasmodically, in an entry in his notebook dated 31 
March 1961, he directly discusses Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. See 
Stuart (2000): 68-9. 
16 Theoretically, ‘the neonate’ cannot be defined as ‘egoistic’ since the neonate, by 
definition, cannot differentiate itself from the external world. For another perspective, the 
neonate can be characterized as ‘egoistic’ in the sense it disregards the existence of the 
outside world beyond its grasp.  
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Therefore, the significance of Bond’s ‘Commentary on The War Plays’ 
and other subsequent writings resides in the fact that, through theorization, 
Bond interrogates the interconnection between subjectivity, ethics and 
aesthetics. In its essence, Bond’s conception of radical innocence as the core 
of the subject is his response to the ethical dilemmas exemplified in the 
Palermo improvisation, through which Bond interrogates the subject’s 
potential in extreme situations – what defines the nature of the subject is 
always the ethical question: how should I act? As Sean Carney contends, 
Bond’s dramaturgical ‘formalism’ results from the consummation of his 
tragic project and the understanding of the self in late capitalism (174); 
Bond’s theoretical development of subjectivity and ethics is acutely 
incorporated into his later plays, which usually provoke Bond to theorize 
further. While I will elucidate Bond’s theory of subjectivity, ethics, and 
aesthetics in the following chapters, here I need to anticipate succinctly my 
arguments in order to situate Bond’s theory in a broader philosophical 
context defined by Adorno and Levinas.  
Although Bond is aware of Adorno’s dictum: ‘[t]o write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbarous’ (2003: 162), in which ‘after Auschwitz’ operates as 
a chronotope that conditions writing of the Holocaust, Bond’s drama by no 
means directly translates Adornian philosophy into dramatic form.17 Instead, 
since it is Beckettian drama that is Adornian par excellence, Bond’s 
relationship with Adorno can be analyzed through his artistic antagonism 
with Samuel Beckett.18 As Adorno’s dictum reveals his skepticism of the 
role of post-Auschwitz art and literature, Levinas, another important 
philosopher whose thinking revolves around the problem of 
‘after-Auschwitz’, articulates a highly ethically-nuanced post-Auschwitz 
aesthetics as well.  
Adorno and Levinas question the validity of traditional artistic 
representation based on the cogito model, that is, the model which is 
                                                
17 See Michael Rothberg’s analysis of the meaning of ‘after Auschwitz’ in ‘After Adorno: 
Culture in the Wake of Catastrophe’ (1997).  
18 For a detailed analysis of the antagonism between Bond and Beckett, see Graham 
Saunders’s '“A theatre of ruins”. Edward Bond and Samuel Beckett: theatrical antagonists' 
(2005).  
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governed by an autonomous ‘I think’ consciousness. Adorno and Levinas 
regard the rationality inherent in this consciousness as complicit with the 
rationality of Nazism, which embodies the most extreme form of 
self-preservation and instrumental abstraction. By questioning the 
complicity of the rational communicating model with Nazism, they present 
different possibilities of artistic representation in response to Auschwitz. 
Therefore, by integrating their ideas, it is possible to construct a new 
framework through which post-Auschwitz art can be estimated.  
Adorno’s dictum, taken as a prohibition against writing poetry, aroused 
many disputes and even misunderstanding, which later compelled Adorno to 
clarify that the dictum should not be taken literally. His point is that writing 
poetry, as a synecdoche for creating art as cultural activity in general, when 
not being mediated critically, can only be a hollow replica of the culture that 
ends up with the Holocaust. Adorno then states provocatively that ‘one must 
write poems’ (435; original emphasis) and that ‘as long as there is an 
awareness of suffering among human beings there must be art as the 
objective form of that awareness’ (ibid). As Adorno defines the world after 
Auschwitz as the world in which Auschwitz was and is still possible (428), 
the awareness that Auschwitz can take place again – if what is presumed to 
be positive and affirmative is not negotiated through critical self-reflection – 
permeates both Adorno’s philosophy of negative dialectics and his 
dialectical attitude towards arts in general. ‘Awareness of suffering’, 
proposed by Adorno as one precondition for writing poetry, is posited again 
in Negative Dialectics (1966): ‘Perennial suffering has as much right to 
expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may be wrong to say 
that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems’ (1999: 362).  
In his seminal essay ‘Trying to Understand Endgame’ (1958), Adorno 
formulates how post-Auschwitz drama can be possible. He first denounces 
Sartrean existentialist drama as being traditional in terms of form – while 
Sartre intends to construct existentialist situations to convey his 
philosophical ideas, Beckett absorbs absurdity as dramatic form in a way 
that disrupts any affirmative meaning of existentialism (2003: 259). Adorno 
also attacks Sartre’s conception of the individual: after the catastrophes that 
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destroy the transient semblance of the empirical world, the category of the 
individual is revealed to be historical, merely as ‘both the outcome of the 
capitalist process of alienation and a defiant protest against it’ (267). While 
the false completeness of a psychological individual is shattered, its 
replacement is ‘the dissociation of the unity of consciousness into disparate 
elements, into nonidentity’ (270). In other words, once subjectivity as an 
independent identity disintegrates, the elements of nonidentity emerge to 
participate in the reconstruction of a post-psychological subjectivity: these 
elements are the negative images of an instrumental and psychological 
reality (271).  
The distinction between identity and non-identity is one of the 
conceptual distinctions that permeate Adorno’s philosophy. In Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944), Adorno and Max Horkheimer equate the logic of the 
Enlightenment with identity thinking in the sense that, in the Enlightenment 
project of the disenchantment of nature, scientific objectification reduces 
heterogeneous nature into calculable entities. As a consequence, every 
particular object is liquidated into ‘universal interexchangeability’ 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 10) at the cost of its qualitative singularity. 
Moreover, the process of identification is not limited to outer nature – 
human beings are no exception. The phenomenon of human self-domination 
is exemplified by the division of labor, which ‘requires the self-alienation of 
the individuals who must model their body and soul according to the 
technical apparatus’ (29-30). That means that the rationality of the 
Enlightenment turns out to be ‘mere instrument of the all-inclusive 
economic apparatus’ (30).  
Identity thinking, nevertheless, is not restricted to being the instrument 
to quantify both nature and human beings. For Adorno, ‘[i]dentity is the 
primal form of ideology’ (1999: 148). Thus defined, ideology designates 
identity thinking that subsumes particulars into universal concepts that defy 
any disparate substrate and qualitative contradiction. For this reason, the 
irrationality of rationality resides precisely in its disregard of its violence 
towards unidentifiable particulars (149). The most extreme form of identity 
logic is demonstrated in Auschwitz, as Adorno states that ‘Auschwitz 
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confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death’ (362). What Adorno 
has in mind is the manufacturing process in the concentration camps that 
reduces human beings into disposable and purely eliminable entities. 
Adorno’s argument echoes Jean-Luc Nancy’s analysis of Nazist ideology 
that, in the process of exalting ‘the Aryan body’ as the only legitimate 
ideologue, the Jews emerge as the forbidden one that has to be annihilated 
(2005: 40).19 The complicity between the logic of Auschwitz and that of the 
Enlightenment shows how human rationality that intends to disenchant 
nature can end with the total eradication of the human species. Moreover, 
the danger of identity thinking is not only how it affects the way disparate 
empirical reality is to be perceived but also how it determines the way 
human consciousness functions.  
Rationality, or ratio, however, is not intrinsically instrumental. As 
Adorno explicates in Negative Dialectics, while ratio in Plato still 
implicates qualitative differentiation, it is from Descartes that ratio works as 
scientific eradication of qualitative differences, which are converted into 
quantifiable units (1999: 43). That is to say, ‘[r]atio is not merely […] an 
ascent from the scattered phenomena to the concept of their species, it calls 
just as much for an ability to discriminate’ (ibid). It is in order to defend the 
discriminating ability against identity thinking that Adorno posits 
non-identity as opposed to identity and states that ‘[d]ialectics is the 
consistent sense of nonidentity’ (5). Regarding the relationship between 
identity and non-identity, Adorno explains that ‘[t]he nonidentical element 
in an identifying judgment is clearly intelligible insofar as every single 
object subsumed under a class has definitions not contained in the definition 
of the class’ (150). In short, non-identical elements are those that resist 
being abstracted and classified under a higher conceptual definition. 
Non-identical thinking designates an alternative cognitive process that seeks 
to understand objects and phenomena in accordance with their singularity 
instead of grasping them merely by abstraction.  
For Adorno, the catastrophe of the Holocaust erases the concept of the 
                                                
19 For a detailed discussion of the Jews as ‘the forbidden representation,’ see Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s ‘Forbidden Representation’ in The Ground of the Image (2005).  
 58 
individual as a psychologically autonomous being with freedom to decide 
and power to act. Accordingly, human beings can no longer be identified 
with the concept of the individual – what remains are those non-identical 
elements that fail to compose any preconceived individuality but add up to a 
post-psychological being. These beings are those Beckett presents in 
Endgame (1957), and it is in this sense that Adorno designates Endgame as 
‘the epilogue to subjectivity’ (2003: 278). Since human beings are deprived 
of any psychological depth and the capacity to remember, history is made 
impossible (265). Emptied consciousness incapacitates personal memory, 
which is essential to self-identity, leaving the characters entangled in 
repetitive physical gestures and meaningless verbal exchanges. According 
to Adorno, as anti-existentialist drama, Endgame exemplifies what 
post-Auschwitz culture is and reveals that the instrumentalization of ratio is 
the source of problems.  
Like Adorno, Levinas also started his philosophy from his reflection on 
the Holocaust. In an interview titled ‘The Philosopher and Death’ (1982), 
Levinas clarifies his ethics in relation to the Holocaust: ‘[T]he Holocaust is 
an event of still inexhaustible meaning’ (1999: 161). ‘In speaking of the 
Holocaust,’ Levinas proceeds to state, ‘I am thinking of the death of the 
other man. […] I have asked myself […] what the face of the other man 
means’ (162). According to Levinas, humanity is defined by how one can 
remain open to the death of the other since the death of the other awakens 
one to the other (157-61). That is, the face of the other in its nakedness and 
vulnerability requires me to take responsibility – the face of the other puts 
into question the persistence of the self (163-64). In 1990, Levinas added a 
prefatory note to ‘Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism’ (1934), in 
which he states clearly that the source of Hitlerism originates from ‘the 
essential possibility of elemental Evil’ inscribed within the ontology 
centered on being as ‘gathering together and as domination’ (1990: 63; 
original emphasis). These remarks clearly illustrate that both Levinas’s 
critique of ontology and his idea of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ are informed 
by his reflections on the Holocaust.  
In ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ (1984), Levinas’s criticism of ontology 
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for presupposing the logic of identity is reminiscent of Adorno’s argument: 
‘Identical and non-identical are identified. The labour of thought wins out 
over the otherness of things and men’ (1989: 78). Levinas regards the logic 
of identity based on rationality and self-consciousness as being the 
foundation for the man to ‘persist in his being as a sovereign’ who exercises 
the power of transcendental reduction to reduce the world as neoma – the 
object or content of a thought – to be rediscovered in consciousness (78-79). 
In ‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity’ (1957), Levinas applies the same 
argument against reason: ‘Reason, which reduces the other, is appropriation 
and power’ (1987: 50). For Levinas, philosophical concepts such as reason, 
freedom, autonomy, and consciousness all entail the logic of identity 
thinking that reduces the otherness of the other for the ego to subsume.  
Instead of defining the man as a sovereign of consciousness, Levinas 
constructs his ethics based on his phenomenological analysis of subjectivity 
other than egology. His main task is twofold: one is to deconstruct the 
ego-centered subjectivity, in which the self commands the other at his or her 
disposal; the other is to seek an alternative subjectivity that gives 
precedence to the other even at the expense of the self. In Levinas’s analysis 
of the ‘I’, he states that ‘[t]he I is not a being that always remains the same, 
but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself’ (1969: 36). 
Levinas argues that the self is not a static being but a constant 
self-identifying process. This is also what he terms ‘the same of the self’, by 
which he means that the self tends to stay the same by self-identification. 
For Levinas, the structure of the I should also be estimated under the 
I-world structure: by identifying itself as the same, the ‘I’ also opposes itself 
to the world as the other. By affirming the self and opposing the other, 
egoist subjectivity completes a totality that encloses the same and the other 
(37-8). Such a self-enclosing structure forecloses the possibility of entering 
into the relationship with the other as alterity since the possibility for the 
self to encounter the other lies outside the oppositional subject-object 
correlation. The other can be the real other only when it appears as the 
stranger that confronts and disturbs the self instead of appearing as a 
disposable object (39). Such an asymmetrical self-other relationship is 
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designated by Levinas as a ‘face-to-face’ encounter. In a face-to-face 
encounter, the other appears as the infinity that transcends the self and 
resists thematization, as Levinas states: ‘An absolute transcendence has to 
be produced as non-integratable’ (53).  
For Levinas, the face is the expression of a living presence that speaks 
(66). The gaze on the face transcends subject-object cognition and demands 
unconditional giving to the other (75). Levinas further defines the gaze of 
the other as a form of soliciting by ‘the stranger, the widow, and the orphan’ 
(78). The face-to-face experience is radically different from the experience 
of representation defined by Levinas as ‘a determination of the other by the 
same, without the same being determined by the other’ (170). Levinas thus 
distinguishes representation from face:  
 
The assembling of being in the present, its synchronization by 
retention, memory and history reminiscence, is representation 
[…]. Representation does not integrate the responsibility for 
the other inscribed in human fraternity. […] The order that 
orders me to the other does not show itself to me, save 
through the trace of its reclusion, as a face of a neighbor. 
(1998: 140) 
 
In other words, representation, for Levinas, is the integration of separate 
entities to form a totality that can be grasped and known; as a mode of 
temporalization, representation is a process of re-presenting.  
From Levinas’s ethical perspective, in opposition to the aesthetics 
dominated by the logic of ‘re-presenting’, the only legitimate art is such that 
‘breaks or disturbs […] “drunken-ness”: fracturing modernist art’ 
(Eaglestone 262). Suspicious of artworks that are constructed as 
subject-object correlations, and skeptical of artworks that entice total 
participation or enjoyment, Levinas advocates artworks that can both disrupt 
subject-object rationality and resist producing pleasure. In Levinasian 
aesthetic experience, what matters is the ethical encounter with the alterity 
of the face revealed in diachrony. Moreover, this encounter destabilizes the 
self-identical subjectivity of the receiver and further requires the receiver to 
respond.  
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To recapitulate: confronted with the crisis of human subjectivity in the 
Holocaust, Adorno thinks that aesthetics is the realm that can still make 
metaphysical experience possible, while Levinas revisions a radical ethics 
based on an alternative conception of subjectivity. Aesthetics, for Adorno 
and Levinas, is not separable from subjectivity and ethics: Adorno’s dictum 
against writing poetry after Auschwitz stems from his insight that the 
barbarism of the Holocaust is structured within, instead of being excluded 
from, the culture of identity thinking; Levinas’s aversion to aesthetic 
enjoyment and art as knowledge shows his suspicion of aesthetics complicit 
with totalitarian ideology. Their negative aesthetics suggest that, only by 
basing post-Auschwitz aesthetics on the critique of Enlightenment reason 
that ends with Nazist totalitarianism, can such aesthetics be ethically valid 
and politically meaningful. In short, for Adorno, only through the 
preservation of non-identity can artworks retain their autonomy from reified 
reality; for Levinas, only through remaining open to alterity can the ethical 
power of artworks be revealed.  
Bond bases the dramaturgy of his later work on the idea of radical 
innocence, which derives from his reflections on post-Auschwitz 
subjectivity. This means that the concept of radical innocence demonstrates 
Bond’s intent to reconceive the human subject after Auschwitz, and this 
new conception of human subjectivity determines how he dramatizes and 
theatricalizes ‘humanity’. In the following chapters I will argue that, 
conceptually, Bond shares the same ground with Adorno and Levinas, and 
their theories of subjectivity and aesthetics can serve as a theoretical frame 
through which Bond’s theory and drama can be critically engaged.  
 
1.4. Theorizing the Biopolitics of the Later Bond 
 
Based on the discussion above, I will attempt to theorize the conceptual 
features of the later Bond. As I have argued, the difference between Bond 
and Brecht is not their use of dramatic devices or their stances on the role of 
reason and emotion in theatre but, rather, with the articulation of their 
concepts of subjectivity and how the subject should be dramatized and 
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theatricalized. As my analysis of Bond’s evolving dramaturgy of the 
Holocaust implies, at the heart of Bond’s post-Brechtian dramaturgy is his 
conception of the subject based on the idea of radical innocence. 
In order to bring into relief the difference between Brecht and Bond, I 
will draw on Patrice Pavis’s analysis of the difference between Aristotle’s 
plot and Brechtian story [fabula]. The following diagram is drawn by Pavis 
to illustrate the difference between Aristotle and Brecht (1998: 141): 
 
 
 
According to Aristotle’s Poetics, characters are represented for the sake of 
the construction of plot, which abides by the law of causal probability or 
necessity and forms a modest, coherent, and complete whole. However, 
Brecht’s story aims to foreground the contradictions within a seemingly 
coherent plot by analyzing the social interrelations between characters and 
emphasizing the social gestus that characterizes the relations of power 
within a specific social and historical context. In opposition to the ideas of 
plot theorized by Aristotle and Brecht, the Bondian fabula can be analyzed 
as follows: 
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According to the dramaturgy of Bond’s later plays, Theatre Events 
constitute the most vital parts of a play. A Theatre Event refers to a moment 
in which characters are forced to confront ethical aporias that unsettle the 
values conditioned by ideologies. In such moments, the innermost potential 
of the character, radical innocence, is provoked to face the dilemma and 
make a decision. Although a character’s decision may either conform to the 
existing rules or break the rules, the character’s deliberation over ethical 
dilemmas and subsequent decisions constitute what I call ‘the performative 
of radical innocence’.20 Compared to Brecht, Bond in his later theory 
emphasizes the potential of the subject to question the social interrelations 
that determine how one is structured by the order of ideology. One of the 
ideological matrices that Bond explores is what Agamben defines as the 
political-juridical nomos of the modern nation-state – the camp.  
Therefore, the significance of Bond’s theory of subjectivity that 
presupposes pre-socialized radical innocence can be reexamined in the 
context of Agamben’s biopolitical distinction between zoē as the simple fact 
of living and bios as the political form of living (1998: 1). Whereas bios 
refers to the socialized self that participates in the modern political structure 
defined by sovereign power, zoē implies a pre-politicized or de-politicized 
form of life. For Agamben, the essence of modern biopolitics resides in how 
the demarcation line between bios and zoē is marked – the moment of 
decision when a human subject endowed with political status can be 
deprived of his or her rights and turned into the status of homo sacer, bare 
life that can be killed without committing homicide. As Agamben 
persuasively states, ‘[w]hen life becomes the supreme political value, not 
only is the problem of life’s nonvalue thereby posed, as Schmitt suggests 
but further, it is as if the ultimate ground of sovereign power were at stake 
in this decision’ (142; my emphasis). As implied by Agamben’s analysis, 
the fundamental problem inherent in modern sovereign states is that it is 
                                                
20 I will explore the concept of the performative of radical innocence in Chapter Six. This 
concept is inspired by Jill Dolan’s concept of ‘the utopian performative’, by which she 
designates the sensibilities and feelings aroused by the ‘experiences of utopia in the flesh of 
performance that might performatively hint at how a different world could feel’ (478). That 
is, Dolan is more concerned with how utopia can be felt than how it should be organized.  
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impossible for this political-juridical structure of the camp to conceive an 
alternative form of life that transcends this separation between political life 
and bare life. 
It is from this political-juridical matrix that I want to consider Bond’s 
idea of radical innocence and the problem of value. Arguably, radical 
innocence as a pre-politicized state of subjectivity can be related to zoē and 
Agamben’s concept of homo sacer – however, radical innocence implies the 
subject’s potential to resist both complete politicization and complete 
de-politicization. While being reduced to the status of bare life is the result 
of the sovereign’s decision to deprive the subject of his or her political value, 
radical innocence as the source of self-valuation must resist the identity 
logic in operation within the sovereign’s decision to politicize or 
de-politicize the subject. This explains why the exploration of ethical 
extreme situations is vital in Bond’s later plays since these moments open 
up the terrain where both the politically instrumentalized subject (such as a 
soldier or police officer as the agent of sovereign power) and the 
de-politicized subject (such as a prisoner, enemy, or criminal as homo sacer) 
can interrogate the fundamental question of ethics – ‘how shall I act?’ – and 
create values different from those decided by the sovereign.  
It is notable that Agamben also applies the concept of bare life to 
‘today’s democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes 
through development’ that excludes certain groups of people and transforms 
them into bare life (180). Despite Agamben’s comment being brief and 
reductionist, the association of bare life with neoliberal capitalism is another 
main strand of biopolitical thought elaborated by Hardt and Negri.21 Their 
viewpoint on the biopolitical relationship between human life and monetary 
economy is cogently demonstrated as follows:  
 
                                                
21 For a critical survey of the concept of biopolitics in contemporary philosophy, see 
Thomas Lemke’s Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (2011). Lemke points out that 
Agamben’s writings and the works of Hardt and Negri are the most important 
reformulations of Foucault’s idea of biopolitics: while Agamben stresses the structural 
importance of bare life in understanding Western political history, Hardt and Negri stress 
the biopolitical nature of contemporary capitalism that annuls the distinction between 
politics and economy (6). 
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There is nothing, no ‘‘naked life,’’ no external standpoint, that 
can be posed outside this field permeated by money; nothing 
escapes money. Production and reproduction are dressed in 
monetary clothing. […] The great industrial and financial 
powers thus produce not only commodities but also 
subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities within the 
biopolitical context: they produce needs, social relations, 
bodies, and minds – which is to say, they produce producers. 
(2000: 32) 
 
In opposition to Agamben’s concept of ‘bare life’, Hardt and Negri 
explicate that, within the matrix of the contemporary monetary system, there 
is ‘no “naked life”’ but subjectivity being produced and reproduced 
according to monetary logic. However, Agamben’s emphasis on the 
exclusion of certain groups from the operation of neoliberal capitalist 
system is in fact complementary with Hardt and Negri’s arguments. That is, 
if there is no bare life beyond the contemporary capitalist system, it is not 
because this system successfully incorporates every human subject within it 
but because it successfully excludes those who fail to be assimilated to such 
an extent that they can never constitute the ‘outside’ beyond the system.  
While Bond explores the biopolitical operation of the camp in his plays 
set in a dystopian totalitarian state, in most of his later plays set in the 
contemporary world he interrogates contemporary subjectivity defined by 
what Hardt and Negri regard as the biopolitical matrix of neoliberal 
capitalism. For example, like Mother Courage who is split between being a 
mother and being a businesswoman, Viv in A Window is tormented by her 
incapacity to reconcile her role of mother, prostitute, and drug addict. 
However, unlike Mother Courage, who negotiates between the two roles, 
Viv is driven mad because she desperately longs for a different social order 
in which she is not socially excluded. Bond’s portrait of Viv is no less 
concrete than Brecht’s portrait of Mother Courage in terms of social and 
economic conditions, but Bond emphasizes the multilayered operation of 
her subjectivity: on one level, Viv is exploited by the monetary logic that 
turns her into a commodity – a prostitute – and she can only seek relief 
through using drugs, which further exacerbates her physical and 
psychological deterioration. On another level, Viv longs for a new identity 
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that is non-identical with her present roles defined and produced by external 
social and economic conditions. In Bond’s terms, this longing is provoked 
by Viv’s radical innocence, a pre-socialized inner potential that produces 
values different from those coded by the established system. It is this 
dimension of subjectivity defined by biopolitics instead of class 
consciousness that differentiates the dramaturgy of the later Bond and that 
of Brecht.  
In other words, what distinguishes the later Bond and Brecht is their 
analysis of subjectivity: while Brecht’s Marxist analysis of class structure 
captures how the socialized self and class consciousness are determined by 
different social and economic conditions, Bond’s analysis turns the focus to 
the pre-socialized potential of the subject that enables the subject to 
question the fissures and possibilities in the process of the formation of 
subjectivity. This shift of focus by no means suggests that Bond’s characters 
are immediately endowed with autonomy and power to transcend the 
limitations of the ideologized world. On the contrary, Bond bases his 
analysis of subjectivity and dramaturgy on the acknowledgment of the 
totalizing logic of biopolitics exemplified either by the camp or by 
neoliberal capitalism.  
It is in the context of this totalizing biopolitical logic that I want to 
reconsider how the theories of Adorno and Levinas can be relevant: 
Adorno’s idea of non-identity characterizes how radical innocence remains 
the subject’s potential to resist the identity logic in operation both in the 
camp, where the execution of a rule is identical with the formation of rule, 
and in the neoliberal capitalist system, where human value is identical with 
monetary value. This subjective dimension inaugurated by radical 
innocence is also an ethical dimension: in opposition to the value system 
defined by the existing biopolitical matrix, the subject is confronted with an 
unknown territory in which new values need to be established – these acts 
of creation are what I have described as performatives of radical innocence. 
It is in this difficult ethical terrain that Levinas’s ethics of alterity can be an 
exigent standard to measure against the subject’s creative acts and the 
possible violence inherent in these instances of creation. All these questions 
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must start from examining Bond’s theory of subjectivity and the idea of 
radical innocence – and this is the task of the next chapter. Although Bond’s 
theorization of subjectivity is deeply affected by his reflection on Auschwitz, 
I will analyze his theory of subjectivity instead of his post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy first because theoretically and chronologically Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity precedes his post-Auschwitz dramaturgy.   
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Chapter Two 
Understanding Humanness: Theorizing and 
Dramatizing Subjectivity  
 
At the core of Bond’s theoretical writings is his unremitting reconfiguration 
of the concept of subjectivity, often referred to as the neonate, 
consciousness, self-consciousness, the psyche, the mind, etc. I use 
‘subjectivity’ to refer to these terms because it can not only encompass these 
ideas but also contextualize and problematize them in relation to 
contemporary philosophical interrogations of subjectivity. As Australian 
philosopher Nick Mansfield suggests, the theories of subjectivity from the 
1970s on agree on one thing – the rejection of the idea of the Enlightenment 
subject that is autonomous and self-contained (13). When Bond began to 
formulate his later theory of subjectivity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
this was also the period when contemporary European philosophers started 
to reflect on the status of the subject after decades of the poststructuralist 
project of deconstructing the concept of subjectivity, as exemplified by two 
collections of essays: Who Comes After the Subject? (1991), and 
Deconstructive Subjectivities (1996). Jean-Luc Nancy, in his introduction to 
Who Comes After the Subject?, reproduces his invitation letter that poses the 
question:  
 
Who comes after the subject? […] Everything seems, 
however, to point to the necessity, not of a “return to 
the subject” […], but on the contrary, of a move forward 
toward someone – some one else in its place […]. Who would 
it be? How would s/he present him/herself? Can we name 
her/him? Is the question “who” suitable? (1991: 5; original 
emphasis) 
 
Nancy answers this question by replacing the idea of existence with that of 
presence – for him, one’s presence ‘is presence to presence not to self (not 
of self)’ (8). In opposition to the idea of the self as a self-contained 
existence, one’s presence in the world necessarily entails a community in 
which everyone’s presence is a common phenomenon. Therefore, for Nancy, 
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the idea of community rather than that of self should be the starting point of 
rearticulating subjectivity. Ute Guzzoni’s ‘Do We Still Want To Be 
Subjects?’, the last essay collected in Deconstructive Subjectivities, also 
questions whether the idea of subject as the human capacity for acting in 
general is still desirable as such capacity has brought about numerous 
disasters and violent domination (206). Instead, Guzzoni suggests that the 
subject should be reformulated through what lies outside the autonomous 
subject – that is, the subject becomes a relational concept defined by the 
interplay between ‘we’ and ‘whatever arises and occurs around and within 
us’ (216). Therefore, I suggest that the meaning of Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity in relation to drama, instead of being regarded as an isolated or 
idiosyncratic theoretical endeavor, emerges only when it is contextualized in 
this wider philosophical context.  
Bond has consciously explored the idea of subjectivity over nearly 
thirty years in his letters, notes, interviews, prefaces, and essays; therefore, 
in order to trace and calibrate his theoretical development, a chronological 
reading of his major theoretical writings on subjectivity is methodologically 
desirable and necessary. Since it is detectable that in every major writing 
Bond introduces new concepts to clarify, revise, and complicate his 
previous theorization, by highlighting how the core ideas have been 
proposed and reworked, a chronological reading can circumvent the 
difficulties of some of Bond’s later writings and shed light on how to 
approach his neologisms and evolving ideas. Moreover, we should also be 
aware of the discrepancy between dramatization and theorization, as he 
maintains: ‘I find writing theory demanding, and it never really gives me 
that satisfaction of achieving specific insights – as opposed to 
generalizations – which I get from creative writing: but it has to be done’ 
(Stuart 1995: 47). As Bond makes clear that the contrast between theoretical 
writing and creative writing is that between generalization and particularity, 
what is more important is the way he defines the nature of this contrast: it is 
not that the particularity demonstrates the generalization as an example, but 
that the particularity always exceeds the generalization as a singular event. 
Therefore, the first half of this chapter will illustrate, examine, and 
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problematize Bond’s theory of subjectivity, and the second half will 
investigate how his plays further dramatically engage with the theory.  
 
2.1. Radical Innocence and Justice 
 
2.1.1. The Concept of Radical Innocence and Its Difficulties 
 
In ‘Commentary on The War Plays’, Bond explicates his idea of ‘radical 
innocence’ at length for the first time:22 
 
In the Palermo improvisation the soldier killed his brother or 
sister. In the camp the soldier refused to kill his brother. Both 
decisions came from the same paradox. The paradox is never 
absent from our mind. It is the crux on which humanness is 
poised, an expression of the radical innocence. (1998: 251) 
 
However, if both the soldier’s decision and the Russian guard’s decision 
express radical innocence, how should we explain the difference? Does 
radical innocence entail any law intrinsic in humanity that determines our 
moral actions? Bond proceeds to define radical innocence as ‘the psyche’s 
conviction of its right to live, and of its conviction that it is not responsible 
for the suffering it finds in the world or that such things can be’ (ibid.). It is 
surprising that, after explaining the examples of the soldier and the Russian 
guard, Bond defines radical innocence as the psyche’s impulse for 
self-preservation without noticing such definition exactly contradicts the 
examples. If radical innocence is the psyche’s conviction of its right to be, 
then both the soldier and the Russian guard should only follow the military 
order to execute whomever he is commanded to kill. Logically, there should 
never exist any ethical paradox in these situations. However, in Bond’s 
theoretical writings, there is no definite definition of radical innocence. In 
the same commentary, he also regards radical innocence as ‘part of history’s 
                                                
22 In Bond’s earlier writings, he also uses ‘radical innocence’ – for example, in a note entry 
on 29 April 1987, he writes: ‘Radical innocence is presumably (or is close to) creativity?’ 
(Stuart 2001b: 270). In his letter to Michael Fuller on 13 January 1988, he states that 
radical innocence is the child’s right to live (Stuart 1994a: 8). However, it is not until this 
commentary that Bond starts to develop radical innocence as a distinct theoretical term.  
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rational development’ embodied by religious martyrs (258). For Bond, 
martyrdom exemplifies the ‘dramatic assertion of radical innocence’ (ibid.). 
Obviously, martyrdom – death or self-sacrifice on account of adherence to a 
religious cause – is the exact opposition to the psyche’s impulse for 
self-preservation. In other words, in Bond’s theory, radical innocence 
involves self-contradictory definitions. In addition to the two definitions I 
illustrate above, Bond also characterizes radical innocence as the capacity 
for moral discrimination, questioning, and judging (254-55). Regarding the 
persistence of radical innocence, Bond further contends that although 
radical innocence may be ‘corrupted’ by society, it can never be ‘totally 
corrupted’ (257).  
We can observe that, for Bond to solve the theoretical contradictions 
and to construct a more coherent theory, he needs to answer at least three 
questions: first, how can radical innocence simultaneously entail 
self-preservation and self-sacrifice? Second, how can radical innocence 
become the ground for moral questioning and judging? What is the source 
of such moral discrimination? Third, if radical innocence can be corrupted 
but cannot be completely corrupted, what is the significance of the 
irrepressibility of radical innocence? Bond’s developmental and structural 
models of subjectivity, which I will explain in the following sections, aim to 
answer these questions. In this section, my focus is on the relationship 
between radical innocence and justice.  
 
2.1.2. Bond and Kant 
 
In Bond’s later writings, he rephrases the psyche’s conviction of its right to 
be as the neonate’s ‘existential imperative’ to be (2000b: 115). Once the 
neonate becomes aware of the outside world, this imperative becomes the 
‘imperative for justice’ (143) – everyone should have the right to be in the 
world. Bond’s use of the concept of imperatives, his concept of justice, and 
the idea of the indestructability of radical innocence demonstrate how Kant 
influences Bond’s theoretical construction. In Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), when Kant discusses the problem of 
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radical good and evil, he maintains that the basis of good and evil is 
founded on moral maxims other than natural impulses; with regard to the 
adoption of maxims, he argues that ‘the good or the evil in the human being 
is said to be innate […] only in the sense that it is posited as the ground 
antecedent to every use of freedom given in experience’ (1998: 47; original 
emphasis). Disassociating good and evil from determinism, Kant proposes 
that human predisposition either follows the good maxim, that is, to precede 
moral law over self-love, or follows the evil maxim, which is the reversal of 
the good maxim. Thus said, to make moral education or improvement 
possible, Kant argues that ‘we must presuppose in all this that there is still a 
germ of goodness left in its entire purity, a germ that cannot be extirpated or 
corrupted’ (66). Arguably, Kant’s reasoning about the definition of 
innateness and the indestructible possibility of being good in human beings 
is incorporated into Bond’s idea of radical innocence.  
Furthermore, Bond’s idea of justice as a universal statement of the 
human right to be also originates in Kant’s theory of unconditional 
imperatives. In one of his notebook entries in 1996, Bond writes that ‘“[b]e 
just” means that everyone belongs to Kant’s kingdom of ends’ (Bond 2000b: 
76). In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant defines ‘a 
kingdom of ends’ as such:  
 
The concept of every human being as one who must regard 
himself as giving universal law through all the maxims of his 
will, so as to appraise himself and his actions from this point 
of view, leads to a very fruitful concept dependant upon it, 
namely, that of a kingdom of ends. (1997: 41, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Kant proceeds to state that in the ‘kingdom of ends’, every rational being 
should treat oneself and others as ends in themselves instead of as mere 
means (ibid). As maintained by Kant, the maxims that every rational being 
follows therefore have three features: firstly, they have a form of 
universality, which means that they should be conceived as a universally 
applicable law; secondly, they have a matter as an end, which means that the 
human being as an end in itself should serve as a restriction of other 
 73 
whimsical ends; thirdly, one’s maxims should be in harmony with the 
kingdom of ends (43-44). These features are commensurate with those of 
the ‘categorical imperative’, the principle of practical reason, which Kant 
defines as a principle that demands every rational being ‘act in accordance 
with maxims that can at the same time have as their object themselves as 
universal laws of nature’ (44).  
Obviously, Bond’s concepts of justice and radical innocence as the 
universal imperative or existential imperative have their origins in Kant’s 
moral philosophy as is introduced; nevertheless, in assimilating Kantian 
ideas, Bond inevitably must face the problems implicated in Kant’s theory. 
In Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno observes that Kant aims to 
combine the unconditional adherence to reason and the ultimate happiness 
of mankind; humanity, consequently, for Kant, is the ultimate realization of 
practical reason instead of empirical mankind (2000: 140-41). For Adorno, 
Kant’s ideal ‘kingdom of ends’ can never be realized by human beings 
empirically since this ideal presupposes that all human beings conduct their 
actions in accordance with transcendental practical reason. While Kant 
aspires to bridge the gap between practical reason and the experiential world, 
the difficulty still arises when any particular action is required in a particular 
situation since how to conduct a just action can only be deduced from an 
ideal world of justice, which is still a future task (142). Adorno thus states 
clearly that the weakness of Kantian ethics is that ‘it fails to provide us 
anything concrete, in other words, it fails to provide us with a casuistic 
method, one that would enable us to apply a general moral principle to a 
particular case’ (155). When one applies Kantian ethics, the fact that the 
‘infinite ramifications of social possibilities, an infinite choice’ (156) is at 
one’s disposal only makes it impossible to determine the right action.  
 
2.1.3. Justice and Its Aporias  
 
Jacques Derrida, in dissecting the aporias of justice, presents arguments that 
also address the problem of incommensurability between the particular and 
the universal. Derrida distinguishes law from justice by defining the former 
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as a system of calculation and the latter as an incalculable event of 
singularity: ‘Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be 
law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calculate with incalculable’ 
(1992: 15). In examining the complexities of incalculable justice, Derrida 
proposes three insolvable aporias of justice when it comes to any 
determination of justice: the first aporia is ‘épokhè of rule’ (23), by which 
Derrida means that justice presupposes freedom to decide and thus is 
incompatible with a set of rules which actuate programmable legal 
procedures. In other words, what is legal in terms of rule allows no freedom 
beyond the rule to judge a case in accordance with its singularity and fails to 
achieve justice as a result. The second aporia is ‘the ghost of the 
undecidable’ (24), by which Derrida designates the experience in which one 
is obliged to make the impossible decision even faced with the incalculable 
foreign to any order and rule. The third aporia is ‘the urgency that obstructs 
the horizon of knowledge’ (26), by which Derrida points out that a just 
decision always presupposes unlimited knowledge of information and 
conditions, which is impossible for a decision that is always required to be 
made immediately at certain moments. Derrida thus concludes from the 
analysis of these aporias: ‘Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is 
unpresentable, but it is the chance of event and the condition of history’ 
(27).  
Both Adorno, who criticizes Kantian ethics for being practically 
impossible, and Derrida, who elucidates the aporias of justice, demonstrate 
that any just decision which must take the singularity of each case into 
account and furnish itself with infinite information is undecidable, that is, 
impossible. In addition to Adorno and Derrida, Levinas is also conscious of 
the limitations of Kantian ethics and proposes an alternative thinking. He 
criticizes Kant’s concept of ‘the kingdom of ends’ for being ‘a certain 
limitation of rights and freewill’ (1994: 122) and warns that such limitation 
risks ‘treating the person as an object by submitting him or her (the unique, 
the incomparable) to comparison’ (ibid). Arguing against the danger 
implicated in the concept of justice as calculation, Levinas proposes an 
ethics based on an asymmetrical face-to-face encounter in which one bears 
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infinite responsibility to the irreducible other, the absolute unique. Though 
Levinas understands that it is practically impossible to replace justice of 
calculation with face-to-face ethics, he believes that ‘it is ethics which is the 
foundation of justice’ and that ‘within justice, we seek a better justice’ 
(1988: 175). In his phenomenological description of the face-to-face 
encounter, it seems that Levinas also identifies the undecidable moments of 
ethical aporias as analyzed above:  
 
[I]n the Face of the Other always the death of the Other and 
thus, in some way, an incitement to murder, the temptation to 
go to the extreme, to completely neglect the other – and at the 
same time (and this is the paradoxical thing) the Face is also 
the “Thou shall not kill.” (2000: 104) 
 
Faced with such aporetic moments, Levinas pleads for ‘a doing justice to 
the difference of the other person […], an otherness of the unique’ (194). 
Levinas argues that the asymmetrical relationship between one and the other 
constitutes the premises of the possibilities of justice. However, as Derrida 
contends, Levinas’s upholding of ethical singularity and alterity is destined 
to be problematic and aporetic when this ethics is applied to political or 
legal matters (1995: 84) – Derrida explicates this aporia clearly when he 
deconstructs the concept of justice.  
 Therefore, it logically follows that Bond’s idea of justice influenced by 
Kant can be problematic, if not aporetic. Bond, in elaborating on the 
paradoxes faced by Kant and Gandhi, thus remarks on the problem of 
calculation and the prioritization of moral acts:  
 
Can we talk of sacrificing a moral act? Is a calculus possible? 
And then, if non-resistance is the moral act, there is no 
argument: the parents may not shoot the soldiers even if the 
children are taken to be used in vivisection experiments […]. 
(2000b: 82) 
 
Intriguingly, Bond is not only aware of the potential difficulties within 
Kantian ethics that necessarily entails a calculus of human freedom to 
maintain the co-existence of human beings, but he is also alert to the 
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limitations of morality when it comes to extreme atrocities of inhumanity. 
Therefore, the failure of radical innocence to seek the impossible justice 
should not simply be regarded as the deficiency of Bondian theory of the 
human psyche and its dramatization; rather, the enforcement of radical 
innocence testifies to the human potential of self-lawgiving even in 
disobeying the universal imperative. Instead of defining justice as a static 
state and radical innocence as predetermined moral maxims, Bond also 
defines justice as constituted by creative human actions that change society 
(2000b: 48). 
 
2.1.4. A Rereading of Radical Innocence and Justice 
 
Regarding Bond’s contradictory accounts of radical innocence and the 
aporetic nature of the concept of justice, I want to reformulate these 
problems by foregrounding three concepts simultaneously in operation in 
Bond’s theory: being, being-with and becoming. In different contexts, the 
idea of radical innocence may refer to the imperative to seek 
self-preservation (‘One has a right to be’), the imperative to seek justice 
(‘Everyone has his or her own right to be’), the imperative of being 
responsible for others (‘Radical innocence is responsibility for other 
people’s lives’), and the imperative to seek justice based on creative acts 
(‘Justice is to be created’). The theoretical difficulties are obvious: first, if 
one’s right to be is the highest imperative, then it logically follows that 
one’s right to be can be obtained even at the expense of depriving others of 
their right to be. Second, if it is imperative that actions should be taken 
according to the principle of justice, that is, everyone has his or her right to 
be, this imperative is always in danger of being violated since, practically, 
either not everyone is valued equally or someone must be sacrificed in 
certain circumstances. Thus, the concept of ‘being’ seems to be opposed to 
that of ‘being-with’. However, this conflict between ‘being’ and ‘being-with’ 
by no means leads to an ethical dead end; instead, for Bond, the 
impossibility of attaining justice makes it necessary that every ethical 
decision should be creative to initiate a possible process of ‘becoming’. 
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‘How can one seek justice in an unjust society?’ – This is how Bond 
encapsulates the aporias inherent in his articulation of subjectivity and 
ethics, a statement that is also reminiscent of Adorno’s aphorism that wrong 
life cannot be lived rightly. Contemporary resonances of Adorno’s ethical 
theory can be found in Judith Butler’s Adorno Prize Lecture, ‘Can One 
Lead a Good Life in a Bad Life?’ (2012), in which Butler addresses the 
biopolitical implication of this problem by, instead of first defining what 
constitutes ‘good’, interrogating what differentiates life from non-life. For 
Butler, the question of living a good life in a bad life presupposes two 
meanings of life: a life lived by the individual and a life as a social and 
economic organization which does not necessarily produce the conditions 
that make every life equally liveable (2012: 16). Since whether a life is 
liveable or disposable is determined by a wider network of social, economic, 
and ideological conditions, a liveable life is thus not a self-evident fact but 
the product of a social process of inclusion and exclusion. As Butler argues, 
‘[i]f there are two such “lives” – my life and the good life, understood as a 
social form of life – then the life of the one is implicated in the life of the 
other’ (17). The two meanings within the concept of life correspond to my 
analysis of ‘being’ and ‘being-with’ inherent in the idea of radical 
innocence. Intriguingly, Butler also deploys the idea of transformation, a 
similar idea to that of ‘becoming’, to resolve the tension between the two 
meanings of life:  
 
If I am to lead a good life, it will be a life lived with others, a 
live [sic] that is no life without those others. I will not lose 
this I that I am; whoever I am will be transformed by my 
connections with others, since my dependency on another, 
and my dependability, are necessary in order to live and to 
live well. (18; my emphasis) 
 
In other words, whereas the concepts of radical innocence and justice 
inexorably presuppose undecidability, this neither prevents radical 
innocence as the potential of the subject from being activated nor discards 
justice as a desirable end of human action. What should be further 
unravelled is how the subject is necessarily conditioned by external social 
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factors that subjectivize the subject and how the subjectivized subject can 
still seek re-subjectivation by interrogating the conditioning factors. Bond 
explicates the process of subject formation through two models: the 
developmental model and the structural model. Through the analysis of the 
two models, I will demonstrate how Bond complicates the concepts of 
radical innocence and justice in relation to subjectivity.  
 
2.2. Bond’s Developmental Model of Subjectivity 
 
2.2.1. Neonate – Core Self – Socialized Self 
 
Bond explains the developmental model of subjectivity mainly in two 
essays: ‘The Reason for Theatre’ (1998) and ‘Drama and Freedom’ (2006). 
In the following, I will draw on these two essays to illustrate how Bond 
describes the development of the subject through three stages. But it should 
first be noted that, according to Bond, the structure of the self is like a 
palimpsest where different levels of the self are overlapped. Instead of only 
treating the formation of the self as a linear sequence of developments, 
Bond maintains that the self is a multilayered structure where different 
levels of the self are potentially to be activated and reactivated. Therefore, 
the three stages of the developmental model can also be understood as the 
three modalities of the subject.  
The first stage of the self is called the ‘neonate’ or the ‘monad’, which 
Bond describes as ‘a being enclosed within itself, the entirety of everything’ 
(2006: 207). This stage of the self is actually the ‘pre-self’ – in the world of 
the neonate-monad, there is no difference between the inside self and the 
outside world; what the neonate-monad experiences oscillates between pain 
and pleasure (207-08). At this stage, the imperative of radical innocence to 
seek the right to be is realized through the seeking of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain. The form of justice is embodied through ‘bodily comfort’ 
(217). Therefore, the neonate’s morality is based on ‘egoism’. With regard 
to the role of pain, Bond points out that the experience of pain is the origin 
of consciousness and the sense of responsibility for the external world (2011: 
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xiv) or ‘responsibility for the Tragic’ (2000b: 115). Although Bond 
acknowledges the antagonism between pleasure and pain initiates the 
neonate into the external world, the sphere of ‘not-I’ as the source of pain, 
he denies the existence of ‘pleasure in pain’ as exemplified by the 
phenomenon of masochism (115). Although Bond borrows from Freud the 
dualism between pleasure and pain, his denial of the existence of 
masochism shows his divergence from Freud’s theory. While I will analyze 
how Freud’s psychoanalytic theory influences Bond’s theory in the 
following section, here I only focus on the idea of pain.  
In ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’ (1924), with the 
introduction of the death instinct, Freud postulates that, while sadism 
derives from the portion of the instinct diverted by the libido outwards to 
serve the sexual function, primary masochism derives from another portion 
of the instinct that remains libidinally bound within the organism (2001a: 
163-64). This primary/erotogenic masochism by no means demonstrates the 
pure operation of the death instinct, but it evidences the coalescence 
between the death instinct and the Eros, which manifests itself as ‘pleasure 
in pain’. Obviously Bond need not completely accept Freud’s formulation, 
but what problematizes this refusal is Bond’s theory itself. In fact, the logic 
of the death instinct and pleasure in pain is already intrinsic to Bond’s 
theory. Contrary to the pleasure principle, Bond proposes that, just like the 
self seeks its right to be, the self also has the right to commit suicide (Bas 
and Bond 31). Commenting on the mass suicide in Have I None, Bond 
states:  
 
By committing suicide, the people in the play are acting like 
those people in prison who deliberately wound themselves – 
as if their body was the prison and they were destroying it to 
get out […]. They only manage to hurt themselves, of course. 
In the play they commit suicide not because they are fed up 
with life but because they want to live. But they are not 
allowed to live as they want and they should. (Tuaillon 2015: 
161) 
 
We can observe how the ideas of the death instinct and pleasure in pain are 
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entailed in this comment: firstly, it should be noted that, since the way Bond 
describes the people in prison is analogous to his description of the neonate 
as an enclosed entity, it is not without reasons to propose that the neonate, 
when faced with extreme pain, may possibly seek self-destruction. Secondly, 
although this example does not directly describe the neonate’s behaviour, by 
following Bond’s logic, we can infer that the mass suicide is made possible 
by the existence of radical innocence, which determines how the neonatal 
self reacts to pain and pleasure. This suggests that the drive towards death is 
already included in the logic of radical innocence. Finally, Bond implies 
that, since the society cannot provide the pleasure desired, self-destruction 
becomes a desirable and greater pleasure – although it is a pleasure in pain. 
In short, although Bond’s conception of the neonate is structured by radical 
innocence and the pleasure principle, it cannot exclude the masochistic 
facets such as pain in pleasure and the death instinct.  
 Another problem in relation to pain is about otherness. Whereas the 
neonate is conceived to be an enclosed entity, the neonate’s sensations of 
pain and pleasure originate from the outside world that is yet to be delimited. 
The feelings of pain in fact point to the existence of otherness beyond the 
control of the neonate, and this explains why the oscillation between pain 
and pleasure leads the neonate to distinguish itself from the external world. 
What is more important is the ethical meaning of otherness. As Levinasian 
scholar Simon Critchley argues, Freud’s concept of trauma as the 
unpleasurable disruption of psychic equilibrium is akin to Levinas’s concept 
of the subject traumatized by the irreducible other (2005: 71-72). Taking the 
cue from Critchley’s argument that endows psychoanalysis with ethical 
weight, I propose that, when Bond conceives the neonate’s psychic 
experiences by accentuating the neonate’s existential self-assertion, he 
bypasses the ethical dimension of unpleasurable and painful experiences. 
That is, the process of the neonate’s emergence as self-consciousness 
necessitates the violence of expelling the other that threatens the existence 
of the neonate. However, the traces of the other always already constitute 
the subject, as Levinas defines: ‘Subjectivity, prior to or beyond the free and 
the non-free, obliged with regard to the neighbor, is the breaking point 
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where essence is exceeded by the infinite’ (1998: 12).  
The problem of pain in Bond’s conception of the neonate again reflects 
the conceptual ambiguity of radical innocence – it is undecidable whether it 
is sadistically egoistic or masochistically altruistic. This ambiguity is also 
present in the later two stages of the subject. The transition from the neonate 
to the core self is through the first intellectual event – distinguishing the 
patterns of pleasure and pain and turning such patterns into the ideas of the 
Comic and the Tragic (2006: 208-09). Notably, Bond introduces the concept 
of ‘the Tragic’ as one of the constituents of the human mind and relates this 
concept with the neonate’s painful feelings. For Bond, ‘the Tragic’ is not 
necessarily concerned with dramatic form, or with dramatic effects; rather, 
it is firstly part of the mental activity intrinsic to the human being. Bond 
thus regards the creation of the self as ‘the first drama’ and defines the 
structure of the core self – Tragic, Comic and intellect – as a dramatic and 
dramatizing structure (209). Although the core self will soon be influenced 
by the outside world and ideology, it remains the fundamental dramatizing 
structure upon which the effects of any drama will impose. According to 
Bond, the functioning of such dramatic structure is as follows: ‘The core 
self of the Tragic, the Comic and reason form the imperative of its right to 
be. As the right is implicit in thought, the self must express it, and doing so 
is its radical innocence’ (211). While the neonate’s imperative is realized 
through the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the core self, this 
imperative to seek justice is carried out through the balancing of the Comic, 
the Tragic and reason.  
Bond usually uses children’s play to illustrate the dramatizing structure 
of the psyche: ‘Children enter the real world through the monad’s 
self-creativity, they anthropomorphize the world, create it in their own 
image. […] Trees speak, chairs are tired, storms angry, winds spiteful, 
plates hungry and demons wait in the dark’ (2000b: 119). For Bond, the 
child’s playful anthropomorphizing is their way to utilize their imagination 
to construct an imagined world of justice. However, it is also possible that 
this anthropomorphizing only reflects the child’s misunderstanding of his or 
her ability to control the external world. Although children may need to 
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control their relation with the outside world, it is impossible that the outside 
world can be constructed according to their imagination. Moreover, the 
child’s act of imagining that the objects other than the self must act 
according to their will may necessitate not only the use of imagination but 
also that of violence. Bond is also aware of the problem of the relation of 
the self to others, as he tries to articulate the moral meaning in the transition 
from the egoistic neonate to the core self by stating that ‘[e]gotism is the 
only possible origin of altruism’ (138). However, the problem is that it is 
unclear in what sense altruism can be said to originate from egotism, and 
ethical dilemmas often arise in this undecidable zone. In a more 
corroborative manner, Bond also states: ‘The neonate accepts responsibility 
for the Tragic because no act by it (the sole actor) could remit or eliminate 
the Tragic’ (115). Although Bond acknowledges that the self must take 
responsibility for the other, how to respond to the other remains undecidable. 
Bond’s theory addresses the problems of otherness and the aggression 
inherent in the ego, but Bond’s positions are uncertain. Despite this, this 
theoretical uncertainty becomes the driving force of his dramaturgy of 
subjectivity, as I will illustrate in my analysis of his later plays.  
The third stage of self is called ‘the socialized self’ – the self that is 
influenced by society and ideology. In this stage, according to Bond, the self 
is faced with a human paradox: ‘Radical innocence cannot be at home in 
society unless it is corrupt. But then the self cannot be at home in itself’ 
(2006: 212; original emphasis). Society, according to Bond, is unjust 
because it is administered and controlled by the unequal system of 
economics and politics. When the self enters such society, it cannot attain 
justice as the imperative requires, and this failure either drives the self mad 
or coerces the self to accept injustice. In most cases, the self becomes 
accustomed to mainstream ideology while radical innocence, though 
existent, remains repressed and dormant in the psyche. Therefore, the 
process of socialization creates a ‘gap’ between the pre-socialized core self 
and the socialized self, and the way the core self is socialized is determined 
by how the gap is filled. Usually, the gap is filled by ‘authority’, that is, the 
ideology that ‘legitimates itself through practical utility’ (2012: xxxii). 
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Based on the analysis above, Bond’s developmental model of the subject 
can be summarized in the following table:  
 
The Neonate The Core Self The Socialized Self 
From the wholeness of monad to the 
consciousness of self-other distinction 
From the pre-socialized core self to 
the socialized self  
 
2.2.2. Nothingness 
 
To deepen our understanding of Bond’s idea of gap, the concept of 
‘Nothingness’ that Bond elaborates in ‘The Cap’ (2002) is useful here. 
According to Bond, Nothingness can refer to the neonate’s painful 
experience of being contradicted in its right of existence (2003: xxii), and 
this painful experience is later conceptualized as the Tragic. Moreover, the 
traumatic experience results in a structural gap in the subject and how the 
subject functions is determined by how the gap is filled. The structural gap 
can be understood in terms of Nothingness as a site that can be occupied by 
imagination or ideology. It is important to note that Nothingness not only 
refers to the gap in the self determined by the interaction between the 
ideologized reason and imagination, but it also refers to the possibility of 
changes society can undergo according to specific material conditions and 
ideology. In other words, the idea of Nothingness is the point of intersection 
to articulate how the self is structured within society and how society may 
be changed: 
 
The Neonate The Core Self The Socialized Self 
Nothingness causes pain 
Nothingness occupied 
by the 
anthropomorphizing 
imagination 
Nothingness occupied 
by the ideologized 
interplay between 
imagination and reason 
 
 To address how the self is socially conditioned, we need to analyze the 
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role of ideology in Bond’s theory. For Bond, ideology acts as the source of 
authority, which refers to the operation of legitimation through which social 
reality is constructed and legitimatized. In fact, Bond’s idea is similar to 
Paul Ricoeur’s – Ricoeur defines ideology as the ‘integration between 
legitimacy claim and belief […] by justifying the existing system of 
authority as it is’ (1986: 14); this connects ‘the concept of ideology as 
distortion’ and ‘the integrative concept of ideology’ (ibid.). Ricoeur’s 
definition clarifies that ideology as the legitimization of authority 
necessarily entails distortion in the process of integrating existing systems. 
Moreover, the process of legitimization inherently implicates violence 
because there is no guarantee that legitimatizes this operation prior to 
legitimization. Walter Benjamin also analyzes this founding violence of 
authority in ‘Critique of Violence’ (1921): ‘All violence as a means is either 
lawmaking or law-preserving. […] It follows, however, that all violence as a 
means, even in the most favorable case, is implicated in the problematic 
nature of law itself’ (287). For Benjamin, violence is inherent in the nature 
of law itself: any act of lawmaking itself is founded on violence and the act 
of preserving the law requires another form of violence.  
More specifically, for Bond, just like the source of legitimization of 
society resides within ‘Nothingness’, a gap that can be filled with ideology, 
the process of socialization experienced by the self is conditioned by how 
the gap of the subject is filled with ideology, which constitutes the 
subjective reason. However, Nothingness as the subjective gap can also be 
occupied by imagination, through which ideology can be problematized in 
the subjective interaction between reason and imagination. The power of 
imagination resides in its capacity to posit another source of legitimacy to 
question the established law and to contest the meaning of justice. In 
Benjaminian terms, it is the moment when the violence of the law-giving 
imagination conflicts with the violence of the law-preserving ideology.  
While ideology as the source of legitimatizing authority is based on 
violence, ideology as the source of the signifying order is based on 
‘transcendentalism’ (Bond 2003: x), by which social authority operates as 
the source of meaning. Imagination not only seeks justice, but it also needs 
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truth. As Bond states, ‘[t]he child’s map was a truthful lie, ideology reverses 
this to a lying truth’ (104). The process of a child’s mapping of the world 
begins with the neonate’s experience and continues as the core self 
constructs the world. Although the child’s anthropomorphized world is true 
for the child, it is not true from the adult’s perspective. This is why Bond 
states that ‘[i]n the beginning was the lie and it is the source of all value’ (98) 
– the process of constructing a fictional world is also a process of value 
attribution. For Bond, the possibility of attributing different values to reality 
from the ones attributed by ideology resides in the fact that the self is a gap 
that resists the totalization of value attribution and the closure of 
signification. It is in this sense that Bond states that ‘truth can be spoken 
only in falsehoods. […] The human truth is always in the process of 
becoming. Reality is always emergent’ (2012: xxxviii).  
Therefore, for Bond, the process of socialization in general is the 
process in which ideology structures the self. Ideology refers to the source 
of the legitimation of authority as well as the signifying process that 
distinguishes truth from falsehood. In other words, ideology determines 
what is right and what is true, and this is the main function of reason in 
opposition to imagination, which is the ability to ask why what is right is 
right and why what is true is true. The interaction between reason and 
imagination in the subject constitutes Bond’s structural model of the subject. 
Before I turn to the structural model, I need to analyze how Freud’s theory 
influences Bond’s developmental model as this clarifies the conceptual 
origins of Bond’s theory.  
 
2.2.3. Bond and Freud 
 
As I analyze how Kant’s idea of categorical imperatives influences Bond’s 
conception of radical innocence as the existential imperative, here I want to 
point out how Bond’s developmental model derives from Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory. Regarding his relation to Freud, Bond states: ‘My 
relation to Freud is that he identified aspects of the human self 
but interpreted them through ideological distortions. I accept the potency of 
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Freudian phenomena but not his interpretation of their meaning’ 
(Amoiropoulos 2013: 9). One of Bond’s divergences from Freud lies in the 
concept of the death instinct. This also can be seen in Bond’s developmental 
model – although this theory is apparently influenced by Freud’s conception 
of the development of ‘ego-feeling’, it still evades Freud’s idea of the id as 
the reservoir of instincts. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud 
states that, whereas an infant at the beginning cannot distinguish himself or 
herself from the external world as the source of sensations, he or she will 
gradually realize that some sources of excitation are beyond his or her 
control – that is, a ‘pleasure-ego’ is confronted with an outside world as the 
source of unpleasure. It is at the moment when the self becomes aware of 
the outside world that the reality principle begins to intervene in the ego 
development. Despite this, the feeling of wholeness of the ego will not be 
completely annulled but will be preserved within the realm of mind (2001c: 
66-68). It is obvious that Bond borrows from Freud the concepts such as the 
distinction between pleasure and pain, the formation of the ego at the advent 
of the intervention of the outside world, and the palimpsest structure of the 
psyche.  
However, for Freud, the appearance of the autonomous entity of the 
ego is deceptive since the ego only serves as a façade for the id (2001c: 66). 
In Freud’s second theory of the psychical apparatus, the id as a psychical 
reservoir of two instincts – Eros and the destructive instinct (the death 
instinct) – is the oldest area of the psyche. Both the ego, the functioning of 
which is determined by the pleasure principle and the reality principle, and 
the super-ego are later diversifications of the id (Freud 2001e: 145-48). If 
we compare Freud’s psychic apparatuses and Bond’s model of the subject, 
the concept of the neonate is analogous to Freud’s idea of the 
undifferentiated ‘id-ego’ (a concept close to the ‘pleasure-ego’ previously 
mentioned), in which the energy of Eros is present and abides by the 
pleasure principle while the destructive instinct is neutralized by it (Freud 
2001e: 149-50). Nevertheless, what differentiates Bond from Freud is that 
he renounces the existence of the destructive instinct (death instinct), which 
abides by a pleasure ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, and only accepts the 
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idea of the pleasure principle.  
Bond’s attempt to avoid the concept of the death instinct even leads 
him to make a questionable judgment on Freud:  
 
If it [imagination] were fantasy we would imagine only what 
was pleasant – and doubtless sometimes what was unpleasant 
for others. Freud believed all dreams to be wish-fulfilments 
[sic]. He had to explain why some dreams are nightmares. We 
have to understand why often imagination turns to loss, 
danger, dread – the Tragic. (2000b: 113) 
 
Bond’s assertion that Freud never discusses nightmares is false. But this is 
strange since Bond surely knows that Freud does discuss nightmares in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), in which Freud speculates about the 
idea of the death instinct and opposes the life instincts (Eros) to the death 
instinct (Thanatos). Bond’s opposition to Freud precisely resides in his 
opposition to the idea of the death instinct as he states that ‘Freud believed 
that the self sought escape from tensions, to find quietude (Thanatos). This 
is an ideological misconception […]. It reduces death to a banality. But 
death is an existential drama’ (2000b: 21). If Bond knows the concept of the 
death instinct in Freud’s writing, he should know that this concept originates 
from Freud’s analysis of war neurosis and its symptomatic repetitions of 
nightmares.  
Although Bond argues that Freud’s idea of the death drive ‘reduces 
death to a banality’, he still acknowledges the significance of death as ‘an 
existential drama’. In fact, despite Bond’s opposition, his theory is closer to 
Freud than he admits. In order to clarify this relation, we need to consider 
another difference between Bond and Freud: the concept of the super-ego. 
According to Bond, 
 
Pleasure is different from pain but the holistic neonate is the 
self-origin of both. This later becomes the profound relation 
of the Tragic and the Comic. […] There has to be a relation 
between p and p (later between Tragic and Comic) – and 
subsequently between right and wrong, and this is the basis of 
civilization. Right and wrong are cultural appropriations of 
the neonate’s self creation. (Amoiropoulos 2013: 7) 
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In Freud’s theory, the ego’s sense of right and wrong is decided by the 
super-ego, which develops out of the ego’s identification of the parental 
authority and later other authority figures and traditional morality (2001d: 
64). The super-ego is analogous to Bond’s idea of authority, which ‘corrupts’ 
the self in the process of socialization. Bond insists that the neonate is the 
origin of right and wrong because he resists the idea of the self being totally 
dominated by law and order. However, it by no means follows that Freud 
thinks the ego must be restricted by the super-ego; on the contrary, Freud 
proposes that the main aim of psychoanalysis is to strengthen the ego and 
diminish the power of the super-ego. As he famously states, ‘[w]here id was, 
there ego shall be’ (80) – instead of obeying the super-ego, the ego should 
follow the id.  
The original German wording of this famous statement is ‘Wo Es war, 
soll Ich werden’. Although in the standard edition, James Strachey translates 
‘Es’ as ‘id’ and ‘Ich’ as ‘ego’, Jacques Lacan proposes a different 
translation and interpretation. In Seminar VII on the ethics of 
psychoanalysis, Lacan translates ‘Es’ as ‘it’ and ‘Ich’ as ‘I’: ‘That “I” which 
is supposed to come to be where “it” was, and which analysis has taught us 
to evaluate, is nothing more than that whose root we already found in the “I” 
which asks itself what it wants’ (1992: 7). Towards the end of the seminar, 
Lacan rephrases the moral experience undergone by the subject in relation 
to ‘it’ as ‘Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?’ (314). 
Just as ‘it’ is different from traditional morality manifested as the super ego, 
the desire in the subject can never be satisfied with what is provided by the 
present norm. More intriguingly, he uses Antigone as his example to 
illustrate the problem of ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden’ and endows the death 
instinct with ethical significance. For Lacan, Antigone’s resistance to Creon 
through her suicide is ‘radically destructive’ (283). Although Lacan’s 
interpretation of Antigone’s desire as destructive is still reminiscent of the 
death instinct, the difference between ‘it’ and ‘id’ is that the former 
designates a purer ethical stance. That is, the destructiveness of ‘it’ may not 
necessarily entail the drive towards death; instead, the destructiveness of ‘it’ 
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derives more from it being the Kantian categorical imperative – an 
unconditional ‘Thou shalt’ (315-16).  
Therefore, the fact that Bond misreads Freud is not so much important 
as the fact that this misunderstanding betrays the implicit theoretical affinity 
between Bond’s idea of radical innocence and Freud’s idea of the death 
instinct. If how the neonate experiences the world and how the neonate 
judges these experiences is structured by radical innocence, then radical 
innocence cannot only accord itself with the pleasure principle. There is 
always a surplus beyond the pleasure principle at work, as evidenced by 
‘Es’, ‘it’, and the death instinct. Only through this interpretation can Bond 
validate the relationship between radical innocence and the ‘drama of death’, 
as exemplified by Antigone and his own plays.  
 
2.3. Bond’s Structural Model of Subjectivity  
 
In Bond’s theory, the behaviour of the socialized self is determined by the 
interaction between reason and imagination. The difference between reason 
and imagination is that between knowing ‘what’ and asking ‘why’. As Bond 
states, ‘[y]ou can be instructed in bricklaying. Who will teach you whether 
to build a hospital or a gas chamber? – the imagination’ (2003: 119). In 
other words, we can be instructed to build a gas chamber and export people 
into the chamber reasonably and legitimately, but only imagination can 
question why this is reasonable and legitimate. Based on the basic 
interaction between reason that instructs and imagination that questions, 
Bond further complicates the interplay between reason and imagination in 
his discussion of madness. In ‘Social Madness’ (1997), Bond distinguishes 
two kinds of madness: clinical madness and social madness. According to 
Bond, people become clinically mad when they fail to create a functional 
relationship with society and their madness is developed as an alternative 
reality that questions the legitimacy of what is regarded as the real. In 
contrast, social madness designates the fact that people who follow the 
rational logic of society are mad because society itself, due to its structural 
injustice, is intrinsically ‘mad’. As Bond further explicates and connects 
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madness with his theory of subjectivity, it is clear that the ‘corruption’ that 
occurs when neonates undergo the process of socialization is the foundation 
of madness (2000b: 87). In Bond’s theory, madness is structurally formed 
within human subjectivity: while the socially mad undergo the process of 
normal socialization, the clinically mad who fail or refuse to accept the 
process turn to delusions to construct an alternative fictional reality. The 
following table shows how these two kinds of madness correspond to 
different structural relationships between reason and imagination:  
 
Clinical Madness The self dominated by imagination 
Social Madness 
Interaction between reason and imagination within the 
socialized self 
The socialized self dominated by reason 
 
Notably, Bond’s concept of clinical madness is related to that of the 
core self. The pre-socialized core self refers to the state in which the child 
uses imagination to anthropomorphize and construct the world. Although 
the pre-ideologized logic of anthropomorphizing imagination is different 
from the logic by which the socialized self interacts with society, it is the 
means by which the pre-socialized self claims the right to be in the world. 
Following Bond’s theory of the developmental model, we can infer that 
clinical madness may derive from the failure of the socializing process, and 
this is how Bond characterizes Billy in Chair. As an adopted child by Alice, 
Billy is forbidden to leave the apartment and thus never interacts properly 
with outer reality. Instead, his interaction with the world is imaginatively 
constructed through his pictures. The other possible cause of clinical 
madness is the regression from the socialized self to the core self as a 
symptom of trauma, exemplified by Dea’s hallucination in Dea, in which 
Dea is driven mad by the death of her son.  
In addition to the self being dominated by imagination, the self can 
also possibly be dominated by reason. As Bond states, ‘[m]adness is an 
excess of rationality’ (2003: 98). In the case of the self excessively 
dominated by reason, ‘[t]he mad are reduced to relying entirely on their 
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reason’ (ibid.). The self dominated by reason adheres to law and order, and 
the symptom of this kind of social madness is the instrumentalization of the 
self in submission to the order. In Chair, the Welfare Officer, who 
interrogates Alice with cold bureaucratic language, demonstrates herself as 
an instrument of the totalitarian state. In Part Three of Dea, Cliff, a soldier 
wandering in the ruins, seems to be ‘possessed’ by the military command 
and cannot stop himself from shooting Dea. The self who completely 
succumbs to reason renounces any resource to imagination and acts strictly 
in accordance with the operation of authority. This recalls what Hannah 
Arendt’s commentary in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951): 
‘Totalitarian government can be safe only to the extent that it can mobilize 
man’s own will power in order to force him into that gigantic movement of 
History or Nature which supposedly uses mankind as its material’ (1973: 
473). 
However, it is impossible to define the subject through such a 
schematic manner. As Bond states, Hitler may destroy for irrational reason, 
but his acts of violence are not without imagination (Hankins xcix). Lacan, 
in analyzing psychosis, also contends that even psychotic hallucinations are 
based on another kind of reason – the lack of the order of signification need 
not prevent the psychotic from constituting another reality (2007: 470). 
Thus, the problem is not to discern the topology of how reason and 
imagination relate to each other since, in whichever form, this entanglement 
structures the subject in madness. The problem is how to disentangle 
imagination and reason in order to articulate alternative forms of 
subjectivity. For Bond, this is the task of drama that dramatizes subjectivity.  
 
2.4. Dramatizing Subjectivity  
 
By implication, for Bond, the subject is structurally mad. Whether the 
subject is dominated by pure reason, pure imagination, or by any 
harmonious, yet corrupted, interactions between reason and imagination, the 
subject is anchored in different forms of madness. However, what is at stake 
is how radical imagination can become – radical innocence at the foundation 
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of imagination is the force that radically questions any form of madness. In 
order to go beyond the enclosed circle of madness, in ‘The Third Crisis’ 
(2012), Bond articulates the idea of ‘psychosis’ as another form of madness 
that transcends the enclosed structure of madness. While the act of authority 
that fills the gap with law is an act of necessary violence, the self, in certain 
circumstances, may not be able to accept the established order and seeks to 
create ‘unreal-reality’ (Bond 2012: xxxii) through imagination. This is what 
Bond terms as ‘psychosis’. The discrepancy between the socialized self and 
ideology compels the subject to question the social order and to seek justice, 
but those who disobey and transgress the law are usually regarded as mad 
and abnormal. In defence of madness, Bond states that ‘[t]he mad go mad in 
order to seek the truth of their situation, and in drama the 
fictions-in-the-fiction are the means by which our madness heals itself’ 
(xxxviii). It is important to point out that, for Bond, the only way to 
transcend the structural madness is to keep psychotically questioning and 
self-questioning – this is radical innocence in its purest form as well as a 
process of deconstructive self-dramatizing.  
Although Bond seldom refers to the thought of deconstruction, he does 
refer to it once: ‘Deconstruction shows that there is no “closure” in thought, 
nowhere meaning may be secured or value confirmed. But value comes 
from the imagination because it cannot be stabilised by closure’ (2003: 
114-15; original emphasis). It is due to the impossibility of the closure of 
meaning that Bond states that drama is ‘a form of psychosis’ that ‘unravels 
ideology’s contortions’ (2012: xxxviii). Therefore, for Bond, imagination 
refers not only to the subject’s faculty but also to the imagined dramatic 
work that preserves the operation of imagination. Imagination, or, radical 
innocence, can ‘unbind’ the distortions of reality and ‘rebind’ these 
elements into a new order that can be preserved in dramatic form and 
disclose new possibilities of approaching reality.   
To illustrate the relation between Bond’s theory and his plays, in the 
following I will examine two plays, The Crime of the Twenty-First Century 
(2001) and Have I None (2000), focusing on the extreme moments when the 
characters are forced to decide ‘the just act’ towards others and how these 
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actions demonstrate Bond’s theory of subjectivity. While both plays are set 
in a totalitarian state in 2077, they delineate the world from different 
viewpoints and provide contrasting justifications for the justice enacted. 
This attests to the fact that the indeterminate nature of the Bondian subject 
can only be conserved through different dramatizations.  
 
2.5. The Crime of the Twenty-First Century 
 
The Crime of the Twenty-First Century was first staged by Alain Françon at 
the National Theatre de la Colline in Paris in 2001. Set in a dystopian future 
where people live under severe surveillance, The Crime of the Twenty-First 
Century revolves around Sweden’s journey of escape. He was incarcerated 
due to vandalism, but he succeeded in escaping by pulling the tag that tracks 
him out of his chest. Under the surveillance of the totalitarian regime, 
Sweden is reduced to the status of homo sacer – outside the control of the 
system, he becomes a bare life. When he first meets Hoxton and Grig in the 
ruins of the suburbs, Grig states: ‘Escapes – law ain cover ’em’ (Bond 2003: 
225). When Sweden recounts how he threw the tag into the river, he is also 
aware of his own ‘symbolic death’ in the social system: ‘That’s ’ow I died – 
drown myself ’n floated out t’ sea’ (Bond 2003: 227). However, even 
though he has been excluded from the society, he remains positive and 
hopeful. At the beginning of the play, Sweden is portrayed as a child-like 
young man – he ‘jumps onto the wall and balances along it’ or ‘sits on the 
wall, casually swinging his heels against it’ (Bond 2003: 231). Sweden even 
cries like a child when Grig does not believe what he says about the tag. In 
the Paris production in 2001,23 Éric Caravaca’s interpretation of Sweden 
established him as a child-like young man by agile body movements in 
contrast to Hoxton’s and Grig’s slow movements suggestive of their 
exhaustion. The physical fatigue was established not only through their 
physical appearance but also through the way they speak. This contrast is 
made explicit in Françon’s production, in which Grig, played by Carlo 
                                                
23 My analysis of this production is based on the recording archived at Ina THEQUE. 
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Brandt, spoke with a sore throat due to lack of water. It is important to point 
out that Bond’s conception of the subject is never an abstract entity but must 
be concretized as a human body determined by physical vulnerability and 
finitude. Especially in this play, Sweden’s journey is also a journey of 
accelerating physical suffering.  
 Although Hoxton refuses to leave with Sweden, who claims that there 
is somewhere better than the ruins, he still leaves. During Sweden’s absence, 
Grace, Hoxton’s daughter, finds her mother in the ruins. Hoxton left Grace 
when she was chased out of her house because she could not afford to keep 
her. Before that, Hoxton used to work for a rich woman, and other women 
who could not afford to raise their children paid Hoxton and left their 
children there. However, Hoxton used the money only to raise Grace and 
abandoned other children. Contrary to Sweden, who wants to leave, Grace 
comes to the suburb ruins in order to live together with Hoxton. Later, when 
Sweden returns, he has been blinded by the army. Different from Sweden, 
who is determined to escape from the control of the regime, Hoxton, Grig, 
and Grace are reluctant to escape with him – while Grig states that he will 
return to his small hometown once Sweden leaves Hoxton, Hoxton and 
Grace only intend to stay in the suburb although Sweden warns that the 
ruins will soon be cleared by the regime.  
 Frustrated with Hoxton’s refusal to leave with him and anxious to find 
a way of living without eyes, Sweden threatens to kill Hoxton: ‘Tell me ’ow 
I live! Out there! No eyes! No face! Tell me!’ (Bond 2003: 251). Sweden’s 
killing of Hoxton can be explained by his revenge for her lack of care and 
help, and his stabbing Hoxton’s breasts implies their pseudo mother-son 
relationship and Sweden’s pre-Oedipal desire. Being reduced by the 
situation to, in Bond’s words, ‘a powerless infant’ (Tuaillon 2015: 195), 
Sweden’s homicide can be compared to the neonate’s insistence on his right 
to be – the violence enacted out of radical innocence. Sweden even sings 
and dances with Hoxton’s corpse as if he returns to the stage of the core self 
and enacts his fantasy of omnipotence. In Bond’s conception of the core self, 
children’s play always potentially entails aggression and violence, and this 
is clearly demonstrated by Sweden’s actions. After killing Hoxton, Sweden 
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accuses Grace of co-opting with Grig and kills her out of his fear that Grace 
may betray him. After the death of Hoxton and Grace, Sweden tries to 
escape again – this time, he still fails and his legs are mutilated by the army. 
Grig, though having become a member of the state, witnesses Sweden’s 
suffering and claims that Sweden is ‘innocent’. Grig’s assertion that Sweden 
is innocent suggests that Sweden’s ‘crimes’ originate from a bigger crime, 
that is, a bad life in which living a good life is impossible. As Bond states, 
since the characters’ violence derives from their resistance to the 
authoritarian domination, the violence bears ethical significance: ‘They can 
be violent to each other, but it is always on a moral ground – to save 
someone else and make a new valuable life’ (Tuaillon 2015: 193). 
 In terms of Bond’s theory of subjectivity, the world of ruins both 
represents an imagined post-apocalyptic world and a psychic field in which 
the palimpsest structure of the Bondian subject can be revealed – this is 
made obvious especially in Sweden’s interactions with Hoxton and Grace 
before he murders them. In terms of images of the stage, Bond intends that 
the wall should delimit ‘a boundary between the site and the social world 
outside, between the self and the material reality, the subjective and the 
objective’ (Tuaillon 2015: 123). As these characters are what Zygmunt 
Bauman designate as ‘wasted lives’, the outside social world, though only 
obliquely presented, perfectly embodies a totalitarian state that has the 
absolute right to ‘preside over the distinction between order and chaos, law 
and lawlessness, citizen and homo sacer’ (Bauman 33; original emphasis). 
As Bauman suggests, such society is based on the logic of ‘order-building’, 
through which everything should be put in its proper place (30). Therefore, 
paradoxically, this dystopian society of order can be the world of justice 
desired by the Bondian subject, whose imperative is to seek a world in 
which everything has its own place. Since the construction of a just world 
must always already be a deconstructive process, within any self-claimed 
just world there is concealed violence that maintains the surface of just 
order. In this sense, the landscape of ruins in this play actually discloses a 
terrain where the deconstructive desire for justice confronts the established 
social world of justice – this dystopian imagination of ruins can be 
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productive since it guides our gaze towards the wasted lives as well as 
towards the utopian potential inherent within the ruins.  
In Performance in a Time of Terror (2011), Jenny Hughes argues that 
performances of waste, although they depict the mortification of the other, 
can provide possible sites for interrogating resilience and adaptability (195). 
Bond’s combination of dystopian imagination and utopian longing 
exemplifies Hughes’s idea of ‘critical mimesis’, which is defined as ‘a 
practice of performance that materialises protective and habitable worlds in 
which life might encounter its own decay, whilst also securing itself in the 
world’ (22). As ‘critical mimesis’ is not to reproduce the world as it is but a 
self-conscious interrogation of the process of making and unmaking of the 
world, the works of art that evoke ruins can ‘evoke, capture and mobilise 
the sensual domains of mortification and adaptation, decay and vivification’ 
(191). In addition to demonstrating the ethically extreme situations, in his 
stage directions Bond strikingly details how the characters cope with their 
everyday life in the ruins – they need to drink, wash clothes, and hang the 
washing. In performance, these everyday routines, which are placed in an 
unusual situation, attract attention since they sensually remind us of how our 
human existence is built on these mundane chores, and even in the ruins the 
possibility of humanity starts from these routines. These routines also reflect 
the character’s situation and internal state. When Sweden kills Hoxton, he 
even notices how he has made the washing dirty and tries to hang the pieces 
of washing; however, disturbed by his murder of Hoxton, he cannot do it 
properly. Also, Grace, after arriving at the ruins, makes a little path by 
walking up and down between the ramp and the cell as if she needs to adapt 
to the ruins and make the place livable.  
Bond uses Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no such thing as society’ as 
the epigraph to this play, suggesting that, through this play, he interrogates 
how the atomized individuals can rebuild a community together and how 
this process inevitably leads to violence. Being both a victim who suffers 
from mutilation and dismemberment and a victimizer who kills Hoxton and 
Grace, Sweden bears the most extreme suffering and enacts irremissible 
violence. Through Sweden, Bond explores the extreme end of humanity and 
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compels us to answer whether Sweden ‘is still a man’, in Primo Levi’s 
terms. Sacrificing others’ lives to make oneself live seems immoral, but for 
Bond, this is the manifestation of the cost of resistance and emblematic of 
our modern human condition (Tuaillon 2015: 193). Although we may 
understand Sweden’s violence, his actions can hardly be morally normative. 
Bond tends to stipulate the primacy of the imperative for justice and 
bypasses the problems of aggressiveness and otherness, but when 
subjectivity is dramatized, drama can be a medium that guides us through 
different extremes of (in)humanity unexplored in his theory. Although Bond 
may define what Sweden has done as ‘just’ and ‘innocent’, this by no means 
excludes other possibilities of defining humanity – whereas Sweden 
embodies one extreme of humanity, in Have I None, Sara embodies the 
other extreme.  
 
2.6. Have I None 
 
Have I None was first presented by Big Brum in Birmingham in 2000. 
Françon directed the play at the National Theatre de la Colline in 2003 and 
restaged it in 2008. My analysis of performance refers to the production in 
2003.24 In the world of Have I None, people are required to abolish their 
memories. Jams, a police patroller, and Sara, his wife, live a life of amnesia. 
Their life, nevertheless, is disrupted by Grit, who appears one day and 
claims that he is Sara’s brother because he found a photo of their past, 
which restored his memory. Disturbed by Grit, who breaks down their daily 
order, Jams and Sara decide to kill Grit by poisoning his soup, but it is Sara 
who ends up dying by drinking the soup.  
Through Jams, Sara, and Grit, Bond’s presentation of the modalities of 
subjectivity in this play is almost schematic: Jams embodies the subject 
whose behaviour is principally determined by authoritarian reason; Sara is 
divided between reason and imagination; Grit evokes and become part of 
Sara’s memory and imagination. However, we should still be attentive to 
                                                
24 My analysis of the production is based on the recording archived at Ina THEQUE.  
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how Bond gives nuances to this schematic presentation. Jams’s logic of 
action is primarily determined by the external order that has been 
internalized. The internalization of law and order sustains the surface of 
everyday normality for Jams and Sara – this is demonstrated through Jams’s 
and Sara’s obsession with how the chair and table should be placed, and 
when Grit disrupts this order, they become paranoiac, as Bond observes: 
‘The characters are obsessed with the place of things because authority has 
abolished the past and this made society amnesiac’ (Tuaillon 2015: 161). 
However, even though Jams may embody what Hannah Arendt designates 
as ‘the banality of evil’ – ‘sheer thoughtlessness’ and ‘lack of imagination’ 
(2000: 379) – in Bond’s characterization, he still provides the space for 
radical innocence. In Arendt’s term, the psychic potential of radical 
innocence is analogous to ‘natality’ – the inner capacity to start new 
thinking against the logicality through which the mind submits itself to 
totalitarian tyranny (1973: 473). Jams’s radical innocence is provoked by 
his witnessing an old woman trying to climb on a table in order to fix a 
picture in a ruined house. Bond states that ‘this table seems to represent this 
old woman’s home before it was ruined, so it belongs to the forbidden 
pre-amnesiac past’ (Tuaillon 2015: 118). Although Jams never awakens like 
Sara does, his unease regarding his sight of the old woman suggests that the 
potential to approach the world differently still rests inside him.  
Different from Jams, Sara’s encounter with Grit awakens her to the 
existence of her past concealed by the authorities, and her awakening results 
in her drinking the poisoned soup, an act that seems to be undertaken in 
order to save Grit:  
 
Grit  She drank my soup! 
Jams  What? (He looks at the table. Points to the bowl in 
Sara’s hands.) No – that’s his – 
Grit  (struggling in the ropes) I hope it chokes the bitch! 
Jams  (pointing) His! – poisoned. 
Sara cleans the inside of the bowl with her finger and licks it. 
Jams  You drank his deliberately! 
Sara drops the bowl. 
Grit  Poisoned? 
Sara  Take me outside. I don’t want to die in the house. 
 99 
Grit  You tried to poison me! (Bond 2000a: 87) 
 
Sara’s suicide remains enigmatic since she never reveals her real motives. It 
is not clear whether she kills herself in order to save Grit or does so for 
other reasons. Another enigma is whether Sara is Grit’s sister or not. While 
Sara refuses to accept Grit’s claim that he is her brother, in a rather 
mysterious interval in this play when Sara wears a coat decorated with 
spoons on one side and bones on the other, she is able to share with Grit’s 
childhood memory. Bond’s comment on this question is rather ambiguous: 
‘He is real but he is also a figment of Sara’s mind, she is inventing with 
various odds and ends, to create a human relationship which is forbidden by 
her society’ (Tuaillon 2015: 162). The ambiguity is deftly demonstrated in 
Françon’s Paris production in 2003: in this interval, the lighting is darkened 
and fused with Sara’s costumes, resulting in a dreamlike atmosphere that 
reminds spectators that this interval can be Sara’s unconscious working 
instead of reality. The subjective implication is enforced by the fact that 
Jams cannot see Sara in her coat. This ambiguity is further sustained by 
Dominique Valadié’s acting: she portrayed Sara living in two different 
worlds – in her quarrel with Jams, she was presented by Valadié as a 
farcical character; however, when she contemplates the door-knocking 
unheard by Jams, or when she starts to share memory with Grit, Valadié’s 
Sara was calm and solemn. In addition, the spoons and bones adorning the 
coat are reminiscent of life and death, suggesting that Sara’s unconscious 
may be as powerful as the neonate’s primal experiences of the world. 
In this play, the act of committing suicide is described by Grit as a 
collective phenomenon, and Bond sees it as the symptom of human desire to 
live on (Tuaillon 2015: 161). Undeniably, Sara can commit suicide 
‘deliberately’ to save Grit whether he is her brother or not. Nevertheless, 
instead of being the act of self-sacrifice, Sara’s suicide can also be 
categorized as only one more case among others. In other words, she may 
commit suicide out of egoistic need rather than altruistic concern just as she 
imagines that Grit is his brother only to achieve self-appeasement. 
Obviously, Bond intends both the relationship between Sara and Jams and 
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Sara’s motives of suicide to remain ambiguous, but we can be certain that 
there is another psychic level operating within Sara. Even before Grit 
appears, Sara keeps hearing the mysterious sound of door-knocking, a sign 
of Sara’s inner disturbance that she cannot suppress. Both Grit’s appearance 
and the sound of door-knocking, instead of being defined as ‘real’, should 
be regarded as ‘spectral’.  
In Have I None, it is through the dramaturgy of spectrality that Bond’s 
presents the palimpsest structure of subjectivity. This is especially 
demonstrated through Sara, who is haunted and becomes herself a ghost. 
Before Sara recounts her memory of Grit, she appears wearing ‘a 
ground-length loose coat of stiff sky-blue silk […] covered with metal 
spoons’ (Bond 2000a: 77). After Sara finishes narrating her shared memory 
with Grit, she ‘takes off the coat, turns the coat inside out, and puts it on 
again. The inside is black and covered with bones’ (Bond 2000a: 78). Sara’s 
spectral presence makes her visible to Grit but invisible to Jams. Curiously, 
in ‘Phenomenon and Enigma’ (1957), Levinas states that an enigma 
manifests itself as an absolute disturbance as if ‘[s]omeone unknown to me 
rang my doorbell and interrupted my work’ (1987: 64). An enigma cannot 
be transformed into a phenomenon that is ‘a presence to the gaze and to 
speech’ (61) – moreover, an enigma remains ‘[a] quite different plot [which] 
takes form in the I’ (70). Levinas’s enigma as ‘a different plot’ is not 
without dramaturgical implications. Both the sound of door-knocking and 
Sara’s emergence as a spectre are ‘enigmatic’ in the sense that these 
occurrences interrupt the coherence of emplotment based on materialistic 
logic and possibility. Although Bond does not explain who knocks on the 
door and why Sara dresses herself like a spectre, the gaps of emplotment are 
not dramaturgical failures – instead, their significance derives from their 
rupturing force to disturb the totalitarian order within the play as the only 
logical emplotment of reality.  
In fact, spectrality permeates underneath the ostensibly highly-ordered 
oppressive world. Another spectre in this play is Grit if what Sara recounts 
is true: ‘All next day I was terrified they’d find out you were dead. Blame 
me! – I’d dragged you. I was frightened in the way only a child can be…No 
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one found out. The doctor didn’t notice you were dead’ (Bond 2000a: 78). If 
Grit is Sara’s deceased brother, his ghostly appearance also manifests Sara’s 
inner disturbance. He comes to find Sara because he has found a photo that 
reminds him of his sister, and Sara can only recognize him when she also 
starts to be haunted by her memory. However, if Jams cannot see Sara as a 
spectre, how is it possible that Jams can see Grit as a spectre materialized by 
Sara’s memory? Or is it possible to assume that Grit’s appearance also 
disturbs Jams, who seems to be a strict rule-abiding patroller? At the end of 
the play, after Grit takes Sara’s corpse and leaves the house, Jams hears 
again a knock at the door. The spectral sound of door-knocking does not 
disappear after Sara dies and Grit leaves. Instead, the spectre still haunts the 
house, and Jams is no exception to this haunting.  
As psychoanalysis academic Stephen Frosh points out, the experience 
of being haunted is to be affected by an inner voice that keeps returning (2). 
But what is the significance of this inner voice? Towards the conclusion of 
his analysis of the ethics of the voice from Socrates to Heidegger, 
philosophy scholar Mladen Dolar states that, in the tradition of the inner 
voice of conscience, the ethical voice always comes from the Other: ‘The 
ethical voice is not the subject’s own, it is not for the subject to master or 
control it […]. But it does not pertain simply to the Other either, although it 
stems from it: it would belong to the Other if it were reducible to positive 
commands, if it were not merely an opening and an enunciation’ (102). In 
other words, the voice of conscience is not an external demand that requires 
any specific moral actions, nor is it the inner freedom that governs the 
autonomous subject. It is the opening that belongs neither to the subject nor 
to the Other. But how should this opening be understood? Dolar ends his 
analysis with Heidegger’s ontological description of the voice, which he 
regards as the purest form of the ethics of the voice: it is the voice of alterity 
that disrupts self-reflexity, extricates us from submerging into existents, and 
directs us into the opening of Being (96). Therefore, in Heidegger’s 
ontology, the opening is the opening of Being. However, it is peculiar that 
Dolar fails to take into account Levinas’s ethics, which is based on a 
critique of Heidegger. Foreseeably, Levinas refutes the association between 
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the voice of conscience and being:  
 
[T]o hear the voice of conscience – it is not enough to be 
(rather, it is not a question of being) in relationship with a 
freedom, perceiving it in the other, since we already recognize 
that freedom in its transactions. This freedom is already 
presented to me when I buy up, or exploit. For me to know 
my injustice, for me to catch sight of the possibility of justice, 
a new situation is required: someone has to call me to account. 
Justice does not result from the normal play of injustice. It 
comes from the outside, “through the door”. (1987: 39-40) 
 
According to Levinas, the voice of conscience does not come from the 
opening of Being but from the outside that not only interrupts 
self-coherence but also resists being pacified. It is the voice ‘through the 
door’, the voice that originates from a stranger in proximity but beyond 
grasp.  
In Bond’s theory, the idea of radical innocence emerges as intimately 
caught up with the idea of the voice of conscience. The operation of radical 
innocence as the existential imperative to seek justice presupposes an 
untotalizable residue like a voice of conscience that demands the self to 
correct the unjust. Even in the phase of the neonate-monad, radical 
innocence as the imperative to assert one’s right to be is already posited as 
an inner voice: ‘I have the right to be’. However, this inner voice is not 
completely interior as it also comes from beyond the enclosed self. 
Therefore, both Grit’s appearance and the sound of door-knocking 
dramatizes the ethical relationality that keeps structuring and haunting the 
subject, no matter how conformist and ideologized he or she is. Sara’s 
suicide also attests to this spectral structure of ethical relationality – she 
chooses to commit suicide either because of her desire to die for Grit or 
because of her awareness of the impossibility of ethical relations.  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
In analyzing The War Plays, theatre academic Jean-Pierre Sarrazac 
maintains that the only character is ‘humanity’ (134). In fact, rather than 
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being autonomous individuals, characters in Bond’s later plays embody a 
variety of possibilities of humanity in accordance with his theory of 
subjectivity. Through the comparison of Sweden’s and Sara’s reactions to 
extreme situations, we can observe that the dramatized Bondian subject 
foregrounds the undecidability of justice that cannot be predetermined 
theoretically. What confront Sara and Sweden are moments of 
undecidability in which they are forced to make an impossible just decision. 
The undecidability stems from the theoretical incompatibility between the 
particular situation and the universal imperative. Moreover, in a totalitarian 
world where every human being is reduced to a mere means of 
governmental rationality, possible actions of justice necessarily entail 
violence as a means of resistance to the dominant authorities. Such acts of 
violence, hence, are manifested through Sweden’s homicide and Sara’s 
suicide. In addition, as Karoline Gritzner argues, in line with Adorno’s 
thinking, ‘the concept of the self continues to be decentred and re-imagined 
on the contemporary stage where it functions like a residual reminder of the 
unrealized (utopian) promise […] of freedom’ (2008: 330). Indeed, in 
Bond’s theory and dramaturgy of subjectivity, ‘the self’ remains a necessary 
concept, but it is always already divided and corrupted. However, this does 
not mean that the self is incapable of ethical actions – on the contrary, both 
the palimpsest structure of the psyche and the faculty of radical innocence 
endow the Bondian subject with the potential to decide how to act in 
extreme moments of undecidability and define the possible forms of 
humanity and freedom.  
Bond’s theory of subjectivity is important not only because this theory 
demonstrates how Bond defines humanity but also because it determines 
Bond’s dramaturgy of his later plays. In the next chapter, I will analyze how 
Bond’s theory of subjectivity determines his post-Auschwitz dramaturgy. 
As I argued in the previous chapter, throughout his playwriting career, Bond 
has developed different dramaturgical strategies to deal with the Holocaust, 
and his post-Auschwitz dramaturgy is conceivable only on the basis of his 
theory of subjectivity.   
  
 104 
Chapter Three 
Aesthetics and Ethics in Bond’s Post-Auschwitz 
Dramaturgy 
 
As I outlined in the previous chapter, at the heart of Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity is his quest for a new form of drama in response to the 
problematic of ‘after-Auschwitz’. Bond contends that post-Auschwitz 
drama requires a new conception of humanity and this new conception must 
be incorporated by drama. While the previous chapter partly explicated this 
problematic by focusing on Bond’s theory of subjectivity, in this chapter I 
will focus on how Bond approaches Auschwitz both as a historical event 
and as a dramaturgical trope, and in what sense Bond’s later drama can be 
defined as ‘post-Auschwitz’.  
While I term Bond’s late works as post-Auschwitz drama, how to 
define this term is not without its problems. Robert Skloot, who has edited 
two volumes of The Theatre of the Holocaust (1982; 1999) and written The 
Darkness We Carry: The Drama of the Holocaust (1988), does not include 
Beckett’s or Bond’s plays in his selection and discussion. While Skloot 
acknowledges the existence of various dramaturgical approaches to the 
Holocaust, he refers to ‘the historical event itself’ as the shared foundation 
of what he terms ‘the Theatre of the Holocaust’ (1982: 19). Furthermore, he 
posits five criteria that Holocaust plays have to meet: they should ‘pay 
homage to the victims,’ ‘educate audiences to the facts of history,’ ‘produce 
an emotional responses to those facts,’ ‘raise certain moral questions,’ and 
‘draw a lesson from the events re-created’ (14). In short, the criteria Skloot 
adopts are based on historical realism and the educational potential of 
theatrical experience. Gene A. Plunka refers to Skloot’s five objectives of 
Holocaust drama and espouses similar criteria in Holocaust Drama: The 
Theatre of Atrocity (2011). He admits that playwrights of Holocaust drama 
face the difficulty of choosing dramaturgical styles between realistic and 
absurd: while realism cannot meet the most rigorous standards of historical 
truthfulness, absurdism distorts the absoluteness of reality (17). Despite this, 
he makes clear that his intention is to analyze those plays that are written 
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directly about Nazi genocide and whose historical references can be 
examined according to their accuracy and veracity. Therefore, he excludes 
absurdist plays such as Beckett’s Endgame and Ionesco’s The Chairs since 
they are not regarded as Holocaust plays as defined in this way (18-19).  
Michael Rothberg proposes that Holocaust writings are principally 
determined by two kinds of epistemological and representational 
presumptions: realist and antirealist. By realist he means a claim that 
knowledge is attainable and such knowledge can be represented, while by 
antirealist he means a claim that the Holocaust – which is hardly knowable 
– cannot be translated by means of traditional representational conventions 
(3-4). The distinction between realist and anti-realist dramaturgy is not 
absolute. Rather, they constitute a spectrum of dramaturgical possibilities in 
which Holocaust plays can be situated. It is also possible to discover a blend 
of different dramaturgical approaches within one play.  
 Contrary to Skloot and Plunka, whose definition of Holocaust drama is 
realist, Karoline Gritzner and Élizabeth Angel-Perez adopt a more antirealist 
approach to discussing drama and the Holocaust. In Gritzer’s Adorno and 
Modern Theatre: The Drama of the Damaged Self in Bond, Rudkin, Barker 
and Kane (2015), she bases her discussion of these playwrights on Adornian 
post-Auschwtiz aesthetics, and she argues that their works can ‘appear as 
autonomous response to the instremental and identitarian logic of 
consumerist society’ (18). By implication, ‘Auschwitz’ here, instead of 
being regarded only as a historical event, refers to what Adorno designates 
as the logic of identity thinking, which also permeates contemporary 
consumer society. In addition, these works are not represented ‘in socially, 
morally or politically engaged terms’, which are further challenged through 
gestures of dramaturgical violation (23). In Voyages au Bout du Possible: 
Les Théâtres du Traumatisme de Samuel Beckett à Sarah Kane (2006), 
Angel-Perez bases her analysis of British contemporary ‘post-Auchwitz’ 
drama on the idea of Auschwitz as traumatism instead of on historical 
events, and she clearly states that what interests her is ‘the 
decontexualization of Auschwitz’ that endows the works with ‘transgression, 
constraint and novelty’ (16).  
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Therefore, ‘post-Auschwitz drama’ is a term to be contested with its 
contours oscillating between realist and antirealist. As I suggested in 
Chapter One, Summer and Coffee, both based on the Holocaust, adopt 
different dramaturgical strategies. What makes Coffee different from 
Summer is Bond’s new dramaturgy and theory of human subjectivity. 
Dramatic representation is determined by how we approach the external 
world and by how we imagine the potentials of inner subjectivity. These 
problems determine the nature of the interaction between perceiver and 
representation: is it delivery of knowlege, consumption of enjoyment, or 
fracture of predetermined ideology? The epistemological, the aesthetic and 
the ethical are inseparable. Only by contextualizing Bond’s late 
‘post-Auschwitz drama’ in his ‘subjective turn’ will it be possible to discuss 
what ‘post-Auschwitz’ means in Bond’s late works.  
In the following I will re-examine the ethical and aesthetic significance 
of the Palermo improvisation and argue that it can be defined as a basic 
dramaturgical unit of Bond’s post-Auschwitz drama. After pointing out how 
the improvisation demonstrates what the Slovenian philosopher Alenka 
Zupančič defines as ‘the ethics of the Real’, I will proceed to draw on 
Adorno and Levinas to demonstrate that the Palermo improvisation 
aesthetically embodies the dramaturgy of negativity and ethically 
interrogates the problem of alterity. By bringing forth a tentative 
Adornian-Levinasian model to understand Bond’s post-Auschwitz drama, I 
will analyze two of Bond’s representative post-Auschwitz plays: Coffee, 
which, although I analyzed it in Chapter One briefly, will be discussed at 
length in this chapter, and Born.  
 
3.1. The Palermo Improvisation and the Ethics of the Real 
 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed and problematized how Bond starts from 
the Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard to develop his 
theory of subjectivity. However, as for the ethical significance of these two 
situations, they are not of the same nature. In Ethics of the Real: Kant, 
Lacan (2000), Zupančič distinguishes two modes of ethics: classical ethics 
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and modern ethics. In the model of classical ethics, the subject is forced by 
tyranny to obey and does not have any choice; however, in the model of 
modern ethics, the subject is involved within situations of terror in which 
the subject is forced to choose whether the subject wants the object chosen 
or not (2000: 213). According to Zupančič, classical ethics is exemplified 
by the case of Antigone, the ethical logic of which is as follows: for one 
thing (the absolute condition) in life, the subject is ready to sacrifice 
anything else, and the subject realizes this absolute condition by sacrificing 
everything, including life (257). Modern ethics is exemplified by the case of 
Sygne de Coûfontaine in Paul Claudel’s The Hostage [L’Otage], the ethical 
logic of which is as follows: for one thing (the absolute condition) in life, 
the subject is ready to sacrifice everything without exception, but the only 
way the subject can realize this absolute condition is to sacrifice everything, 
including the absolute condition (258). To illustrate modern ethics, 
Zupančič provides another example that is more pertinent to my analysis: 
Alan Pakula’s film Sophies’s Choice (1991).25 In Sophie’s Choice, Sophie 
is requested by the officer at Auschwitz to choose which of her two children 
is to be killed. At first she refuses to ‘choose’; however, because the officer 
threatens to kill both of her children if she refuses to choose, eventually she 
chooses the boy and watches her daughter taken away. The scene ends with 
a close-up of Sophie’s silent scream.  
In Zupančič’s analysis, while the Real is demonstrated negatively by 
Antigone’s suicide, the image of which bears dazzling sublime splendor, in 
the case of Sophie, the Real is exhibited through her grimace and voiceless 
scream. In Lacanian terms, the Real is the Thing [das Ding], which 
functions as the cause of desire instead of the object of desire – that is, while 
desire does not seek any specific object, its action of seeking is activated by 
the Thing. As Zupančič argues, desiring without objects does not imply that 
there is no object to be sought at the end of the realization of desire; on the 
                                                
25 In addition to Sophie’s Choice and The Hostage, Zupančič also mentions that Brecht’s 
The Measures Taken is another example of the terror implicated in modern ethics, and this 
implies that the modern dimension of the ethical is a general one (2000: 221). I should add 
that, as a playwright working on Brecht’s legacy, Bond in his later work engages more with 
the ethical dimension of Brecht’s drama than with other dramaturgical devices.  
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contrary, the realization of desire ends with creating an object ex nihilo 
(2003: 184). She also states that the Real is encountered as ‘the impossible 
thing’ that reverses and reconfigures the symbolic order, and this 
reconfiguration of the symbolic has effect in reality (2000: 235). 
In order to relate these two modes of ethics of the Real to Bond’s 
dramaturgy, I need to consider what ‘the Real’ might mean in Bond’s theory. 
In the Palermo improvisation, like Sophie, the soldier is forced to kill either 
his sibling or his neighbor’s child; in the Russian guard’s story, the guard, 
like Antigone, chooses suicide rather than to obey the order. Both cases not 
only exemplify different models of ethics as defined by Zupančič, but also 
entail different processes of subjectivation. The soldier in the Palermo 
improvisation experiences subjectivation that ‘coincides […] with the 
destitution of the subject (Zupančič 2000: 216); while the Russian guard can 
only assert his subjectivity by ‘a radical desubjectivation’ (213) through 
death. Either through the destitution of the subject or by desubjectivation, 
the subject desires an object that the symbolic order can never provide, but 
they still keep seeking. This structure of ‘seeking without any object’ can be 
found in Bond’s definition of radical innocence as a permanent creative 
activity that seeks justice, an act that can be activated in extreme situations, 
or, in Bondian terms, ‘accident time’.  
Since the Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard 
presuppose the ethical structure of the Real – the impossible structure of 
desire aiming at the Real – the fact that Bond keeps returning to these 
aporetic situations not only attests to the impossibility of the ethical 
structure but demonstrates that he keeps the aporetic structure 
dramaturgically unresolved. That is, in order to respond to the aporetic 
nature of extreme situations, Bond’s dramaturgy negates the dramatic 
impulse for resolution and denouement. In the following I will argue that 
this dramaturgy can be understood through Adorno’s aesthetic theory of 
non-identity. 
 
3.2. Adorno’s Aesthetics of Non-identity 
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According to Adorno,  
 
Aesthetic identity seeks to aid the nonidentical, which in reality is 
repressed by reality’s compulsion to identity. Only by virtue of 
separation from empirical reality, which sanctions art to model the 
relation of the whole and the part according to the work’s own need, 
does the artwork achieve a heightened order of existence. (2002: 4) 
 
For Adorno, the principle that governs reality is that of identity – a process 
of reducing non-identical singularities into identical entities – and the 
function of art is to aid the non-identical to be emancipated from the process 
of identification. Thus, aesthetic identity, that is, the process of constituting 
an artwork, can accommodate the singularities that are removed from reality 
and achieve ‘a heightened order of existence’. In Adorno’s terms, an 
artwork formed by the principle of aesthetic identity is a ‘semblance’ 
(Schein), which Adorno defines as the aesthetic unity posited against 
empirical reality (105). However, although an aesthetic semblance can 
preserve the non-identical that is excluded by reality, it is still an identity 
within which the non-identical may be erased by the principle of aesthetic 
identity. Therefore, Adorno contends that the process of forming an 
aesthetic semblance is one of integrating different elements that derive from 
the empirical world and of establishing its own autonomy against reality; 
however, there inevitably remains the heterogeneous in semblance (ibid.). In 
other words, the structuring of a semblance ineluctably entails the logic of 
negativity.  
Those non-identical elements that resist the identifying process of 
semblance formation become what Adorno designates as ‘expression’. An 
artwork can thus be regarded as a field of incongruent forces that consist of 
constructing semblance and disruptive expression: while the former is 
closely associated with the positive power of society, the latter is always a 
force of dissonance (110). It is vital to point out that, for Adorno, aesthetic 
forms such as ‘particularity, development and resolution of conflict’ are 
based on and separated from empirical reality – in the gap between artistic 
semblance and empirical reality, the artwork ‘adopts its stance toward the 
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empirical world in which conflicts appear immediate and as 
absolute cleavages’ and this distancing becomes ‘an act of knowledge’ 
(145). It therefore can be inferred that dramatic forms such as development, 
conflict, and denouement are socially determined – that is, these dramatic 
forms originate in how we perceive the possibilities of reality and how we 
are structured within these possibilities. It is not difficult to imagine that, for 
today’s audiences, conflicts in some plays in the past have lost their 
relevance, or that certain ways of denouements are regarded as unrealistic. 
However, the effectiveness of dramatic forms by no means derives from 
how accurate these forms imitate empirical reality. As Adorno states, 
‘[w]henever art seems to copy society, it becomes all the more an “as-if”’ 
(226). It is the distance created by ‘as if’ that determines the gap between art 
and social reality.  
Following Adorno’s theory, I contend that, although the dramatic 
structures of the Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard 
reproduce the logic of rationality employed during the war and in the camp, 
it is the extreme moments of ethical decision-making that potentially disrupt 
the logic of reality. For Bond, there can never be possible resolution for the 
ethical conflicts in both cases. This impossibility of resolution disrupts the 
conflict-denouement structure despite the fact that it is still necessary to 
complete the aesthetic semblance in which impossible decisions must be 
made according to the result of the negotiation between radical innocence 
and the enforcement of military discipline. It is this paradoxical structure 
caused by the ethics of the Real that makes the dramatic semblance negative 
rather than affirmative.  
In Adorno’s theory, the force of aesthetic negativity is preserved 
through mimesis and expression:  
 
Artistic expression comports itself mimetically, just as the 
expression of living creatures is that of pain. The lineaments 
of expression inscribed in artworks, if they are not to be mute, 
are demarcation lines against semblance. Yet, in that artworks 
as such remain semblance, the conflict between semblance – 
form in the broadest sense – and expression remains 
unresolved and fluctuates historically. (110)  
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‘Semblance’ can be understood both as the artwork in general and as a 
specific constructing force as opposed to ‘expression’ decided by the logic 
of mimesis. What Adorno means by mimesis is not imitation but an attitude 
towards objectivity that is different from the subject-object antithesis. 
Mimetic comportment of expression implicates ‘the objectification of the 
non-objective’ (111) – namely, what is expressed in expression is not a 
graspable object or any impulse to be objectified but those non-identical 
elements. One of the non-identical elements that resists artistic construction 
and moral thematization is the body, especially the body in pain. As Adorno 
argues, the new imperative after Auschwitz – Auschwitz should never 
happen again – must involve ‘a bodily sensation of the moral addendum’ 
because any moral reflection must consider the insufferable bodily anguish 
(1999: 365). Also, Adorno’s insistence on the primacy of bodily mortality 
exemplifies a philosophical gesture against a society determined by the 
logic of self-preservation (Zuidervaart 2007: 146).  
However, although Adorno compares artistic expression to animalistic 
pain, it is not the case that expressive artworks imitate literally any 
experiences of physical pain. Obviously, both the Palermo improvisation 
and the story of the Russian guard entail the representation of violent acts 
and bodily pain, and this may invoke the ‘moral addendum’ and preserve 
the moral significance of bodily mortality. But more importantly, the 
expressive power derives from the moments of ethical impasse in which the 
subject is forced to die or relinquish the cause that determines the subject as 
a subject. The expressive power emanating from the conflict between 
subjective radical innocence and objective rational order is mimetically 
preserved in Bond’s dramaturgy. As Adorno states, ‘[i]f art has 
psychoanalytic roots, then they are the roots of fantasy in the fantasy of 
omnipotence. This fantasy includes the wish to bring about a better world’ 
(2002: 9). In these extreme moments, the longing of radical innocence for 
an impossible but better world order in which the subject can be exempted 
from impossible decision-making is retained mimetically. As Simon Jarvis 
argues, in Adorno’s modernist aesthetics, it is the ‘mimesis of the 
 112 
systematic framework which impoverishes experience’ (122) that 
constitutes the power of mimesis. Dialectically, however, mimesis is not 
semblance as a copy of empirical reality; rather, mimesis designates the 
capacity of preserving non-identical relationships among disparate entities. 
Adorno seeks to posit art as a mimetic comportment by which not only the 
rationality of identity logic can be revealed but non-identical elements can 
also be preserved to serve as a promise for an alternative reality.  
 J. M. Berstein, in explicating Adorno’s aesthetics, argues that ‘[w]ithin 
works of art, universality is conveyed through form while particularity is 
conveyed through moments of dissonance or decomposition’ (2004: 157). 
This structure can be detected in the Palermo improvisation and the story of 
the Russian guard. Arguably, the military command is a universal in terms 
of dramatic form – this ‘universal’ form constitutes one of the core dramatic 
structures in Bond’s later plays – and it also carries its performative force in 
the sense that it must be obeyed by reducing any possibilities of resistance. 
In this regard, the moments of resistance constitute the particularity that not 
only challenges the authority of the command but also discloses other routes 
of dramatic development. This unresolved opposition between authority and 
resistance makes art enigmatic. As Adorno states, ‘[a]rt’s enigmatic image 
is the configuration of mimesis and rationality. […] The indefatigably 
recurring question that every work incites in whoever traverses it – the 
“What is it all about?” – becomes “Is it true?”’ (2002: 127). For Adorno, the 
truth content of artworks is different from an idea as artworks cannot be 
reduced to embodying specific ideas. The truth content of artworks resides 
precisely in this terrain of irreducibility. Instead of conveying the author’s 
intention or idea, what the artwork reveals is enigmatic. The truth-content of 
the artwork unearths ‘the possibility of a nature which “is not yet”’ (Jarvis 
104) and makes the artwork ‘an occasion for the subject to liken itself to a 
state of unfinishedness’ (Huhn 8).  
 Following Adorno’s aesthetics, we can infer that the power of the 
Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard originates from 
the non-identity between the dramatic rational construction that seeks 
closure and the ethical demand that disrupts any resolutions. As Tom Huhn 
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points out, for Adorno, the mimesis of the artwork corresponds to the 
unfolding of subjectivity and the possibility of subjective movement (7). 
Also, as Terry Eagleton observes, in Adorno’s aesthetics, artworks are ‘at 
once determinate and indeterminate’, which is demonstrated through ‘the 
discrepancy between their mimetic (sensuous-expressive) and rational 
(constructive-organisational) moments’ (1990: 353). In other words, the 
non-identity that renders the artwork enigmatic also attests to the 
indeterminacy of the subject’s potential – in Bond’s terms, this is the nature 
of radical innocence. Although Adorno explicates the aesthetic logic of 
Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, it is Levinas’s theory that can more 
clearly disentangle the ethical implications of Bond’s dramaturgy. 
 
3.3. Levinas’s Aesthetics and the Ethics of Alterity 
 
Unlike Adorno, Levinas does not construct a theory of aesthetics per se; 
therefore, it is difficult to discuss ‘Levinasian’ aesthetics without specific 
provisos. In ‘Reality and Its Shadow’ (1948), one of Levinas’s early 
aesthetic treatments, he not only questions the function of art as a source of 
knowledge but also criticizes artistic enjoyment for being egoistic and 
wicked.26 Part of Levinas’s distrust of art stems from his awareness of the 
danger of Nazist artistic participation for political purposes (Eaglestone 
262). The most obvious danger of art resides in the fact that it may 
dissimulate face-to-face ethical experience, which can be reduced neither to 
cognitive knowledge nor to sensual enjoyment. Theatre scholars have also 
been cautioned against applying Levinas’s idea of the face to theatre since 
Levinas’s idea of the face is neither visual nor representational (Ridout 
53-56; Grehan 29-34). However, despite the fact that the Levinasian ethical 
face-to-face encounter may be anti-aesthetical, this by no means excludes 
any further nuanced reading of theatrical experience based on Levinas’s 
ethics.  
                                                
26 ‘Reality and Its Shadow’ has been widely discussed by scholars who aim to extricate 
thoughts of aesthetics from Levinas’s philosophy. For detailed discussions, see Robert 
Eaglestone’s Ethical Criticism: Reading after Levinas (1997), and Jill Robbins’s Altered 
Reading: Levinas and Literature (1999). 
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It is undeniable that Levinas does not completely dispense with arts, 
and he advocates artworks that embody or demonstrate his ethical thinking 
such as those of Maurice Blanchot and Paul Celan. From the authors that 
concern Levinas and the way he discusses their works, it can be inferred that 
Levinas, like Adorno, seeks to articulate an alternative aesthetics that can 
respond to the catastrophe of Auschwitz.27 As Jill Robbins points out, 
Levinas bases his critique of art on conceiving art as a totality – ideas such 
as musicality, rhythm, and participation all presuppose the idea of totality. 
However, Robbins questions whether it is really possible to set participation 
and ethics apart (89).28 Robbins’s argument is not without reason if we 
evaluate how Levinas redefines his idea of ‘meanwhile’ [entretemps]: in 
‘Reality and Its Double’, Levinas states disapprovingly that art brings about 
an immobilized interval of ‘meanwhile’, different from living instants open 
to ‘the salvation of becoming’ (1989: 149); however, in ‘Phenomenon and 
Enigma’ (1957), Levinas uses ‘meanwhile’ to designate an anomalous 
temporality in which the identity of self-consciousness is disrupted and the 
possibility of encountering the other emerges (1987: 68). Although Levinas 
deploys the same concept, this concept refers to different experiences: the 
former refers to an aesthetic experience in which observers are either stuck 
in the immobilized moment or absorbed in the musicality of art, while the 
latter dislodges an ethical dimension in which the self can encounter the 
other. By implication, Levinas’s theory by no means excludes the possibility 
of being ethically implicated in aesthetic experiences.29 What is at stake, 
therefore, is how it is possible for aesthetic experiences to entail ethical 
dimensions.  
In order to elucidate how Levinas’s theory can deepen our 
                                                
27 About Levinas and the Holocaust, see Robert Eaglestone’s ‘Inexhaustible Meaning, 
Inextinguishable Voices: Levinas and the Holocaust’ in The Holocaust and the Postmodern 
(2004): 249-78.  
28 As Josh Cohen points out, Levinas’s writing on aesthetics is not coherent and he remains 
ambiguous about the role of art in relation to the ethical (73). The ideas that Levinas casts 
into doubt in ‘Reality and Its Shadow’ are even used conversely in his later writings to 
account for ethical subjectivity (74). Seán Hand also posits that Levinas in his later writings 
recognizes the potential of the artwork to attain ‘a modality of transcendence’ (78). 
29 For example, when Nicholas Ridout analyzes Maria Donata D’Urso’s Pezzo 0 (due), he 
points out how the ‘invasion of the shadow’ in performance can yield ethical potential 
(67-69). 
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understanding of the ethical significance in Bond’s plays, first, I want to 
relate Levinas’s concept of the face to the Palermo improvisation. This 
particular passage is worth quoting at length because it contains a useful 
description:  
 
“What is there in the Face?” In my analysis, the Face is 
definitely not a plastic form like a portrait; the relation to the 
Face is both the relation to the absolutely weak – to what is 
absolutely exposed, what is bare and destitute, the relation 
with bareness and consequently with what is alone and can 
undergo the supreme isolation we call death – and there is, 
consequently, in the Face of the Other always the death of the 
Other and thus, in some way, an incitement to murder, the 
temptation to go to the extreme, to completely neglect the 
other – and at the same time (and this is the paradoxical thing) 
the Face is also the “Thou Shalt not Kill.” (Levinas 2000: 
104)  
 
Instead of being a phenomenon, the face – the human face – is an event that 
demands the self to respond to the other. It is not difficult to recognize the 
relevance of the passage to the Palermo improvisation, which foregrounds 
the relationship between self and other in terms of ‘an incitement to murder’ 
and perfectly embodies ‘the paradoxical thing’, as Levinas describes. While 
Bond thinks that it is paradoxical for the soldier to kill the baby in his house 
instead of the neighbor’s baby, the real paradox in the improvisation resides 
in the soldier’s hesitation prior to his murder. In the moment of 
undecidability, the self’s sovereign power over others is suspended. The 
difficulty not only resides in ‘which one to kill?’ but also in ‘whether to kill 
or not?’ The paradox inherent in the improvisation is the soldier’s 
calculation of the incalculable as well as his ethical experience in which his 
ego is disrupted by the face of the other – both the face of the neighbor’s 
baby and that of the baby in his house. If he did not hesitate, he would not 
encounter the face as an event – in this case, the face can never emerge 
since it has been completely neglected. This argument also applies to 
Bond’s discussion of the story in which the Nazi soldier refuses to kill his 
communist brother – although the soldier knows both of them are to be 
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killed by the commandant, he still chooses to obey the imperative ‘Thou 
shall not kill’ instead of the commandant’s order.  
 Levinas’s idea of the face is also related to the Holocaust: ‘In speaking 
of the Holocaust, I am thinking of the death of the other man. I am thinking 
of the other man, for whom, I know not why, one can feel oneself to be 
already a responsible survivor’ (1999: 162). For Levinas, the problem posed 
by the Holocaust is how to respond to the death of the other man. For him, 
the death of the other man ‘awakens me to the other’ (161). Likewise, in the 
Palermo improvisation, what troubles Bond is the death of the other man: 
how can I take responsibility for the other man’s death? How can I measure 
one man’s life against another man’s life? The repetitions and variations of 
the Palermo improvisation that permeate in Bond’s later plays manifest how 
this ethical aporia affects him to such an extent that it becomes obsessional. 
If, like Levinas, what affects Bond is the death of the other man, the 
problem is whether it is possible to dramatize those extreme situations 
without dissimulating their ethical weight and affective power.  
When Levinas refers to drama, he is usually skeptical of its ethical 
value. In addition to his skepticism of art as unethical enjoyment in general, 
he also criticizes the ‘three unities’ as a dramatic principle. For Levinas, the 
principle of the ‘three unities’ is a method of assembling that cancels the 
difference between the same and the other and falsely synthesizes the 
differences between terms (1998: 83). Moreover, Levinas also contends that 
‘enjoying a spectacle’ presupposes ‘thematizing consciousness’ that aims at 
identifying the non-representational and the non-identical (67). However, 
more importantly, Levinas states that the movement from unthematizable 
ethical proximity to thematized monstration is like a plot structured by ‘the 
saying’ and ‘the said’. In Levinas’s later writings, he regards language as 
the source of otherness, and every discourse includes ‘the saying’ (le dire) 
and ‘the said’ (le dit). By ‘the said’ Levinas designates the general 
discursive language usage determined by intentional consciousness, while 
by ‘the saying’ Levinas refers to a pre-linguistic ethical proximity that is 
absorbed into the said and resists being totally thematized in accordance 
with discursive logic.  
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Levinas demonstrates the way that the relationship between the saying 
and the said is constructed as such:  
 
The said thematizes the interrupted dialogue or the 
dialogue delayed by silences, failure or delirium, but the 
intervals are not recuperated. Does not the discourse that 
suppresses the interruptions of discourse by relating them 
maintain the discontinuity under the knots with which 
the thread is tied again? 
 
The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted 
in the immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a 
thread tied again, the trace of a diachrony that does not enter 
into the present, that refuses simultaneity. (170) 
 
Derrida points out that in Levinas’s writing, interruptions often refer to 
those that tend towards the Other and refuse to be thematized as the said 
(2007: 163). It is important to note that the saying, though being thematized 
and recounted as the said, can never be totally turned into the said – instead, 
the saying will be conserved as traces, like ‘knots in a thread’ [les 
nœuds d’un fil]. As the traces of the saying, these knots can evoke the Other 
and elicit interruptions. While Derrida describes Levinas’s text in which the 
saying and the said are intertwined as a ‘heterogeneous tissue’ (162), I 
propose that this method of constituting a text can also be dramaturgical and 
theatrical. That is, although a dramatic text or a theatrical performance is 
necessarily the result of thematization – a process in which the 
inconsumable may be consumed as knowledge or enjoyment – this by no 
means excludes the possibility that, in the thematized, there are still traces 
that conserve the knots of interruption. In ‘The Trace of the Other’ (1963), 
Levinas states: ‘when a trace is thus taken as a sign, it is exceptional with 
respect to other signs in that it signifies outside of every intention 
of signaling and outside of every project of which it would be the aim’ 
(1986: 356-57). Notably, Levinas does deploy the concept of ‘trace’ to 
designate a disturbance within the phenomenal order. As Levinas states, the 
movement from the trace preserved by the said back into the saying is ‘the 
phenomenological reduction’ (1998: 54). This logic of ‘phenomenological 
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reduction’ between the saying and the said is also manifest in the 
relationship between thread and knot and between sign and trace.  
Therefore, although Levinas is skeptical of thematizing consciousness 
and any thematized representation, he presents the possibility of 
phenomenological reduction through which the trace of saying can be 
detected in the said. The saying cannot be exhausted in the said, and there 
must be traces left. For Levinas, this process of reduction is through the 
question: ‘What is it about…?’ (44). In the case of the Palermo 
improvisation, we can infer that what is important is not the final decision 
but the space of interruption between the demand and the reaction – it is the 
ethical space in which ‘what is it about…?’ can be proposed and the 
identifying violence of the demand can be suspended. It is also the space in 
which the ethical imperative ‘Thou shall not kill’ can be heard and the face 
of the other can be encountered. For Levinas, this ethical knot in thematized 
threads also activates ‘the knot tied in subjectivity’ that still functions 
latently and can disrupt thematizing consciousness (25). In other words, this 
Levinasian structure of knots and threads is not only on the level of 
representation but also on that of subjectivity. Here, we can observe how 
Adorno’s aesthetics that regards aesthetic mimesis as the configuration of 
subjectivity can converge with Levinas’s idea that knots in the plot of 
representation can disrupt the identifying process of consciousness and open 
up the dialogue with the other. That is, Levinas’s emphasis on the ethical 
significance of the traces of saying inherent in the structure of 
representation complements Adorno’s aesthetics of non-identity.  
Through my analysis above, I intend to demonstrate why Bond’s 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy can be epitomized in the Palermo improvisation 
and the story of the Russian guard. They can be regarded as basic narratives 
that not only expose the process of subjectivation and de-subjectivation in 
ethically aporetic situations but also aesthetically preserve the aporetic 
nature of these extreme situations without simplifying or reducing the 
ethical significance into any moral message. In this sense, Bond’s 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy eloquently responds to Adorno’s demand that 
aesthetic semblance should preserve the expressive power of the 
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non-identical as well as Levinas’s demand that the traces of the 
unthematizable proximity to the other should be retained in the thematized 
narrative assemblage. In the following I will analyze how this 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy and its variations are manifested in Coffee and 
Born.  
 
3.4. Coffee 
 
The professional premiere of Coffee was directed by Françon at the National 
Theatre de la Colline in 2000. The whole play revolves around Nold’s 
journey: Nold, an engineer and part-time student in his room, is lured by 
Gregory into a forest. Upon entering the forest, Nold is puzzled as to why 
Gregory leads him there. However, Gregory denies that he knows Nold, 
leaving Nold more confused about where he is and why he is there. The 
ghostly Gregory seems to be haunted by his own memory:  
 
Gregory  […] They must ’a ’ad me in casualty. Rows a’ 
people on seats. […] Things go wrong. Yer wander round the 
bricks. Kids everywhere. When yer die they come ‘n stare at 
yer open mouth. Old man’s gob, no teeth […]. (Bond 2003: 
130)  
 
It can be inferred that Gregory is traumatized by his memory of serving in 
the military, but still this cannot explain why Gregory appears in Nold’s 
house and how he can lead Nold into the forest without being conscious of 
doing so. One possible explanation is that Nold and Gregory are trapped in a 
world of unconscious mechanisms determined by a different logic from that 
of empirical reality. The other explanation is that it is Nold who has entered 
his imagination in which Gregory functions as one of the imagined figures. 
Whatever the logic is, linear causality is interrupted in the forest. The 
situation becomes more complex when a Woman and a Girl enter the forest: 
when the Woman enters, she threatens Nold and Gregory with a knife; when 
questioned by Nold, Gregory denies that he knows the Woman and states 
that ‘she got inside me when I slept!’ (Bond 2003: 131). As the Woman 
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exists only ‘inside’ Gregory, as he suggests, which means that the Woman 
figures as part of Gregory’s traumatic memory, the forest can be regarded as 
a site of imagination and traumatic memories shared by these characters. 
Françon’s production emphasized the imaginative aspect of the forest scene 
by making the stage extremely dark.30 Although Bond’s stage directions 
clearly describe that this scene is set in ‘[a] dark opening’ (2003: 128), 
theatrically this darkness succeeded in blurring the boundary between 
reality and imagination – especially when this darkness is contrasted with 
the massacre in the following scene, which takes place under ‘[f]ull 
afternoon sunlight’ (Bond 2003: 167). In addition, there were holes on stage 
through which characters appeared and disappeared – characters were 
stripped of coherent psychological motives that determine their actions; 
rather, their dreamlike figurations were presented as if they are created out 
of Nold’s (or their collective) imagination.  
In contrast to the Woman, whose first appearance is accompanied by 
her desire to push away or even kill Gregory, the Girl appears and asks for 
food to feed her doll. ‘Killing’ and ‘begging for food’ are two fundamental 
logics that govern how these characters act in the forest and this is not 
without significance as these actions stand for the most elemental human 
behavior of self-preservation. Confronted by the Girl’s demand for food, 
Nold decides to go home to retrieve some food. Nold, however, fails to find 
his way back because there is a war. The Girl gives the only bread kept by 
the Woman to Gregory and decides to kill her doll in order to eat it. How 
the Girl eats her doll is described enigmatically: 
 
The Girl jerks the doll down and tears it with her teeth. 
Girl/Doll  Mummy! Mummy! Mummy! Don’t ’urt precious! 
Don’t bite so deep! It was lovely t’ fly in the air! Away! 
The Girl stares at the doll for a moment then tosses it in the 
air and jerks it back. 
Girl  On the plate! On the plate! Thass the place for you till 
yer go in Mum-ma’s tum-tum! (She tears the doll with her 
teeth.) 
Girl/Doll  Ah! (Bond 2003: 143) 
 
                                                
30 My analysis of the production is based on the recording archived at Ina THEQUE. 
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In The Great Peace, there is a baby-bundle made to speak to his mother. 
However, the effect of making an inanimate object speak is different in this 
play as the Girl and her doll speak as if they are the same person/object. The 
forest is a zone of indeterminacy wherein the boundary between reality and 
imagination is blurred, but principally the relationships among characters 
can still be defined as subject-object relations. The only exception is the 
Girl-Doll relationship, which exceeds the limit of self-preservation and 
demands an absolute co-existence as in the neonatal world, where there is 
no distinction between inside and outside. Therefore, the forest scene is also 
a site of imagination in which different levels of the Bondian subject are 
manifested. The Girl’s neonatal state is also implied when she prepares to 
have an imaginative picnic. The picnic for the Girl is a game of 
make-believe, and she has to invent her own rules of picnicking. One 
instance is that the Girl has no idea about what glasses are for: 
 
Girl  […] (She looks at the picnic.) O Mum-ma…It’s 
beautiful. What are these things for? 
Woman  It was the lady’s I worked for – she – 
[…] 
The Girl runs down the hole. The Woman picks up a glass 
and stares at it. (Bond 2003: 147) 
 
The Girl’s innocence and her ignorance of table manners and the ‘rules’ of 
picnicking point to a phase of human subjectivity anterior to socialization.  
However, this seemingly ‘innocent’ game-playing is soon disrupted by 
the Woman’s decision to use the sheet to strangle the Girl. In performance, 
the changing significance of the sheet was clearly demonstrated: both the 
Woman, played by Dominique Valadié, and the Girl, played by Stéphanie 
Béghain, treated the game of picnicking seriously – in Bond’s terms, the 
area delimited by the picnic sheet can be regarded as the playground of the 
core self’s imagination. Their seriousness of playing the game evokes the 
possibility of the world undisturbed by the cruel reality. However, the 
Woman knows that it is only a game and decides to use the sheet as a tool 
for murdering the Girl. Valadié’s performance, which proceeded from 
painful hesitation to cool decisiveness, demonstrated the complexity of the 
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Woman’s decision. Béghain’s performance of the Girl, who is hooded by 
the sheet, demonstrated the Girl’s fragility as a ‘faceless’ being that is 
comparable to the inanimate doll. In Bondian terms, the moment when the 
Woman turns the sheet for picnicking to a tool for murdering is also the 
moment when the Girl at the stage of the core self is forced to face the 
external reality as the socialized self. Therefore, even though the forest is a 
site of imagination, this by no means excludes the operation of the logic of 
‘reality’ – only be revealing this reality can the ethical significance of the 
moments of make-believe and violence be evaluated.  
In Coffee, Bond’s interrogation of subjectivity is demonstrated through 
ethical decision-making in extreme situations. These situations are 
exemplified by the Woman’s disruptive decision to use the picnic sheet to 
strangle the Girl and the Girl’s subsequent suicide by exhausting herself to 
death. It is difficult to judge whether the Woman is right or wrong since 
what she intends to do is to liberate the Girl and herself from the pain of 
hunger and danger. In extreme situations, the ethical demarcation line 
between victim and victimizer is challenged or even eradicated. This can be 
best explicated by the concept of an ethical ‘grey zone’ proposed by Primo 
Levi and theorized by Giorgio Agamben: according to Agamben, the grey 
zone is a ‘zone of irresponsibility’ wherein exists the unimaginable ‘banality 
of evil’ and the real responsibility is unassumable (1999: 21). The example 
that Agamben provides is the mechanism of ‘Sonderkommando’, by which 
some prisoners are ordered to slaughter other prisoners (25). Bond does not 
deal with any specific case of the camp, but his negotiation of the ‘grey 
zone’ of ethical irresponsibility can be understood as his response to the 
Holocaust. Angel-Perez also utilizes the concept of the ‘grey zone’ to 
designate the central ethical problem in The War Plays (2006: 101). In fact, 
the ethical aporia of the grey zone and the problem of humanity and 
non-humanity constitute the pivotal point of Bond’s post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy. 
Near the end of the forest scene, when Nold returns, he has been 
dressed as a soldier and states that there will be a war. The scene then shifts 
into ‘The Big Ditch’, a scene based on a real historical event: the Babi Yar 
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massacre. This is how Bond narrates the incident that provoked him to write 
Coffee: 
 
The coffee wasn’t spilt at Auschwitz. It was at Babi Yar. 
Soldiers had machine-gunned civilians all day. Then it was 
over – at least for that day. The soldiers stood down and 
brewed coffee. No one screamed, in the silence you could 
hear people talking. A soldier put his cup to his lip. And a late 
lorry turned up with more civilians to be shot. They couldn’t 
be stored overnight and shot next morning. In disgust the 
soldier threw his coffee on the ground. […] They’re entitled 
to their free time, their rest, their coffee, a fag … the incident 
is true. (2013: 21) 
 
Bond possibly became familiar with the episode through Anatoly 
Kuznetsov’s documentary novel, Babi Yar, and this is how Kuznestov 
describes the site of the massacre:  
 
On their left was the side of the quarry, to the right a deep 
drop; the ledge had apparently been specially cut out for the 
purposes of the execution, and it was so narrow that as they 
went along it people instinctively leaned towards the wall of 
sandstone, so as not to fall in. 
Dina looked down and her head swam, she seemed to be 
so high up. Beneath her was a sea of bodies covered in blood. 
On the other side of the quarry she could just distinguish the 
machine-guns which had been set up there and a few German 
soldiers. They had lit a bonfire and it looked as though they 
were making coffee on it. 
When the whole line of people had been driven on to the 
ledge one of the Germans left the bonfire, took a machinegun 
and started shooting. (83) 
 
While this episode of the novel focuses on how Dina, one of the Jews, 
survives the massacre, Bond focuses on the role of the perpetrator. This is 
demonstrated in how he conceives the stage: 
 
A cliff top. […] The cliff’s other edge is upstage facing the 
ravine and the opposite cliff. […] Upstage, two MGs 
(machine-guns) are trained on the opposite cliff. Centre stage, 
a portable filed canteen, Primus, coffee-pot and billy-can […]. 
(Bond 2003: 167) 
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The spectator is compelled to observe how these soldiers act in response to 
those victims that are shot dead in the ravine, off stage. By juxtaposing the 
horror of violence represented by the gun-machines and the normalcy of 
banality represented by the coffee machine, Bond demonstrates that the 
horror of the massacre is both continuous with and complicit in its banal and 
procedural coldness. However, the soldiers are depicted in a more 
differentiated way than might be expected of collective representation:  
 
Jolly, Simon, West and Zemlinsky crouch with their rifles. 
Jelly makes coffee. Nold stands at the Primus, his mug held 
out in his hand, his head bowed in angry thought. (Bond 2003: 
178) 
 
Jolly, Simon, West and Zemlinsky obey the military order while Jelly 
makes coffee to serve them after they finish the task. Under the pressure of 
the structural violence, there is little difference between a man who kills and 
a man who does not kill. The reason why Jelly throws coffee when he hears 
the official demand is not that he loathes killing people but that the task 
interrupts his rest. What attracts Bond to this incident is how the tremendous 
horror of the Holocaust can be epitomized in this banal act, which manifests 
the precedence of individual egoism and indifference for the suffering of 
others. In this sense, this banal act presupposes the same logic as the 
Holocaust that is based on collective self-preservation through eliminating 
others. Different from Jelly and other soldiers, Nold is described as being 
silent ‘in angry thought’ (ibid). Nold seems to think about the meaning of 
the extreme situation and how he should act – a typical gesture of Bondian 
major characters, who ask the meaning of the extreme situation by 
remaining silent and interrogate the possibility of acting differently by 
transgressing predetermined norms and order. 
 In addition to the incident of spilling coffee, the most disturbing 
incident in this scene is how the soldiers treat the suffering of the prisoners 
as an enjoyable and curious spectacle:  
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Nold picks up his rifle and joins the other soldiers at the edge.  
Simon  … the Girl … look she’s climbin up the cliff be’ind ’er … 
[…] 
Jelly  (calls) Coffee. 
Gregory  (going up to the soldiers) Whass going on? (Peers across 
the ravine.) I’m not ’avin that! Bring ’er down! 
Simon  No sarge watch. 
West  ’S only ’er ’n the woman – 
Jolly  ’N the ol’ sod on the end – soon ’ose ’em down, no bother. 
Simon  Yer don’t see this every day. 
[…] 
Jelly  (bored) D’yer want this coffee or what? 
A barrage of feet: Nold, Jolly, Simon, West and Zemlinsky drum the 
ground like sports spectators. 
[…] 
Gregroy  (slow) … This is a picture … […] 
[…] 
Simon  Normal yer never see it … 
Jelly  I’ll pour. 
[…] 
The soldiers fire. Silence. (Bond 2003: 183-85) 
 
While Nold joins the other soldiers and enjoys the spectacle of the prisoners’ 
suffering, Jelly still makes coffee to serve them. These soldiers do not want 
to kill because they want to prolong this exceptional spectacle which cannot 
be watched every day – even Gregory, who first orders the soldiers to fire 
immediately, also starts to be attracted by the ‘picture’. The logic of these 
soldiers’ actions stands in opposition to Levinasian ethics – the face of the 
other is completely eradicated and turned into an enjoyable spectacle that 
only serves the pleasure of the ego. Since, for the soldiers, the prisoners’ 
faces are stripped of the ethical weight, they can fire without hesitation 
when they have enjoyed the spectacle. Bond even makes this action of 
‘watching a spectacle’ more disturbing by indicating that these soldiers act 
like ‘sports spectators’. Françon’s staging strictly follows Bond’s stage 
directions and succeeds in differentiating a variety of the solders’ reactions 
to the massacre – their boredom, resistance, excitement, and coldness. 
Instead of delineating individual motivations, Françon’s staging presents a 
picture of different modalities of subjectivity.  
Bond’s dramaturgical framing of how the soldiers watch the pain of the 
other invites audiences to reflect on the nature of ‘spectating’ and visibility. 
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In representing the soldiers, Bond by no means intends to represent them 
‘realistically’ – rather, as I have argued, Bond’s presentation of the soldiers 
exhibits his understanding of the modalities of human subjectivity. His 
calculated use of gestures that remind audiences of sports spectacles also 
‘alienate’ the stage image and encourage audiences to critically examine 
what takes place on stage. In addition, Bond’s tactical representation of the 
victims through the perspective of the soldiers makes what is unrepresented 
on stage being present in the spectator’s imagination – the spectator knows 
there is no victim on stage, but he or she is invited to reflect on the pain of 
those who have really suffered in the massacre. In performance, the clarity 
of Françon’s staging rendered Bond’s complex dramaturgical construction 
of the stage image highly effective – this effectiveness derives from those 
moments of suspension that invite the spectator’s reflection. In Watching 
War on the Twenty-First Century Stage, Clare Finburgh emphasizes the 
importance of ‘suspension’ in watching spectacles of war:  
 
‘Suspension’ performs two functions. It enables the kind of 
interruption or breach […] which invites the spectator’s 
considered critique and reflection. Suspension also constitutes 
the time needed to watch the world critically. It is precisely in 
theatre that this suspension, this ‘waiting’, can take place. 
(289) 
 
Indeed, the logic of suspension is embedded in Bond’s dramaturgical 
framing through which the Babi Yar massacre is represented and spectated. 
Through these moments of suspension, the massacre on stage cannot be 
easily identified with the historical massacre, and this non-identical 
relationship encourages critical reflections on what is represented, what is 
not represented, what can be represented, and what cannot be represented. 
More importantly, Bond emphasizes the subject’s potential to ‘suspend’ 
what is ordered from him or her and the capacity for acting differently. Only 
through this capacity can the non-identical neglected by the logic of identity, 
embodied by the military order, be recognized and other alternatives be 
imagined.  
Although Nold joins the other soldiers and shoots the prisoners in the 
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ravine, it is not until the next scene that we know what the angry Nold is 
thinking about. In this scene, which takes place in the ravine in which 
people have been shot dead, Gregory, Simon, and Nold meet the Woman 
and the Girl who appeared in the forest and are now survivors of the 
massacre. Gregory orders Nold to shoot the Girl, but Nold resists: 
 
 Nold  Less leave it sarge. Pretend it never ’appened. 
 Gregory  It did. 
Nold  Pretend. That’ll get us through. We can walk back t’ 
barracks in ’arf ’n ’our … ’n be free. 
 Gregory  I must ‘ave order. I must ’ave order. 
Nold  I can’t do what yer want. I don’t know why. […] 
(Bond 2003: 203) 
  
By ‘pretending’ that they never meet the Woman and the Girl, Nold thinks it 
can exempt them from killing. Nold’s ideas underscore the fact that the 
capacity to fictionalize reality and suspend the imposed order can possibly 
resist authority. This is also what the Girl does in the forest – her interaction 
with her doll and her invention of new picnic rules, while possibly 
symptomatic of madness, demonstrate the potential power of human 
imagination. The borderline between rationality and madness is challenged 
and deconstructed by imagination: is it rational to obey the rules to kill or is 
it rational to pretend in order to deprive the rule of its effects? While 
Gregory insists that Nold should obey the rule, Nold puts the rule into 
question and suspends its effects.  
Nold eventually kills Gregory and Simon in order to rescue the Girl. At 
the end of the play, Nold visits Gregory’s daughter and tells her that he 
killed her father in order to survive. Coffee can be read as Nold’s journey 
from innocence to experience: Nold, at the end of the journey, is not 
innocent anymore in both a literal and figurative sense. How we define 
Nold’s innocence and guilt depends on how we define what justice and 
humanity is. In probing the ethical aporia of the ‘grey zone’ of 
irresponsibility, Bond aims to interrogate complex potentials of humanity 
without sticking to a specific message or idea.  
Coffee begins in Nold’s room, and, in the following scenes, he is 
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transported to a dark forest of no-man’s land, to the large ditch of the Babi 
Yar massacre, to the ravine, where the Jews die, and finally back to a 
citizen’s house after the war. Regarding this structure, Bond explains: ‘If the 
play had gone immediately to Babi Yar […], audience would have been 
much more able conventionally to cope with that. […] But because of the 
way the drama is constructed, the audience don’t ask the question, the 
question questions them’ (Tuaillon 2015: 149). By preceding the Babi Yar 
massacre with the forest scene, Bond states that ‘the world of darkness and 
imagination […] goes on haunting the whole play’ (Tuaillon 2015: 150). 
The forest scene haunts the whole play because it is the scene in which the 
ethical human relationship based on the face-to-face encounter is explored – 
characters in the forest have to decide how they should treat each other, and 
the decisions determine how they define their humanity. These moments of 
ethical decision-making are concealed in the massacre scene, the logic of 
which is always already determined by the authorities.  
Therefore, Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy does not aim to 
represent any historical event in the Holocaust, but he emphasizes the 
possible existence of the basic ethical relationality of face-to-face encounter 
even in the most dehumanizing situation. This dramaturgy preserves the 
ethical moments in which the identity logic of military authorities meets the 
non-identity logic of ethical encounters.  
 
Born 
 
Born was first staged by Françon at the Avignon Festival in July 2006. If 
the ethical dilemma Nold faces is whether he should kill, Luke, the 
protagonist in Born, is bothered by the desire to know what is involved in 
being killed. In Scene One, Peter and Donna move into a new house and 
have a baby, Luke; in Scene Two, twenty years later, however, the normal 
society collapses and turns out to be governed by a totalitarian regime. Peter 
and Donna do not know that Luke has become a WAPO (war police) and 
that their house is going to become a new police unit. At the end of the 
scene, Donna and Peter are taken away from their house separately by other 
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WAPOs. In Scene Three, on a hillside, Luke and other WAPOs encounter a 
Woman and her baby. Whereas other WAPOs think the Woman and her 
baby should be killed immediately, Luke wants to know how the Woman 
feels and what she is thinking about towards the end of her life. In short, he 
wants to bear witness to the Woman’s testimony at the end of her life: ‘I 
want t’ know whass it like at the end? I know what ’happens t’ the body. 
Know all that. Seen it. I want t’ know what it’s like inside. What ’appens in 
yer ’ead at the end’ (Bond 2006: 21). 
Luke’s voyeuristic desire reminds us of Len in Saved, in which he 
observes how the baby is stoned to death without interfering. However, 
unlike Len as an observer, Luke is the perpetrator as well as the observer. 
Moreover, the Woman is portrayed as paralyzed and unable to speak or 
react, that is, as a Muselmann – a term used to refer to those who have lost 
their will and consciousness in the concentration camps. Although Bond 
uses these obvious references to the Holocaust, unlike Coffee, which is set 
in the Babi Yar massacre, Born is set in an indefinite future, when the world 
is controlled by a totalitarian regime and its WAPOs. In Born, Bond is still 
concerned with the face-to-face encounter between perpetrator and victim 
exemplified by the Palermo improvisation, but his focus shifts to the 
perpetrator’s witness of the victim as a Muselmann.  
As Levinas proposes, death is an enigma: ‘Death is at once healing and 
impotence; an ambiguity that perhaps indicates an other dimension of 
meaning than that in which death is thought within the alternative 
to be/not-to-be. The ambiguity: an enigma’ (2000: 14). Luke is obsessed 
with the enigma of death and he desires to bear witness to that enigma. In 
order to obtain the Woman’s answer, Luke even threatens to murder her 
baby, thinking that the Woman’s panic may force her to speak. However, 
the Woman remains silent, except that she utters a meaningless sound from 
her throat.  
The Woman’s mysterious sound is reminiscent of Primo Levi’s 
description of Hurbineck, a child at Auschwitz who had no name and could 
not speak. Although Hurbineck cannot speak, he kept uttering a sound that 
bespeaks the urgent need of speech, and Levi transcribes it as ‘mass-klo’ or 
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‘matisklo’ (198). In Remnants of Auschwitz: the Witness and the Archive 
(1998), Agamben contends that this non-language reveals testimony as 
structured by two impossibilities: first, in order to bear witness to the 
impossibility of bearing witness, language must be replaced by a 
non-language; second, this non-language bears witness to the impossibility 
of bearing witness to that which does not have language (1999: 39). For 
Agamben, the complete witness is the Muselmann, who is completely 
deprived of the ability to speak, and, by implication, any attempt to deploy 
language or non-language as testimony is inevitably ensnared within the 
structure of two impossibilities. However, Agamben remains cautions that, 
although this structure of impossibilities may be theoretically valid, 
advocating it risks repeating the logic of the camp, in which the ultimate 
goal is to turn the human as a speaking being completely into the inhuman 
as a living being (157). By contrast, Agamben argues that ‘the witness 
attests to the fact that there can be testimony because there is an inseparable 
division and non-coincidence between the inhuman and the human’ (ibid.). 
For Agamben, the witness is a remnant in the sense that the true witness is 
the one whose humanity has been completely destroyed but who still 
remains – that is, the human cannot be completely eradicated and the human 
remains to be what may be defined as the inhuman (133). In other words, 
testimony is the disjunction between the living being (the inhuman) and 
language (the human) (130). 
About the authority of testimony, Agamben contends:  
 
Precisely insofar as it inheres in language as such, precisely 
insofar as it bears witness to the taking place of a potentiality 
of speaking through an impotentiality alone, its authority 
depends not on a factual truth, a conformity between 
something said and a fact or between memory and what 
happened, but rather on the immemorial relation between the 
unsayable and the sayable. (157-58) 
 
Here, Agamben makes clear that testimony has nothing to do with factual 
truth or memory; rather, precisely because testimony cannot take place 
through speaking but through the impotentiality of speaking, testimony 
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guarantees an ‘unarchivability’. In this sense, intriguingly, Luke bears 
witness to the Woman’s testimony by bearing witness to the impossibility of 
testimony.  
In Scene Five, Luke is brought home by Peter, but he remains 
unconscious. Donna, also at home, is busy nursing the dead Muselmänner, 
and she is unable to recognize Luke or Peter. This scene can be compared to 
the forest scene in Coffee as both are constructed as sites of imagination. 
Regarding this scene, Bond states: ‘For Born, I put both on stage at the same 
time, as one site: what the fiction assumes as the real and what Luke 
experiences in his imagination – but the other characters also 
bring their own realities into it’ (Tuaillon 2015: 156). This scene is thus a 
site where different characters’ imaginative worlds converge: Donna 
imagines that she can unconditionally nurse the dead; Luke keeps asking the 
Woman and imagines that the Woman’s dead baby comes to life; Peter 
imagines that he becomes a WAPO and fires the Muselmänner. In the 
imaginative world, the Woman can speak, and when asked by Luke about 
what happens at the end of life, she answers that she wants her baby. Luke 
then imagines that the dead people start to assemble the baby’s body parts 
and make the baby come to life. However, although Luke thinks that the 
Woman will tell him something, the Woman shakes the baby’s fists open 
and grabs the food. Unable to get the Woman’s answer, Luke asks the dead 
Muselmänner the same question: ‘Tell me, teach me what yer know. 
What ’appens at the end? Tell me something that makes sense a’ the life 
I ’ave t’ live! […] I kill all a’ yer. I made yer wounds’ (Bond 2006: 61). 
Luke then starts to play with the baby – it is only when Peter reminds him of 
the fact that the baby has been dead that Luke howls in pain.  
In Born, the fact that Bond explores the ‘zones of crisis and exception’ 
through the perpetrator’s perspective may seem ethically challenging – for 
Bond, the command ‘thou shall not kill’ can be found not only on the face 
of the victim but also within the perpetrator’s capacity for imagining an 
ethical relationality with the other. However, along with the logic of ethical 
imagination, Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy is still based on the logic 
of reality. That is, Born concludes with the WAPO’s killing of Luke, Peter, 
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and Donna. Just like the end of Coffee, in which Nold acknowledges his 
action of murder, Born does not end with the scene of imagination but with 
the atrocious violence of reality. Commenting on this dramatic structure, 
Bond states: ‘Structurally, once the line of each character has been driven to 
its extreme, then the play has no further use for the world of imagination. 
The audience would know what is happening inside the characters 
and where they subjectively stand, so reality can come back again’ (Tuaillon 
2015: 172). This dramatic structure demonstrates again the logic of Bond’s 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, which resides in the convergence of and 
tension between the logic of reality and that of imagination – the former 
encloses aesthetic semblance of narrative while the latter generates a space 
for non-identical ethical proximity.  
Different from Coffee, in which Bond examines humanity through a 
series of decisions that characters have to make, in Born, Bond explores the 
possibilities of humanity through a series of ethical images of wasted life. 
As Jenny Hughes argues, ‘the circulations of waste and wasted life in 
performance evoke uncertainties relating to how we might live together in 
the unpredictable and exposed zones of crisis and exception without 
interpersonal violence’ (28). As I argue, Bond’s post-Auschwitz dramaturgy 
aims to explore and retain moments of irresolvable ethical difficulties – only 
by preserving the traces of otherness that resist being reduced to any moral 
prescription can post-Auschwitz dramaturgy remain powerful. In 
performance, the image of the otherness of ‘wasted life’ is demonstrated 
through the actor’s body.31  
In performance, Stephanie Béghain, who played the Woman, embodied 
a Muselmann’s physical suffering – throughout the performance, Béghain 
seemed drained of energy and remains inactive to such an extent that she 
looked like a mannequin. In a similar manner, in the scene where Donna 
feeds the dead Muselmänner, they were performed mannequin-like when 
they move. Although Bond, through Luke, implies that the Muselmann’s 
experience cannot be expressed or represented, in Born, he does imagine 
                                                
31 My analysis of the production is based on the recording archived at the National Theatre 
de la Colline in Paris.  
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and represent the Muselmann – an image that is arguably forbidden to be 
represented. Bond’s representation of the Muselmann seems to break the 
belief that the Holocaust cannot be represented figuratively, but we need to 
be more cautious about how Bond constructs and contextualizes the stage 
image – by setting the play in an indefinite future, it can be inferred that 
these Muselmänner are not represented as those who suffered in Nazi 
concentrations camps but are imagined as those who may suffer in the 
future. In addition, these Muselmänner should be regarded as the 
construction out of the characters’ imagination – this further problematizes 
any direct comparison between these stage images and historical references. 
Therefore, although unlike Coffee, in which the prisoners and the dead 
remain unrepresented except the Woman and the Girl, in Born Bond seems 
to adopt a more direct approach to presenting what may be regarded as 
unrepresentable, Bond’s representation is strategically framed and cannot be 
interpreted as any direct representation of historical facts.  
In ‘The Intolerable Image’, Jacques Rancière’s analysis of the 
relationship between image and genocide is pertinent here:  
 
The problem is not whether the reality of these genocide can 
be put into images and fiction. […] It is knowing what kind of 
human beings the image shows us and what kind of human 
beings it is addressed to; what kind of gaze and consideration 
are created by this fiction. (102) 
 
Rancière continues to argue that images ‘help sketch new configurations of 
what can be seen, what can be said and what can be thought and 
consequently, a new landscape of the possible’ (103). As Rancière points 
out, what is important in image construction, instead of the truth or 
falsehood of the image, is what kind of human beings the image 
demonstrates and how the image relates to our understanding of the world. 
Therefore, in Bond’s theatre, the construction of images reflects how he 
understands human subjectivity: in his presentation of different human 
bodies – the soldier’s discinplined body, the prionser’s suffering fragile 
body, the baby’s disembered body, and the Muselmann’s dead body – we 
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are reminded of the mortality of human beings and how these bodies are 
produced through the appratuses of authority. In his configuration of these 
human images, Bond aims to imagine the ethical relationality between 
human beings through these images and explore the potential of the human 
being to act creatively.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, by drawing on Adorno’s and Levinas’s philosophical 
reflections on post-Auschwitz aesthetics and ethics, I argued that Bond’s 
post-Auschwitz dramaturgy is exemplified in the Palermo improvisation and 
the story of the Russian guard because both episodes examine the processes 
of de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation in extreme situations of 
decision-making and preserve the ethical aporias by means of dramatic form. 
Based on this model, I analyzed Coffee and Born, both of which involve 
references to the Holocaust. However, what concerns Bond is not the 
accuracy of historical facts but how to imagine the non-identical ethical 
relationality between human beings in the ethical grey zone involved in 
extreme situations epitomized at Auschwitz. Having examined Bond’s 
theory of subjectivity in relation to its dramatization and his post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy, in the next chapter I will approach the later Bond through 
another perspective: trauma-tragedy.  
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Chapter Four 
The Structure of Bondian Trauma-Tragedy: Justice, 
Truth, and Madness 
 
In the previous chapters I have examined Bond’s theory of subjectivity 
based on post-Auschwitz ethics, how this theory determines his dramaturgy, 
and how this dramaturgy responds to the representation of the Holocaust. In 
this chapter I will examine one pivotal concept that has emerged in the 
previous discussions: the Tragic. In Bond’s theory of subjectivity, both the 
neonate’s feeling of pain and the core self’s idea of the Tragic are essential 
in subject formation in the sense that the Bondian subject cannot be 
conceived without encountering the painful and the Tragic. Correlative with 
the concept of the Tragic is that of trauma – indeed, the Bondian subject is 
also a post-traumatic subject. Not only is the Bondian subject traumatized 
on the level of psychical formation, but the Bondian subject also 
experiences traumatic frustrations in the process of socialization, as Bond 
states that the self’s imperative to seek justice is always frustrated in an 
unjust society. The aim of this chapter is to examine how Bond conceives 
the possibility of contemporary tragedy based on his theory of subjectivity, 
how his concept of tragedy is related to the idea of trauma, and how he 
negotiates post-traumatic subjectivities in his tragedies. 
In the phase of the neonate, the monad’s world is governed by the 
pleasure principle, by which the neonate relates to the world by 
differentiating pain from pleasure. Later, in the phase of the core self, this 
pain/pleasure pattern becomes the dramatizing structure constituted by the 
Tragic and the Comic. This dramatizing structure then becomes the 
subjective origin of the objective art forms of tragedy and comedy. 
Although Bond only uses the neologism ‘drauma’ (Stuart 2001a: 42) once, 
it suggests the inherent intertwinement of subjective traumatic experiences, 
subjectivity as a dramatic structure, and dramaturgy of trauma-tragedy. 
Bond’s theory of subjectivity in relation to trauma can be illustrated as 
follows:  
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The Neonate The Core Self The Socialized Self 
Pain 
Feelings 
Tragic 
Ideas 
Tragedy Cultural 
Artifacts Pleasure Comic Comedy 
The Primal Trauma 
Repetitions of 
Traumata 
Trauma-Drama 
(Drauma) 
 
For Bond, although in the phase of the core self, the concept of the 
Tragic constitutes the core self’s dramatization of the Tragic and the Comic; 
tragedy, however, implicates the external reality in relation to the self’s 
imagination. In a letter to Jean-Pierre Vincent on 13 October 2004, Bond 
writes: ‘Tragedy throws the indifference of the universe in our face, and 
only the self’s concept of the Tragic […] can receive the assault and restore 
the self’s humanness’ (Davis 2005: 193). For Bond, the aim of drama is to 
‘create Tragic danger’ (ibid) in order to cope with the ‘the indifference of 
the universe’. In ‘Drama Note 1 – Being In a State’, Bond asserts: ‘Radical 
innocence is not naive, its ultimate expression is in the implacability of the 
Tragic, when it chooses to be human in the face of authority and the 
administration of Ideological [sic] law-and-order’ (2016b: par. 5). In other 
words, for Bond, fabricating suffering and danger to revitalize ‘the Tragic’ 
as an idea inherent in our consciousness is not only to redramatize the core 
self’s imagination on a personal level but to create ‘a political tragedy which 
will describe and invoke the suffering of our time’ (Stuart 1998: 22). 
Therefore, the Tragic should not be conflated with tragedy, which does not 
repeat dramatizing the Tragic but bears political significance through 
revealing how personal trauma is structured by a broader ideological 
framework.  
In addition to conceiving tragedy based on his theory of subjectivity, 
Bond also frequently draws on Greek tragedy and Shakespearean tragedy as 
his references. In an interview with Peter Billingham in 2007, when asked 
about the problems that impact on the contemporary world, Bond replies:  
 
They are essentially the problems of Oedipus and Orestes. 
Oedipus is the problem of the self and Orestes (and Antigone) 
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is the problem of the relationship to authority and the 
community. Of course, both of these problems overlap but 
that is the basic conflict. (Billingham and Bond 2)  
 
Bond’s reply furnishes another lens through which to approach his tragedy: 
its indebtedness to Greek tragedy. In another interview with Fabienne 
Arvers, he states that if Antigone is the most important character in the 
twentieth century, in the twenty-first century it is Medea (2016c). Although 
Bond has adapted Shakespearean and Greek tragedy in Lear (1971) and The 
Woman (1978), his recent plays adapt Greek and Shakespearean tragedy in a 
different way: these plays are not set in mythological or legendary 
circumstances, nor do they invoke Greek or Shakespearean characters. 
Instead, they are constructed either in a contemporary or in a dystopian 
futuristic world and depart from the plots of specific and well-known 
tragedies.  
As theatre scholar Margherita Laera points out, theatre is like a 
memory machine which incessantly recollects, re-elaborates, and contests 
existing cultural materials to produce new ideas, and this is in line with the 
logic of adaptations that, by returning to the past to repeat or to reject it, 
results in evolutionary reoccurrences (3). This is how Bond imagines, in a 
tellingly humorous manner, what it would be like if major characters of 
Greek tragedy lived today: 
 
If Oedipus lived now he would not blind himself, he would be 
treated by a psychiatrist. Orestes and Electra would not kill 
their mother, she would be in prison for murdering her 
husband. Antigone would not hang herself, she would vote for 
the party that opposed Creon. (2012: xxii) 
 
Bond’s irony underscores how the epochal discrepancy between our age and 
ancient Greece corresponds to the differences of dramatic imagination 
conditioned by social and political structures. Admittedly, it is not the case 
that Bond sends his tragic characters to a psychiatrist, prison, or a ballot box, 
but he acknowledges the necessity of constructing his tragedy in a world 
determined by contemporary networks of psychiatric, juridical, and political 
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discourses. Before analyzing how Bond constructs his tragedy by 
recollecting and reorganizing existing cultural materials, I first turn to 
explore Bond’s idea of ‘drauma’ – drama-trauma – in relation to trauma 
studies in order to elaborate the theoretical foundation of his tragedy.  
 
4.1. Bondian Trauma-Tragedy: Ontological, Historical, and Structural  
 
According to The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trauma is defined as ‘[a]n 
event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the subject’s incapacity 
to respond adequately to it, and by the upheaval and long-lasting effects that 
it brings about in the psychical organisation’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 465). 
Accordingly, the structure of trauma presupposes both the occurrence of 
traumatic events and their belated effects. The question, therefore, is how 
we conceive those traumatizing events. As Griselda Pollock argues, it is 
productive to differentiate structural trauma and historical trauma – while 
the former refers to those universal psychic events that contribute to the 
formation of the subject, the latter refers to those particular events 
experienced by the individual subject (43). Since I use ‘structural’ to refer to 
the idea of social structure, here I use ‘ontological’ to describe the traumatic 
events inherent in subject formation. In Bond’s theory of subjectivity, 
trauma can be a transhistorically ontological concept – that is, every human 
subject experiences the traumatic feeling of pain due to the separation from 
the mother, and this pattern of feelings (pain/pleasure) is later translated into 
corresponding patterns of ideas (Tragic/Comic) in the phase of the core self 
when it starts to be conscious of the external world. This pattern of trauma 
extends to the stage of the socialized self, as Bond states that ‘trauma 
repeats and attenuates itself in daily life in society and in its crises’ (2000b: 
140). This kind of trauma can be defined as ‘historical’. However, we 
should not conflate ontological trauma and historical trauma as this 
conflation obscures the specificity of historical trauma and unproductively 
perpetuates the repetitive return of ontological trauma.  
Furthermore, when we examine the full process of subject formation, 
we need to consider that, at the advent of the subject being structured by the 
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symbolic social order, the subject also experiences the constraining and 
traumatizing effects of socialization. Trauma is not only a concept related to 
the psyche, but it also refers to a network of social and political conditions 
that determine how the socialized self is fashioned. In Freud’s theory, in 
addition to the trauma model structured around an original trauma event and 
belated traumatic effects, in ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’ (1926), 
Freud proposes another model of trauma based on the expectation of 
danger-situations. For Freud, instead of waiting for a traumatic situation to 
take place, the individual may develop a capacity for expecting incoming 
danger and producing anxiety. Regarding anxiety, Freud states: ‘Its 
connection with expectation belongs to the danger-situation, whereas its 
indefiniteness and lack of object belong to the traumatic situation of 
helplessness’ (2001b: 166). It is based on this model that Derrida interprets 
the form of trauma produced by terrorism: ‘We are talking about a trauma, 
and thus an event, whose temporality proceeds neither from the now that is 
present nor from the present that is past but from an im-presentable to come 
(à venir)’ (Borradori 97).  
More precisely, in Bond’s later plays, it is the biopolitical structures 
exemplified by the camp, the security state, and neoliberalism that define 
the parameters of traumatizing reality. Operating by differentiating the 
livable from the unlivable, these traumatizing structures constantly produce 
unrecognized wasted lives. Regarding how these structures produce political 
subjects, political sociology scholar Mark Neocleous argues that the 
permanent pursuit of security and preparation for resilience against trauma 
build the foundation of contemporary political subjectivity that entails ‘the 
making of the self in preparation for the trauma to come’ (209; original 
emphasis).  
Bond’s dramatic articulation of traumatizing structures is not an 
exception. As Roger Luckhurst argues, in the 1990s there emerged a new 
articulation of subjectivity based on the concept of trauma (28). He proposes 
that this emergence of ‘trauma culture’ derives from the disappearance of 
structures of communality, as a result of which traumatised identities 
become the sites of communality although they are still unable to process 
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the traumatization of the individual (38-39). In the field of theatre, we can 
find similar observations of this ‘trauma culture’ and anxiety caused by the 
loss of communality, the detachment from experiential reality induced by 
the accumulation of spectacles, and the totalizing logic of neoliberalism. 
According to Liz Tomlin, due to the fact that reality is experienced more 
and more through mediations of media communication and information 
technologies, the distinction between reality and representations of reality 
begins to collapse. Therefore, the preoccupation of the theatre during the 
1990s with individual identities can be regarded as a response to the anxiety 
about the possibility of an identity outside mediated simulacra (2008: 498). 
However, contemporary theatre by no means accepts the obsession with the 
individual identity without problematizing the phenomenon of the 
atomization of the individual. As Tomlin argues, the ending of Mark 
Ravenhill’s Shopping and Fucking (1996) expresses a longing for 
community (504). Mark Taylor-Batty also points out that Sarah Kane’s 
dramaturgical strategy in Blasted is to arouse visceral effects through 
mimetic bodily suffering as an opposition to mediated televisual images 
produced during the Bosnian War (61-63). Along similar lines, in an essay 
on bodily mutilation in British theatre during the 1990s, Dan Rebellato 
argues that the theatrical images of violent bodily mutilation are attempts at 
affirming the possibility of human contact in opposition to the neoliberal 
logic of reducing human bodies into mere parts of industrial processes or 
acts of consumption (2008a: 200-04). In another essay on the apocalyptic in 
British theatre in the twenty-first century, Rebellato argues that the 
prevalent use of the apocalyptic signals a ‘counterstrategy to capitalist 
realism’ and that this dramaturgy of the end of neoliberalist capitalism is 
revolutionary in the sense that it endeavors to think beyond totality and 
explore the unthinkable (2017: par. 58-59).  
These theorizations about the political significance of dramaturgical 
features such as the use of violence and apocalyptic images presuppose a 
traumatic structure embedded in the context of contemporary neoliberalist 
social order and the accumulation of mediated spectacles. The individual is 
so entrenched in the totalizing symbolic and imaginary orders that it is 
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impossible to conceive other alternatives of reality and communality. 
Trauma in this kind of analysis refers to a traumatizing structure that 
produces trauma symptoms instead of a recognizable trauma event. Theatre 
academic Patrick Duggan’s study of ‘trauma-tragedy’ encapsulates this 
strand of analysis: ‘Trauma-tragedy is a model of contemporary 
performance that has arisen in response to the de-cathected, individualized, 
and flattened society in which we live at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century’ (174-75). In contradistinction to Christina Wald’s analysis of 
‘trauma drama’, which emphasizes the representation of the traumatized 
subject in relation to trauma events (156), for Duggan, trauma-tragic 
performances reflect how the individual is being traumatized by a 
traumatizing structure and provide the possibility of re-cathected aesthetic 
experience.  
As Dominick LaCapra cautions, trauma may be used as a generalizing 
idea that subsumes the particular into the universal, and it is crucial to 
address the ‘mediation between the particular and the general’ (223). 
Similarly, Michael Rothberg notes that event-based trauma theories should 
include the perspective of structural violence while theories of structural 
violence should consider individual psychic effects that derive from 
structural victimization (2014: xiv-xv). Insofar as the concept of trauma 
entails at least three levels – ontological, historical, and structural – of 
meaning, I argue that Bond’s idea of ‘drauma’ should also be considered in 
relation to post-traumatic subjectivity, historical trauma events, and 
traumatizing structures.  
As Bond states: ‘Drama “re-enacts-out” the neonate’s original 
creativity but now burdened with the experience of injustice and Ideology 
and the social chaos they cause’ (Bond 2015: par. 17); dramatic imagination 
is also structured traumatically in the sense that it involves traumatic events 
or structures and the structure of repetition. However, the dramatic 
imagination of trauma should not be regarded as pathological repetitions of 
ontological, historical, or structural trauma. Instead, by dramatizing trauma, 
the dramatic terrain becomes a space where historical traumatic events can 
be evoked and traumatizing structures can be revealed. Furthermore, this 
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imaginative encounter with trauma not only initiates a subjective process of 
‘acting out’ but also prepares a hermeneutic space for ‘working through’. 
More specifically, this double process of acting out and working through 
can be considered in terms of Bond’s theory of subjectivity. Based on 
Bond’s theoretical structure of subjectivity, I argue that Bond’s tragic 
dramaturgy comprises justice, truth, and madness as three structurally 
interdependent concepts: 
 
1. The Bondian subject seeks justice when Nothingness qua the 
source of legitimizing authority is contested.  
2. The Bondian subject seeks the truth when Nothingness qua 
the source of signifying order is contested.  
3. Since the site of Nothingness is occupied by ideology, the 
site of Nothingness determines what is rational and what is 
mad. The Bondian subject therefore is structurally mad since 
the subject seeks reason beyond that defined by ideology. 
 
The Bondian subject is always already traumatized by ‘Nothingness’, which 
is a site where the subject undergoes the process of subjectivation – for 
Bond, this process entails the seeking of justice, truth, and sanity. Moreover, 
in Bond’s tragedy, ‘Nothingness’ can be experienced through specific 
historical trauma events or through general traumatizing structures. Bond’s 
imagination of the subject’s encounter with Nothingness opens up a 
subjective terrain in which traumatic events and structures can be negotiated 
with the subject’s pursuit of a new distribution of meanings around the ideas 
of justice, truth, and sanity. Based on these concepts, I examine Chair, 
People, and Dea to demonstrate Bond’s dramaturgy of trauma-tragedy.  
 
4.2. Chair: Freedom and Justice 
 
Chair was first broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on 7 April 2000 and was staged 
at the Avignon Festival on 18 July 2006, directed by Alain Françon. In 2008, 
the play was restaged at the National Theatre de la Colline. As Sean Carney 
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observes, Chair is set in a totalitarian regime under a permanent state of 
emergency, a place where even the most tiny action of compassion can be a 
crime (173). This totalitarian state is also a welfare state governed by 
biopolitical measures. As Michel Foucault argues that biopower can be 
applied both through the discipline of the body and through the regulation of 
populations (145), in Chair, Bond imagines an extreme form of the 
Foucaultian welfare state that not only applies its biopower to every 
individual but also normalizes these biopolitical administrations and 
perpetuates a traumatizing anxiety-inducing structure in everyday life. In 
Chair, this biopolitical operation is exhibited not only dramaturgically but 
also theatrically. To facilitate my analysis, I draw extensively on Françon’s 
production in 2008, 32  which succesfully mounted Bond’s dystopian 
worldview on stage through the actors’ nuanced performances. By 
examining how Bond’s characters are embodied, we can not only 
understand how the Bondian subject is structured within a biopolitical state 
of exception, the manipulation of which is best expressed through the 
human body, but we can also see how the palimpsest structure of the 
Bondian subject is manifested.  
At the start of the play, Alice looks through the window at the Soldier 
and the Prisoner in the street while Billy, Alice’s adoptive son, is drawing 
pictures. Partly because Alice thinks the Prisoner is her mother, and partly 
because Billy suggests that Alice should take a chair for the Prisoner or the 
Soldier, she decides to take a chair down to the street. The interaction 
between Alice, played by Dominique Valadié, and Billy, played by 
Pierre-Félix Gravière, exhibited how the intersubjective relationship is 
conditioned by the external world of totalitarian control. Valadié’s 
performance demonstrated how the individual under the domination of the 
totalitarian state lives in constant fear and anxiety. When she looked out of 
the window, her taut face and uneasy body expressed her apprehension 
about what happens on the street as well as her indecision about what action 
to take. Alice knows that she will be interrogated if she does anything that 
                                                
32 My analysis of the production is based on the recording archived at Ina THEQUE.  
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breaks the norm, but she also knows that she needs to take action. Valadié’s 
reserved performance made the restraining effects of the totalitarian 
authority on the body palpable through minute bodily expressions, but her 
performance also indicated the inner conflict between Alice’s fear and her 
will to act against the fear. In contrast to Alice, Billy never undergoes a full 
process of socialization due to his lack of contact with the outside society, 
and this explains why he is unable to understand Alice’s anxiety and 
occupies himself with constructing fictional worlds through painting. 
According to Bond, through his drawings and stories, Billy imaginatively 
controls the external world (Tuaillon 2015: 158). Gravière’s Billy was a 
carefree man who was not only physically child-like but also intellectually 
immature. His performance embodied Bond’s idea of the core self, a 
pre-socialized state in which the self is obsessed with constructing a world 
uncorrupted by ideology. In performance, whereas Alice’s actions 
demonstrated how her reason, which has internalized the totalitarian order, 
prohibited her from freely taking action activated by imagination, Billy’s 
actions externalized the activities of the pre-ideologized imagination.   
When Alice descends to the street, the Prisoner is unable to 
communicate with her by words although she can utter some meaningless 
sounds. As Alice tries to decipher what the Prisoner intends to convey, she 
bites Alice. Later, the Soldier shoots the Prisoner dead as she is about to 
chase Alice. In this scene, Léna Bréban’s performance as the Prisoner was 
powerful in emphasizing the dehumanizing aspect of the totalitarian state. 
While Bréban’s performance remained faithful to Bond’s description in the 
play, her embodiment of the Prisoner as an old fragile woman shorn of grey 
hair was enigmatic in visually presenting how the human figure can be 
extremely distorted, dehumanized, and even desexualized in the totalitarian 
state. The Prisoner’s physical presence on the stage made us instantly 
understand why Alice is uncertain about the Woman’s identity though she 
thinks she knows the Prisoner, who is in fact her mother. When commenting 
on the meaning of the Prisoner’s reaction to the chair, Bond states how the 
chair can become a cage or even a prison with bars, and how the Prisoner is 
devastated by emotion when she meets her daughter (Tuaillon 2015: 
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115-16). However, in performance, the semiotic meaning of the chair and 
the Prisoner’s relation to Alice remained uncertain. Bréban foregrounded 
the unpredictability of the Prisoner’s reactions – from taking hold of the 
chair, murmuring to Alice, to biting her – but the sense of unpredictability 
was achieved by acting in a determined and logical manner. By restraining 
the expression of overt emotions and avoiding explicit gestures to determine 
the relationship between the Prisoner and Alice, Bréban’s performance not 
only made the Prisoner an enigmatic person but made her relationship with 
Alice ambiguous.   
Back in the house, Alice starts to tear off all the pictures and burns 
them because she knows the authority will investigate what has happened 
on the street. It is because we know the importance of the paintings for Billy 
that the concentrated theatrical power is stunning when Alice starts to tear 
all of the paintings off the wall. Valadié’s Alice acted with determination, as 
if this decision was based on her rational calculation. However, this also 
marks the point from which Billy’s neonatal innocence starts to be 
destroyed, and Gravière’s reactions – from calmly intervening, losing 
control of himself to bursting into tears – illustrated how a child anxiously 
responds to the destruction of his imaginary world. Later, Billy is consoled 
by Alice’s story about his birth as if the new story in place of his preceding 
imaginary construction enables him to regain the psychic balance.  
During the Welfare Officer’s investigation, the Officer examines any 
tiny actions and even meaningless sounds in accordance with the 
rationalized standards and procedures. While Alice states that she intended 
to take the chair to the Soldier, the Officer focuses on the Prisoner’s 
behavior towards Alice and asks Alice whether her action was prompted by 
her pity for the Prisoner. The investigation is meticulous to such an extent 
that even the Prisoner’s whispering must be deciphered. Bréban’s 
performance as the Welfare Officer embodied the dehumanizing coldness of 
authoritarian bureaucracy.33 Her unaffected way of speech highlighted the 
                                                
33 The fact that Bréban played both the Prisoner and the Welfare Officer demonstrates the 
two facets of the same process of dehumanization: while they occupy different biopolitical 
positions – one is bare life and the other is responsible for maintaining the biopolitical order 
of the regime – they are governed by the same logic of instrumentalization.  
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alienating formality of official language, and her matter-of-fact attitude 
underscored how the authoritarian logic can be present in the form of 
procedural banality.  
Due to the Welfare Officer’s investigation, Alice decides to commit 
suicide and leaves a note for Billy to follow. After Alice commits suicide, 
Billy is not shocked by her corpse but treats it only as a dangling object 
behind the door. Gravière’s performance showed that Billy seems to be 
unaware of the meaning of Alice’s death. What he can do is follow Alice’s 
death note and bring the urn of ashes to the parking lot. While the stage 
directions describe in concrete detail how Billy experiences his first contact 
with the outside world, Françon used darkness with various soundscapes, 
which were divided by several blackouts, to represent Billy’s encounter 
with the outside world. By situating Billy in the middle of the darkness, 
Françon intensified Billy’s sense of estrangement and vulnerability in the 
face of the menacing omnipresent power of the state, the horror of which 
was highlighted by Billy’s death by a stranger’s shot. Billy can never grow 
up from the state of the core self to that of the socialized self because the 
totalitarian state must eradicate any anomalous existence such as Billy.  
In Chair, both Alice’s taking the chair down to the street and her final 
suicide can be regarded as ‘Antigone moments’ – rebellious gestures against 
the totalitarian authority. In what ways can Chair be read as a reworking of 
Antigone? Bond’s understanding of Antigone is anti-Hegelian: ‘Hegel might 
have argued that […] both Antigone and Creon had equal rights. I think this 
is not so because Antigone is right and Creon is wrong’ (Billingham and 
Bond 6). The debate over the meaning of Antigone derives from different 
modes of understanding tragedy. As Hans-Thies Lehmann argues, there are 
two models of tragedy: the conflict model and the transgression model (59). 
The conflict model designates the tragedy, the form of which ‘involves the 
ever-repeated conflict between personal autonomy and social nomos, or the 
law of history’ (59-60), while the transgression model designates the 
tragedy in which ‘the tragic constitutes the human being insofar as it proves 
essential for mortals to overstep given borders’ (61). Whereas the conflict 
model necessitates the collision of two equally justified positions, the 
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transgression model emphasizes the anarchic force of destabilizing the 
prevailing order.  
Among the many interpretations of Antigone, Hegel’s reading and 
Lacan’s reading of Antigone correspond to each of these two models. In 
Hegel’s view, the essence of tragedy is a conflict within which each side is 
justified in affirming its positive ethical content and in infringing the power 
of the other. However, the tragic collision must come to resolution and 
peace is restored by eternal justice (1196-7). Antigone, for Hegel, is the 
perfect example of tragedy that represents the conflict between Creon, who 
embodies the ethical order of the state, and Antigone, who represents the 
ethical order of the family. Each of them preserves its one-sided justification, 
and their collision ends with the cancellation of the conflict in reconciliation 
(1215). Lacan, however, disagrees with Hegel’s conception of tragedy that 
ends with the reconciliation of equally antagonistic forces. On the contrary, 
Lacan reads Creon’s judgment as ‘[promoting] the good of all as the law 
without limits, the sovereign law, the law that goes beyond or crosses the 
limit’ (1992: 259). For Lacan, the common good and the sovereign law 
cannot dominate over everything without an emerging excess (ibid.). For 
Lacan, the content of the excess is realized in Antigone’s objection to 
Creon’s law as the supreme reason: ‘She lives in the house of Creon; she is 
subject to his law; and this is something she cannot bear’ (263). Antigone’s 
desire does not obey the common good and the sovereign law, in opposition 
to which her desire only commands that she should act in accordance with 
desire itself. For Lacan, the universalization of the service of common good 
by no means resolves the problem of the relationship of the individual to his 
or her desire (303).  
Bond’s understanding of Antigone is similar to Lacan’s. Instead of 
representing another established collective legal order, Antigone embodies 
her own desire to transgress the order imposed by Creon. Antigone’s death 
never amounts to a resolution that accomplishes justice; on the contrary, 
Antigone’s death operates as a non-totalizable surplus that problematizes 
the possibility of resolution. Lehmann also argues that Antigone should be 
read as a tragedy of transgression as ‘it conjures up a final point of 
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uncertainty in the law: the groundlessness it harbours’ (2016: 82). The idea 
of the ‘groundlessness’ of law resonates with Bond’s idea of Nothingness as 
the origin from which the legal is divided from the illegal by the dominant 
ideology.  
For Bond, radical innocence as the potential power of imagination can 
be activated in extreme situations to resist the total domination by ideology, 
and this imaginative power is the foundation of ethical acts. Whereas, in 
Chapter Two, I have pointed out the relationship between Bond and Kant, 
here I refer to Kant again and focus on the concept of freedom in order to 
account for the ethical implication of Alice’s action. In ‘Freedom and 
Drama’, Bond evokes Kant’s idea of freedom and morality to explain his 
idea of the imperative of ‘radical innocence’. According to Kant, ‘the sole 
principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of law 
(namely, from a desired object) and at the same time in the determination of 
choice through the mere form of giving universal law’ (1997: 30). Kant’s 
practical reason is not determined by any ‘matter’, any specific desire or 
object, but by a mere ‘form’ of universal law. Kant restricts his theory 
within the field of practical reason in the form of universal lawgiving and 
excludes any consideration of practical applications in empirical reality. 
Bond’s idea is Kantian in the sense that he refuses to explain the imperative 
through psychological motives; nevertheless, he acknowledges the 
discrepancy between practical reason and empirical actions by stating that 
‘the imperative remains constant but the act changes’ (2006: 217). As 
Kant’s idea of freedom is posited to guard against causal determinism and 
pathological determinants, Bond’s idea of the imperative as a constant 
without predetermined causality makes freedom possible. For Bond, the 
locus of freedom is that of radical innocence as the psychic potential 
inherent in imagination. What Kant designates as determinism in Bond’s 
theory is ideology as he states that ‘ideology seeks to impose the 
determinism and necessity of nature on us, the human imperative seeks the 
freedom it does not have’ (221-22).  
 Bond’s conception of radical innocence presumes that there exists the 
psychic potentiality that is not completely ideologically determined. As 
 149 
ideology can be understood as the source of legitimacy, radical innocence 
designates the possibility of defying the established legitimate order. The 
universal self-lawgiving form of the Kantian categorical imperative also 
entails that the self-lawgiving causality is free from the restraint of the 
empirical legal sphere. Therefore, radical innocence is analogous to the 
Kantian imperative as both presuppose that the cause of self-determination 
is different from legality. However, while the Kantian categorical 
imperative presupposes a transcendental subject and requires that the 
imperative should be universally valid, the Bondian subject of radical 
innocence is situated in concrete material conditions and the decision 
activated by it is therefore in accordance with the particular situation.  
In Chair, one of Alice’s ethical acts is her decision to take the chair 
down to the street. How do we understand Alice’s decision? She denies that 
she does it out of pity. What determines her action is an imperative without 
clear motives. In fact, this is not the first time that Alice breaks the rule of 
the state. Her adoption of Billy is illegal as she acknowledges that she did 
not hand him over to the authority because she was afraid of being 
questioned. Alice’s actions are not out of her moral rationalizations as she 
never asserts what she does is right and the authority is wrong. She knows 
what the authority demands for the common good but she never regards her 
action as an overt violation of the rule. Instead, she tries to secure a space 
where the authority might cease to operate, the rule fails to apply, and 
authentic human relations are possible.  
However, her action of taking the chair implicates her in the field of 
the operating sovereign power. For the Welfare Officer, the nature of 
Alice’s action does not matter: Alice is a criminal if she acts out of pity, 
which is forbidden; if Alice does not act out of any motive, then she should 
be regarded as mentally deranged. Either way, juridically her action is 
illegal – in the state of exception, the authority does not follow any 
predictable legal procedures but imposes its law through administrative 
decisions. Every administrative application is lawful and needs no further 
legitimacy. As a result, the regulation of one’s physical acts and mental state 
is so complete that the possibility of acting out of freedom is cancelled – 
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even motiveless benevolent acts are forbidden. This makes Alice choose 
death. For Bond, ‘Alice is a rebel. […] So she claims there is a part of her 
that they will never possess and this is a shared humanity’ (Tuaillon 189). 
Determining one’s death as the resistance to being ‘possessed’ turns out to 
be the only possible way of acting out of self-lawgiving freedom against the 
totalizing legal sphere. Alice’s suicide, like her adoption of Billy and her 
taking the chair for the Prisoner, is one of her actions that seek the space of 
freedom beyond the sovereign power.  
Alice’s suicide and Billy’s death make explicit the prevalence of the 
traumatizing structure conditioned by the biopolitical governance and the 
permanent state of exception. These events take place in what trauma 
studies scholar Jenny Edkins defines as ‘trauma time’ – ‘a time where 
events that we call traumatic or unspeakable both expose the lack that 
underpins a sovereign political symbolic order and reveal the radical 
relationality of life’ (127). Although Alice’s suicide and Billy’s death 
evidence the violence of the political order, Alice’s compassionate acts and 
Billy’s biological existence, which is defined as anomalous, also 
demonstrate the ‘radical relationality of life’ – the ethical dimension 
entailed in the sphere of human contact. Since the anxiety-inducing 
traumatizing structure of permanent threat manufactured by the welfare 
security state leads to the ‘colonisation of political imagination’ (Neocleous 
199), remaining resilient towards anxiety only prolongs the policing of 
imagination. In Chair, we can see that it is only by confronting traumatizing 
structural anxiety can alternative political and ethical envisioning of 
freedom and justice be made possible.  
 
4.3. People: Truth and the Account of the Self 
 
While Chair, by focusing on Alice’s ethical actions, is modeled on Antigone, 
those plays that interrogate the problem of knowledge and self-knowledge 
are modelled on the myth of Oedipus. In the following I will analyze People, 
the fourth play of The Paris Pentad, to demonstrate how Bond conceives 
the problem of knowledge and truth. Premiered by director Françon at the 
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Théâtre Gérard Philipe in Saint-Denis on 13 January 2014, People includes 
four traumatized characters – Postern, Lambeth, Margerson, and Someone – 
who wander over post-catastrophic ruins, and the play is structured as a 
collective journey towards self-knowledge. While theatre critics agree that 
Françon’s staging of People presents the post-apocalyptic no-man’s-land 
persuasively and praise the performance of the actors, they are uncertain 
about the validity of the play’s message. Brigitte Salino points out that Bond 
fails to answer what it means to be human, the pivotal question that 
permeates his other plays.34 Additionally, she argues that Françon’s fidelity 
to the atrocity depicted in the play turns the spectacle into a ‘trial’. Similarly, 
Philippe Chevilley remarks that, although a few stories and some poetic 
passages are moving, overall the play fails to transform the spectators as his 
preceding plays did.35  
These responses are understandable as People is an exception to the 
standard Bondian plays that interrogate the human potential of acting out 
justice in extreme situations. It is reasonable to speculate why Bond chooses 
to change his dramaturgy to such an extent that it fails to meet the 
expectation of the theatre critics. Does this mean that Bond thinks the 
problem of justice is associated with that of truth? As Bond acknowledges 
that The Paris Pentad should be read as a series of plays in which one play 
answers the question left by the preceding one, we can consider the 
relationship between People and the preceding play, Born, to see what is the 
question left unanswered. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, while 
the pivotal scene in Born takes place when Luke decides to kill the 
Woman’s baby, what concerns Luke more is the meaning of death and life. 
Before killing the baby, Luke keeps questioning the Woman about the 
meaning of being at the end of life, but she remains silent throughout Luke’s 
interrogation. The question unanswered in Born is the question about the 
truth of the subject as a living human being. If People has to answer the 
unresolved question, logically it must be a play concerned with the problem 
                                                
34 See Brigitte Salino’s ‘Les atrocités mécaniques d'Edward Bond’ in Le Monde on 22 
January 2014. 
35 See Philippe Chevilley’s ‘L’apocalypse et après?’ in Les Echos on 26 January 2014. 
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of desire for the truth. Since People lacks overt sustaining dramatic actions 
that connect every character, it is more approachable if we read it as 
composed of four different journeys of the characters’ self-discovery. After 
recounting their journeys, I will focus on how they define themselves 
through the quest for their own truth.  
Throughout the play, Margerson keeps telling the same story about ‘he’ 
as a boy – in fact, the ‘he’ in his story is himself. The obsessive and 
repetitive story-telling not only functions as a method of objectifying the 
story in order to master it, but it also demonstrates how Margerson is 
tormented by his memory. According to the story, Margerson used to be a 
boy killer who was trained to kill and was ordered to kill every morning as a 
routine. One day, however, Margerson found out that the one he was 
ordered to kill was another boy of his age, which made him unable to kill 
and drove him mad. The next morning, a game was designed: Margerson 
and the boy were ordered to run from two sides of a square to get a rifle to 
shoot the other. The boy got the rifle but he failed to kill Margerson on the 
spot. That night, the camp was raided, and Margerson managed to escape. 
From that moment, he has kept returning to the story and told it repetitively.  
Lambeth is a woman who collects the clothes of dead soldiers and sells 
them in a market to earn her living. At the start of the play, she is waiting 
for Postern’s death so that she can obtain his quality overcoat. Later, we 
discover that Lambeth is not only able to distinguish good clothes from bad 
ones, but she can also figure out what happens to those who wore the 
clothes. Near the end of the play, Lambeth reveals that she lost one of her 
two sons under the violence of an army gang, and the other son, blaming her 
for the death of his brother, started to abuse her. She escaped and ended up 
earning her living by selling the clothes of the dead.  
Postern lies unconscious and bleeding on the ground at the beginning 
of the play. After waking up, he tries to remember what has happened to 
him. When he sees Someone, he gives him an overcoat which he obtained 
from a prisoner killed by him. He keeps the coat because he remembers that 
the prisoner did his button up even before being killed – a gesture that 
troubles him. Postern gives Someone the coat because he insists that 
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Someone is ‘innocent’. However, Someone confesses that he is not innocent. 
Unable to accept this truth and haunted by the gesture of the prisoner he 
killed, Postern ends up repeating the phrase ‘do yer button up’ (Bond 2006: 
108) and finally dies.  
Someone is a man who has forgotten his identity and hopes to find out 
who he is by interrogating others. Someone discovers who he is, rather than 
by factual evidence, by a process of remembrance and confession. When 
hearing Margerson’s repetitive story, Someone is reminded that he also used 
to be a boy who was trained to kill. It is only when Lambeth starts to 
recount her domestic tragedy caused by the army gang that Someone truly 
acknowledges his own identity as a soldier killer. He is traumatized because, 
like Margerson, he was also ordered to kill a boy of his own age. He 
disagrees with Postern’s insistence that he is innocent and confesses that he 
is guilty. He also discovers that the button of the coat given to him by 
Postern has been ripped off, suggesting that what the prisoner did was to rip 
off the button instead of doing it up. In other words, Postern misreads the 
prisoner’s final gesture, which in fact demonstrates angst and defiance. At 
the end of the play, worried that other soldiers from Postern’s camp may 
return, Someone parts company with Lambeth, who asks Margerson to 
accompany her and help her bear her sack of rags and clothes.  
Regarding these characters, Bond states: ‘They are fighting to find out 
what happened to them in order to take their particular responsibility for it. 
It is like a summing up speech in a trial where various lawyers are giving 
their version of what happened’ (Tuaillon 2015: 197). This statement clearly 
encapsulates the play, but it needs further clarification: first, Postern and 
Someone are ‘fighting to find out’ their past but Lambeth and Margerson 
are not – if they are, it is a fight of a different nature. Second, not every 
character is taking ‘their particular responsibility’: Postern refuses or evades 
his own responsibility by misreading the meaning of the prisoner’s gesture 
and misconceiving Someone’s past, while Margerson, tormented by his 
traumatic past, is unable to take responsibility at all. Third, it is true that 
they are ‘giving their version of what happened’ but, as lawyers, who are 
they defending? If it is a trial, what is the verdict of this trial? What is the 
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truth that legitimizes the verdict of the trial? How does People relate to the 
myth of Oedipus? All these questions revolve around the desire for the truth, 
and this is related to how Bond understands the myth of Oedipus.  
In the myth of Oedipus, by answering the Sphinx’s riddle, Oedipus 
gains his self-knowledge as a human and his status as the king of Thebes. 
However, as we know, what Oedipus knows about himself is not the truth – 
the missed encounter with the real traumatic past is made possible only after 
he investigates the cause of the plague in Thebes. The traumatic past posits 
itself as an enigma and compels Oedipus to produce a new truth that can 
reconstitute the order. It is only when Oedipus accepts the past, blinds 
himself, and declares that he is Oedipus that he completely grasps the whole 
truth. Bond’s interpretation, however, problematizes the relationship 
between crime, innocence, and truth: 
 
Oedipus defies the gods and is outside social law. His acts are 
not crimes, they come from the pre-social need to be at home 
in the world. To seek justice, Oedipus murders his father and 
marries his mother. […] When Oedipus commits his crimes, 
peace comes to the city, because Oedipus, anticipating the 
future, answers the Sphinx’s riddle: the definition of a human 
being. When Oedipus’s story is known, his acts become 
crimes. Administration makes innocence criminal and uses 
the transcendental to make it a sin, an impurity. (2000b: 130; 
original emphasis)  
 
Bond regards Oedipus’s flight from Corinth to exempt himself from 
committing the crime foreshadowed by the oracle as an act of innocence. It 
is due to his innocence to seek his right in this world that he murders Laius 
and marries Jocasta. What makes him criminal is not his act of innocence 
but the transcendental power, which causes the plague, and the 
administration of the state, the investigation of which makes Oedipus 
juridically guilty. For Bond, it is ideology that turns Oedipus’s acts of 
innocence into crime. While the truth established by the facts and witnesses 
reveals that Oedipus is the criminal juridically, this by no means suppresses 
the innocent nature of the crime. Similarly, Oedipus’s self-blinding can be 
regarded as a form of punishment that results from the investigation as well 
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as an innocent act of self-determination. For Bond, innocence and crime do 
not exclude each other – on the contrary, innocence persists in crime and 
can take the form of crime. What is at stake is what authorizes the 
establishment of truth that determines the conviction. Juridical conviction 
based on factual evidence as truth is not justice since it is authorized by the 
state that legitimatizes the structural injustice in society. Conversely, the 
persistence of innocence in crime can only be revealed by the 
self-authorized determination of subjective truth.  
More importantly, this subjective truth is based on a desire for 
narration. According to philosopher Adriana Cavarero, although Sophocles’ 
Oedipus can answer what man is in terms of philosophical definition, he 
cannot know who he is as a singular human being by abstract knowledge – 
Oedipus can know who he is only through the narration of his story and it is 
others who narrate his story (2000: 12). In a similar manner, People 
revolves around different forms of self-narration. In People, audiences are 
not provided with facts or witnesses that can completely guarantee the 
veracity of the characters’ confessions. However, the relationship between 
subjectivity and truth can be established by means other than facts. The 
conflicts of various narratives are in principle propelled by each character’s 
desire for their subjective truth established by remembrance, confession, 
and others’ narratives. The disclosure of truth is an event initiated by the 
interrogating subject, and it is through the process of self-conviction of 
crime and innocence that the meaning of the truth is contested. However, 
unlike the Sophoclean Oedipus, who arrives at self-understanding through 
the others’ narratives, not every character in People can achieve 
self-understanding. Speculating about the ethics of accounting for the self, 
Judith Butler states: 
 
To tell the truth about oneself involves us in quarrels about 
the formation of the self and the social status of truth. Our 
narratives come up against an impasse when the conditions of 
possibility for speaking the truth cannot fully be thematized, 
where what we speak relies upon a formative history, a 
sociality, and a corporeality that cannot easily, if at all, be 
reconstructed in narrative. (2005: 132) 
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As Butler suggests that narrative presupposes the conditions of speaking 
about the truth and the self, the difficulty for the characters in People to 
articulate about themselves derives from the fact that their traumatic 
experiences may not be articulable according to the conditions of narrative. 
This does not mean that these characters can never speak about themselves, 
but they do need to surmount the obstacles of speaking. The process of 
self-narration thus requires a redistribution of the conditions of speaking and 
a negotiation between the speakable and the unspeakable.  
When Someone is still struggling to seek his own identity, Postern 
gives him a gun and orders him to shoot Margerson. Someone, while failing 
to shoot Margerson, confesses that he did kill:  
 
Postern  Kill ’im! Do it! ’E cant ’urt yer! – ’E try I break ’is 
back! If yer was a killer yer’d kill me for saying that! Yer ain 
kill! Listen t’ what yer know! I made yer see it! Ken! Ken! 
Ken! – yer cant kill (Pushes Margerson face down to the 
ground.) Try it! Do it professional! Back a’ the neck! 
 […]  
Someone stares down at Margerson’s face.  
 Postern  Piss bullets in ’is eyes! 
 Someone  I killed! I killed! 
Postern falls unconscious. Margerson twists and drags away. 
(Bond 2006: 99) 
 
Postern urges Someone to kill Margerson because Someone’s failure to kill 
Margerson can confirm his belief that Someone is unable to kill anyone. 
After Postern recovers from a coma, he insists that Someone is innocent and 
did not kill Margerson. Someone, at first pretending that he did kill 
Margerson, later reveals that he did kill someone other than Margerson 
before:  
 
  Postern  […] Yer never kill! 
Someone  I did. I did. Before. What can I do about it? – 
it’s ’oo I am. Lie? Thass the lie! Kill meself because I begun t’ 
live! 
Postern  Yer never kill! I swear it on this earth! […] (Bond 
2006: 104) 
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Later, Someone further admits that he did kill another person who is the 
same age as him after Lambeth recounts her story. When Someone first 
appears, he does not know his own name and interrogates other characters 
about his identity. However, no one can confirm his identity or provide any 
clues except Postern, who declares that he is innocent. Postern’s witness, 
nevertheless, fails to help Someone recover from his amnesia due to the fact 
that his insistence of Someone’s innocence is not confirmed by Someone as 
true. Someone’s recovery begins with his gaze at Margerson’s face and we 
should not underestimate the significance of this Levinasian face-to-face 
encounter. It is when he refuses to kill and surrenders to Margerson’s 
impotent gaze that Someone admits that he used to kill. Margerson’s gaze 
operates as an enigma that questions Someone’s inner resistance and 
activates Someone’s subjective transformation. The mere utterance of ‘I 
killed’ as a confession is the point from which Someone starts to take 
responsibility for what he has been doing.  
In contrast, Postern’s identity has to be sustained by another man who 
demonstrates ideal innocence. If what helps Someone to reconstruct his 
identity is the acknowledgment of guilt, for Postern, it is the innocent 
alter-ego that he intends to identify himself with. However, Someone’s 
confession of guilt makes Postern’s identification impossible. A similar 
logic also applies to the button of the coat: an object that Postern believes to 
be the token of human dignity turns out to be the proof of human agony and 
suffering during the war. Whereas Someone’s traumatized self reconstitutes 
itself through his encounter with the real traumatic past, Postern’s defence 
mechanism defers him from the real encounter. However, it is not necessary 
that the encounter with the traumatic past results in a subjective 
truth-seeking. Margerson’s repetitive remembering demonstrates another 
form of symptom: 
 
Mergerson  […] ’E look at the face. It was ’is own age. ’E 
couldn’t kill ’im. Never kill ’im. Not ’is own age. Never should a’ 
look at ’is face. Y’ad a killer’s face. ’Is eyes was ’oles punch in 
the ’ead. Knew straight off. ’E’d met ’is killer. The one ’e’d bin 
 158 
call t’ kill ’d kill ’im one day. The rifle drop. Men watch. (He 
wanders aimlessly in silence.) ’Is breakfast ’d be cold. They never 
kep it one a ’ot plate. (Bond 2006: 72) 
 
Margerson’s repetitive verbalization of his traumatic memory may be 
explained by the notion of the ‘compulsion to repeat’ in terms of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. The function of the compulsion to repeat, however, is 
contested: the repetitive compulsion aims to ‘master and abreact excessive 
tensions’ or tends towards ‘absolute discharge which is implied by the 
notion of the death instinct’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 80). Whether the 
repetition is to ‘master’ or ‘discharge’, it is the sign of the failure of 
psychological homeostasis. In Margerson’s repetitive monologue, he is 
recounting his trauma, but he never uses ‘I’ to articulate the past. Instead, he 
uses ‘he’ as the subject of the story in order to veil the unbearable truth. 
Moreover, he tends to use short sentences and fragmentary phrases as if he 
is unable to formulate and complete the whole story. In contrast, Lambeth 
recounts her traumatic past without difficulty only because she has 
undergone the process of subjective reconstitution. To sum up, through 
confessing the traumatic past and acknowledging their guilt, Lambeth and 
Someone gain their self-knowledge. Margerson, however, is traumatized to 
such an extent that it is impossible for him to recover like Lambeth and 
Someone do. As for Postern, since he cannot find a suitable self-defining 
moral frame to account for his ‘crime’, he can only stick to the impossible 
hope that Someone is innocent, which is not the case.  
People is an investigation into the post-traumatic subject that seeks the 
truth based on acknowledging what is singularly negative and inherently 
criminal within oneself. Truth is not an objective fact to be learned but a 
truth-event to be experienced subjectively. The truth-event is always related 
to the traumatic experience as a ‘deferred action’ (Nachträglichkeit). 
‘Deferred action’, as a Freudian term, designates a deferred revision caused 
by events that allow the subject to obtain new meaning of the past by 
reactivating earlier traumatic experiences that resist full incorporation 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 112). Bond also expresses similar viewpoints: ‘A 
child is traumatised when it must face a situation too brutal or confounding 
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to be used creatively in its story […]. The child must be helped to 
redramatise its mind and change its story’ (2003: 114). The deferred action 
of redramatizing the traumatic event is less a truth-event that aims to 
discover the objective truth in the past than an event in which the trace of 
the past reconstitutes the present. Furthermore, Derrida, in analyzing 
Freud’s idea of deferred action, states that ‘the structure of delay […] 
prohibits […] a simple dialectical complication of the present’ and that 
‘[t]he trace cannot be conceived […] on the basis of either the present or the 
presence of the present’ (1973: 152). This means that the process of 
subjective reconstitution initiated by the trace of the past as an alterity still 
cannot be completely incorporated into the present.  
In this sense, Someone’s recovery from amnesia is a process of 
subjective reconstitution without completely obliterating the alterity of the 
trace of the past. By confessing that he used to kill, Someone recognizes 
himself as a criminal and starts to take responsibility for his past and others. 
However, his act of pleading guilty cannot exonerate him from guilt, nor 
can this act enable him to be responsible for what he has done. On the 
contrary, taking responsibility for the dead is impossible since the dead 
always already remain the alterity that problematizes the idea of ‘taking 
responsibility’ as a way to justify the self-preservation of the living. 
Someone’s plea of guilty requires him to respond to his guilt and his past 
infinitely. This is an ethical task never to be completed. Postern fails to 
reconcile himself with the traumatic past because he fails to recognize the 
impossibility of reconcilement.  
Through the contrast between Postern and Someone, Bond 
problematizes and complicates his idea of ‘innocence’: radical innocence by 
no means designates a regression into neonatal innocence or a progression 
into an impossible terrain outside corruption. Rather, radical innocence as a 
desire to articulate the truth can function through making the self 
acknowledge the impossibility of being innocent, as Bond states: ‘Truth is 
an act of violence: it is the truth when you cannot lie to yourself’ (2012: 
xxxviii). This truth is not determined by the ideological frame through 
which innocence is usually defined as juridically culpable; rather, this truth 
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reveals the incongruity between the abstract definition of innocence and 
embodied singularities. The process of seeking the truth is a process of 
returning to the point where the self is challenged to determine the meaning 
for him/herself – it is thus a process of deferral in which the meaning of 
repetition can only be discovered in differences.  
 
4.4. Dea: Madness and Terror 
 
Dea premiered at Sutton Theatre on 24 May 2016 and was directed by Bond 
himself. 36  As Bond states that ‘[t]heatre is the madhouse where the 
audience go to find their sanity, just as madmen go mad in reality to find 
theirs’ (2000b: 95), his dramatization of madness achieves the pinnacle of 
complexity in Dea, as Cliff, one of the characters, remarks by rephrasing 
Hamlet’s famous dictum: ‘To be sane or not to be sane, that is the question’ 
(2016a: 78). Indeed, the whole play can be read as an extensive 
interrogation of the demarcation between sanity and insanity, or, that 
between reason and madness.  
As the title suggests, Dea gains its inspiration from Euripides’ Medea, 
but it is by no means an adaptation of the original. Instead, while Euripides’ 
Medea ends with Medea’s murder of her children, Bond’s Dea starts with 
filicide. At the beginning of Part One of Dea, Dea is preparing for the soirée 
in celebration of the end of the war. In the absence of her husband, Johnson, 
Dea smothers her two babies and batters them with her shoes. Appalled by 
the death of the babies, Johnson asks why she committed the murder, and 
Dea replies: ‘You wanted me to do it’ (Bond 2016a: 11). Out of rage, 
Johnson rapes Dea as if to retrieve his lost children. It is striking that Dea 
does not kill her children out of hatred, jealousy, and solitude as Medea 
does but because of an ‘order’ that Johnson gives her. However, nothing in 
the play indicates that Johnson orders Dea to kill their children; instead, 
Johnson only orders Dea to get dressed as soon as possible. Why does Dea 
attribute the motive of her murder to an order that does not exist?  
                                                
36 My analysis of the production is based on the live performance that I attended at Sutton 
Theatre.  
 161 
In fact, Dea’s defiant act is to problematize the authority of Johnson’s 
order. When Johnson realizes his children have been killed, he remembers 
how children were dying in the trench during the war – it is as if the death 
of his children reminds him of how other children have been murdered. 
Without doubt, Dea knows how Johnson’s military order could have caused 
the death of other children during the war and it is from this fact that Dea 
senses the ironic nature of Johnson’s order about dress change. Therefore, 
Dea’s disobedient obedience reveals the illegitimate nature of legitimacy: if 
murdering children during the war can be accepted, why should the same act 
be regarded as monstrous at home? If a mother who kills her children is 
wicked, why should a man who kills other people’s children be glorified 
and celebrated? By pushing the legitimacy of military order to the extreme, 
Dea aims to reveal the essential void of the order even at the expense of her 
children.  
The second section of Part One starts with Dea’s homecoming eighteen 
years after she murdered her children. Dea was sent to a psychiatric hospital 
after she gave birth and was detained there before another war destroyed the 
hospital. She returns to claim her right to stay in her house and asserts that 
she is not mad:  
 
 Johnson  […] Why did you ruin my life? 
Dea  I don’t know. […] Every day I was with the mad my 
sanity was clawing at my brain. When the bombs fell they 
opened the roof. Suddenly there was sky everywhere – I was 
free – and I ran out into a bigger madhouse. Help me. […] I 
have a right to live here. 
Johnson  A right! 
[…] 
Johnson  […] You are monstrous! Why why did you do it? 
Dea  Because I’m wicked! Isn’t that it? Is that what you 
want to be told? I’m wicked! Wicked! Wicked! I stink of fire 
and brimstone and the madhouse! It satisfies everyone else. 
Why doesn’t it satisfy you? (Bond 2016a: 19-20) 
 
After eighteen years, Johnson still cannot understand why Dea murdered 
their children, nor can Dea clearly express what motivated her. However, 
Dea is sure that she is neither mad nor wicked. Three days later, Dea tells 
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Oliver, one of her sons, that she is his mother. Realizing that Oliver knows 
the truth, Johnson decides to send Oliver to the army in order to separate 
him from Dea. During the quarrel between Johnson and Oliver, they argue 
over the motives of Dea’s murder, and Oliver states that he understands 
Dea: 
 
I know why she killed them. Bits of me are killed every day 
since I can remember. […] You put on a uniform to kill. 
Where you kill and she killed are the same place – it’s where 
my dead brothers are kept and because they were killed when 
they were little they ride round and round on a 
merry-go-round and wave at us and cheer. (Bond 2016a: 32) 
 
The way Oliver associates Dea’s murder with Johnson’s murder is 
illuminating. He questions whether putting on a uniform can justify killing 
and regards those who were killed during the war as his ‘dead brothers’. 
Like Dea, Oliver also problematizes the essential emptiness of the military 
order. Later, Dea kills Johnson as he is about to rape her and fellates a 
sleepwalking Oliver besides Johnson’s corpse. When Oliver awakes, Dea 
accuses him of killing Johnson and then kills him. Despite these 
transgressive actions, Dea still asserts that she is not mad.  
How do we understand Dea’s statement that she is not mad? On stage, 
Helen Berg’s performance as Dea in Part One was highly controlled and 
calm: she executed every act of transgression in a determined manner as if 
these crimes are rationally calculated and voluntarily committed. Even when 
Johnson rapes her after she killed her babies, Berg’s Dea did not physically 
resist but freezed herself like a mannequin. Berg’s controlled performance 
did not exclude any explicit emotional expressions or deny the underlying 
psychological logic, but she never let her emotions and psychology overtake 
the logic that determines the meaning of the situation. When she declared, in 
a rational manner, that she is not mad, the audience was made to be aware of 
the difficulty of simply attributing her transgressive acts to madness. Instead, 
Berg’s performance foregrounded the indeterminacy of the situation.  
 Part One of Dea reveals the violence underneath the surface of military 
victory through Dea’s symptoms of ‘madness’. Although Dea alludes to the 
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myth of Medea, it can hardly be regarded as an attempt to rewrite the whole 
myth; rather, Dea deconstructs the motivations of Medea’s filicide and 
reintegrates this violent act within the context of the contemporary ‘War on 
Terror’. Still, we can ask in what sense can Dea be related to Medea? As 
Greek tragedy scholar Edith Hall points out, Euripides’s Medea is aware of 
the fact that her filicide is morally wrong, but she is so overwhelmed by her 
rage that she cannot resist the temptation to murder her children; therefore, 
Medea’s filicide is framed in a terrain of moral ambiguity since we cannot 
be sure whether her acts are completely intentional or they are driven by 
uncontrollable rage (189). Dea’s filicide is dramaturgically more ambiguous 
and enigmatic than Medea’s since the killing takes place at the beginning of 
the play, which renders the whole act practically impossible for the audience 
to make sense of. As to Dea’s motivation, Bond explains that Dea performs 
her murder in sleep, and in her dream she can ‘perform the truth of her 
situation’ (Tuaillon 2015: 163). In performance, however, the fact that Dea 
murders in a state of sleep is by no means obvious; instead, Berg’s 
performance demonstrates Dea’s self-consciousness and determination. 
Although whether Dea performs her murder consciously or unconsciously, 
which obviously replicates the moral ambiguity of Euripides’s Medea, is 
open to interpretation, what is more important is ‘the truth of her situation’.  
Judging from Dea’s statement that it is Johnson who orders her to 
murder their children, and from Olivier’s explanation, it is tenable to state 
that Dea is haunted by the war and by the casualties it has caused. Johnson 
cannot understand Dea’s sense of unease because those casualties are 
outside the frame of the grievable. As Judith Butler argues, ‘whether and 
how we respond to the suffering of others […] depends upon a certain field 
of perceptible reality’ (2009: 64). This frame of perception determines what 
is grievable and what is ungrievable by manipulating the field of 
representation, in which certain lives are represented as grievable while 
other lives are prohibited from being rendered grievable. For Butler, this 
frame of representation is a mechanism of violence that completes a process 
of dehumanization (2004: 148). From this perspective, the reason why 
Johnson cannot understand Dea’s unease is due to the frame of perception 
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through which those who have been killed by him can never be mourned 
and rendered grievable. Dea, however, is haunted by those who should 
never be mourned, and her filicide subverts this frame of perception, 
throwing into relief the conditions that determine the demarcation between 
the grievable and the ungrievable. That fact that she mourns for the 
unmourned and murders indifferently those who should be mourned is what 
makes her murder transgressive and incomprehensive for Johnson. In 
analyzing the images of torture at Abu Ghraib, Derek Gregory cites an Iraqi 
woman’s blog: ‘I felt ashamed to be looking at them […] each and every 
one of them is a son and possibly a brother’ (qtd in 229). Gregory contends 
that, although vulnerability is distributed unevenly, it can be shared – in an 
age of terror, everyone can be reduced to the status of homo sacer (230). 
The framework that distinguishes the grievable from the ungrievable 
determines correspondingly the structural difference between reason and 
madness. Euripides’s Medea is an alien in Corinth, and her status as a 
barbarian, as Cavarero argues, can be perceived to account for her 
‘barbarous’ murders, which can only be committed by a savage alien (2007: 
26). However, unlike Medea, Dea’s murder is not attributed to her being a 
foreigner but being a mad woman, and her madness derives from her 
mourning for the ungrievable.  
Part Two of Dea is set in the interior of a military tent. This spatial 
configuration combines the conventions of ‘frontline drama’, which 
dramaturgically focuses on the participants of military invasion in the 
frontline (Gupta 101), and ‘the global war prison’, defined by Derek 
Gregory as ‘a series of sites where sovereign power and bio-power coincide’ 
(206) such as the U.S. army’s prisons at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. 
By simultaneously locating his soldiers in the frontline of counter-terrorism 
and ‘the global war prison’, Bond emphasizes the normalization of the 
biopolitical paradigm as a traumatizing structure and charts various 
traumatized and subjected subjects within this structure.  
In the age of the global ‘War on Terror’, the concept of ‘frontline’ 
should be renegotiated – indeed, the soldiers are in a military tent and they 
are about to fight against their enemies. However, they do not know who 
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and where the enemy is – the line that separates ‘us’ as soldiers from ‘they’ 
as enemies is always indefinite, so are the binary concepts such as 
frontline/home-front, military/civilian, and inside/outside. The impossibility 
of identifying the enemy and the possibility of the enemy being within us 
render the invisible enemy ‘the phantom enemy’ (Galli 217). As Butler 
points out, this spectrality of the enemy makes the war against terrorism 
‘infinite paranoia’ (2004: 34), and Part Two of Dea is structured around the 
phenomenon of paranoia. 
At the beginning, Dea’s other son, John, is investigating the Prisoner, a 
potential suicide bomber. The Prisoner, however, remains silent and refuses 
to tell John anything about her plan. At the same time, John is also disturbed 
by the fact that children start to appear on a nearby hill. However, John is 
not permitted to kill those children, neither is his plan to send the Prisoner to 
kill the children accepted – in fact, he does not even know if those children 
are enemies. In order to force the Prisoner to speak, John orders his soldiers 
to gang rape her. The soldiers, however, feel unable to do what John orders 
them to do though John persuades them that ‘[r]aping her’s the most 
honourable charitable civilized thing you can do’ (Bond 2016a: 52). Later, 
when John is urged by the soldiers to rape the Prisoner, he shoots her dead. 
At the same moment, Dea is ushered into the tent. The soldiers discover that 
the children on the hill have disappeared, and this makes them more anxious 
about the situation to come:  
 
John  I stand before something so big…! Listen to me! 
There are things in nature – twisted up in the wheels of reality 
too complicated to --! I can’t make you understand. (To 
Sergeant) One shot in a woman’s head’s not enough! Go 
outside. Order the men to shoot the hill! Massacre it! 
Massacre the earth! (Bond 2016a: 62) 
 
Out of anxiety, John forces Dea to use a beer bottle to rape the dead 
Prisoner. The soldiers then drag the Prisoner away to continue using the 
beer bottle to rape her while John starts to rape Dea and accuses her of 
intending to murder all of them. Near the end of Part Two, the atmosphere 
of accelerating anxiety obviously implies that the military order is on the 
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brink of disintegration, and the soldiers seem to have become 
psychologically unstable and deranged. Eventually, the Interpreter, who 
most of the time remains silent and helps John to translate ‘rape’ into the 
language that the Prisoner can understand, puts on the Prisoner’s suicide 
jacket, straps the explosives onto the jacket, and detonates it, resulting in the 
death of the soldiers.  
Analyzing the phenomenon of violence and torture at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo Bay, Anne McClintock uses the concept of ‘paranoid’ to 
define the logic that determines the behaviour of the torturer. She considers 
‘paranoid’ to be ‘a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously 
between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat’ (53). 
This oscillation between megalomania and fear is demonstrated in 
performance: while John and other soldiers justify their violence and rape as 
sanctioned by the military order, Christopher Birks’s performance as John 
implied otherwise. Birks’s performance emphasized the process of his inner 
disintegration in the face of the potential danger in the surroundings. While 
he kept emphasizing that his order must be obeyed and executed, what the 
audience sensed is his sense of insecurity and the fundamental emptiness of 
his order. Moreover, as anthropologist Allen Feldman points out, in torture 
scenarios, instead of extorted information, it is the mimetic control 
represented through the degraded body that demonstrates triumphant 
domination (344). This logic explains the soldiers’ rape of the Prisoner 
despite the fact that she is dead and cannot yield any information.  
 Part Two ends with Dea carrying John’s head back into the tent, an 
image reminiscent of Agave’s holding Pentheus’s head in Euripides’s The 
Bacchae. Bond’s appropriation of this image of decapitation invites us to 
compare the relationship between Dea and John to that between Agave and 
Pentheus. In The Bacchae, both Agave and Pentheus are in a Dionysiac 
trance, and Pentheus is decapitated by Agave due to her delirium. Only 
when Agave comes to normal consciousness does she realize her violent 
deed. As Edith Hall notes, The Bacchae, by blurring the distinction between 
illusion and reality, can be regarded as a reflection on the experience of 
theatre, which entails ‘a mimetic enactment of the journey into and out of 
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illusion’ (293). In a similar vein, the dramaturgy of Dea revolves around the 
relationship of, and complication between, reason and madness. However, 
unlike The Bacchae, in which it is Agave who beheads Pentheus, in Dea, it 
is the Interpreter’s suicidal bombing that decapitates John. Moreover, 
instead of attributing the source of madness to Dionysiac entrancement, 
Bond destabilizes the distinction between reason and madness by suggesting 
that madness derives from the excess of reason. In analyzing The Bacchae 
with an intention to draw parallels between the Greek tragedy and the 
contemporary ‘War on Terror’, Terry Eagleton argues that Pentheus is ‘an 
exponent of state terrorism’ (2005: 5). He emphasizes the fact that Dionysus 
informs Pentheus that ‘I am sane and you are mad’, which demonstrates that 
the excessive dominance of reason over madness can only lead to paranoia: 
‘It is sane to acknowledge madness, and lunatic to imagine that such 
madness could ever simply be bullied into reason’ (11).  
 The beheading image is not only reminiscent of The Bacchae, but it 
also directly refers to the online videos of beheading released by ISIS. As 
Jenny Hughes argues, the performance of beheading ‘mimics the contours 
and forms of exception’ (48). This performance of exception produced by 
terrorists mimetically reproduces the state of exception at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo Bay, and this is especially demonstrated by the color of the 
victims’ clothes – in both cases, the victims wear bright orange jumpsuits. 
Since, for Muslims, men wear orange before execution, for the detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, the color functions as part of psychological torture. This 
form of psychological torture is mirrored and aggravated by ISIS when they 
physically execute the victims dressed in orange jumpsuits. In other words, 
ISIS’s performance of beheading is a mimesis of the U.S.’s soldiers’ 
performance of treating the prisoners as bare life outside legal protection. 
Likewise, since the spectral enemy can always mimetically reproduce the 
state of exception, John’s beheading demonstrates that the soldier who 
exercises the power to kill without committing homicide can also be turned 
into bare life.  
While Part Two of Dea revolves around the paranoiac nature of 
excessive reason and the mimetic structure of violence in the state of 
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exception, Part Three focuses on the traumatized subject’s psychic 
negotiation with sanity and insanity. Part Three takes place in a forest 
wilderness where Dea lives in ruins. Dea treats John’s head as her lost child 
and takes care of it in an imaginary world of wholeness. The head is not 
merely a ‘part’ of the human body but a fragmented image that forms a 
whole, a psychic truth that protects Dea from collapsing. In Dea’s delusion, 
she recounts how she has been searching for her son and building a proper 
home for him. Yet, Dea is simultaneously troubled by another woman who 
has followed her for years in search of her child’s disjointed bodily parts to 
make him up. Dea understands the pain of the woman but also feels 
threatened by her madness. Caused by the traumatic experiences of the war 
and exile, her delusion functions as a psychic regression into the state of the 
core self, in which she can construct an alternative reality uncorrupted by 
the outside world. Both Dea’s delusional union with John and her fear of the 
imagined mad woman also demonstrate the psychic logic of the core self 
that oscillates between the Comic and the Tragic in interacting with the 
fictional world. 
It is not until Cliff contradicts Dea’s imagined world that she is made 
aware of the ‘reality’ of John’s head:  
 
 Dea  […] He ordered you to go! 
 Cliff  Who ordered me? 
 Dea  My son! 
 […] 
Cliff  (stares at Dea) That? (Turns to look at the head.) 
That’s real? A – (Shocked.) When I was here before I thought 
it was a toy. Kid’s party mask. 
Dea  He’s my son. 
Cliff  Your son … ? (Turns to look at the head. Turns back 
to Dea.) It’s a head. (Bond 2016a: 75) 
 
Cliff tells Dea that John’s head is only a head and not her son. However, in 
the end, it is Cliff who treats the head as his authority – he starts to hear 
John’s command and shoots Dea. Even after he has shot Dea dead, Cliff can 
still hear the command: 
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No sir. No need. She’s dead. (Dea raises an arm to feel for 
support.) Dying. (Plea.) Please sir. No! (Stamps.) Order order 
order. ’Ell! (Goes to door. Stoops over Dea.) Sorry. Order. 
The second shot. (Yells to make her hear.) An order! (Bond 
2016a: 83) 
 
Though Cliff feels hesitant about the order issued by the head, he still hears 
and obeys the voice of the command from the head. In contrast to Dea’s 
psychotic delusions, in which John’s head is taken to be her son, Cliff’s 
fantasy turns John’s head into the source of authority that must be obeyed. 
David Clayton’s performance as Cliff embodied how he is ‘possessed’ by 
the authority of the order. Clayton did not always talk to the head directly; 
instead, he usually gazed blankly as if he was struggling with the order 
inside himself. Unlike the Welfare Officer in Chair, who instrumentalizes 
herself as a tool only to perform the official task, Clayton’s Cliff suggested 
that the subject may not be completely subjected to the ideologized reason 
as his performance underscored the madness of rational 
self-instrumentalization and revealed the force of resistance inherent in the 
subject.  
Though Cliff is ordered to fire the second shot, he never manages to do 
so. Moreover, Dea, while being shot, reappears in bloody clothes like an 
undead ghost. It is as if, near the end of Dea, we are led into an 
indeterminate zone where the boundary between life and death is blurred. 
The final image of Dea can be compared to what Lacan designates as 
Antigone’s beauty between two deaths. After being punished by Creon, 
Antigone is ‘suspended in the zone of life and death’ (Lacan 1992: 280). 
While the second death is the ‘real’ death of Antigone as a living being, the 
first death is the ‘symbolic’ death that makes her separate from the symbolic 
operation of social life. In the zone between life and death, Antigone is a 
pure living being stripped of her status as a social being. Similarly, as an 
outsider of the social order, Dea eventually realizes what to do with the 
head:  
 
Dea  My twins! (She smashes the head on the table.) I killed 
my twins! (She smashes the head on the ground.) A skull with 
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brains in it! I killed my – (She stamps on the skull. It breaks in 
pieces. Stamps. Kicks the bits away.) My twins! My twins! 
(Kicks and stamps.) My twins! My twins! 
 […] 
Dea  (stamping) An order! An order! (Gagging) The – the – 
the – the – (Bond 2016a: 90) 
 
The dramatic interrogation of the meaning of order is crystallized in the 
moment when Dea smashes John’s head. By smashing the head, Dea 
eradicates the source of fictional authority as well as that of imaginary 
wholeness: only by symbolically killing the authority can it be possible to 
reorganize how justice is defined, and only by acknowledging her murder of 
the twins can Dea confront the truth of her real trauma and start to take 
responsibility for what she has done. However, Cliff never recovers from 
the fantasy that John’s head commands him to shoot.  
It should be pointed out that the final scene of Dea, in which Cliff is 
possessed by the order and Dea is an undead enigma, perfectly dramatizes 
Bond’s idea of ‘the fictions-within-fictions’. This idea is a conceptual 
continuation of that of ‘levels of reality’ presented in ‘Commentary on The 
War Plays’. The dialogue between Dea and Cliff is analogous to that of the 
Woman and the soldier in Great Peace: the Woman treats her bundle of 
rags as her baby, but the soldier reminds her that it is not a living being. 
Later, the Woman also concedes that the bundle is only a bundle. 
Nevertheless, the head in Dea not only operates as the imaginary child for 
Dea as the bundle does in Great Peace, it also functions as the source of 
authority. Therefore, in Dea, Bond complicates the use of the object to 
manipulate the levels of fiction and reality: John’s head can be a head cut 
off during the war, a head that stands for the imaginary child for Dea, or a 
head that still commands for Cliff. How a head is perceived reflects how the 
subject structures the relation with the object that stands for an imagined 
objective reality. It should also be noted that the three subject-object 
relations defined by the head correspond to Bond’s structural conception of 
madness.  
If, in theory, Dea has presented exhaustively how the subject can be 
structured in terms of madness, how do we understand the undead state of 
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Dea? Does Bond suggest that there could be a residue beyond the structural 
madness of the subject? For Bond, the use of ghosts is another 
dramaturgical device of fictions-within-the-fiction:  
 
In drama fiction is the first layer of psychosis. But there are 
fictions-within-the-fiction: God, ghosts, witches, phantoms. 
[…] Then the fictions-in-the-fiction undo, decathex, the 
fictions of ideology, because the audience know they in fact 
are not the dead who came to the theatre as ghosts. […] It is a 
matter of the relation between fictions. (2012: xxxvii) 
 
For Bond, ghosts as ‘fictions-in-the-fiction’ are deployed to undo the 
fictions of ideology. As Bond’s theory of subjectivity revolves around the 
development of the self and the structure of the self, theoretically, the 
existence of the ghost already lies outside the idea of subjectivity. However, 
Dea’s state of being undead situates her between a living individual and a 
ghost, and it is this in-betweenness that makes her existence a possible 
residue outside the Bondian structure of subjectivity. To be more specific, 
through the final image, Bond probes into the possibility of the birth of a 
new subject once the ideology is undone. The birth of the new subject 
cannot be conceived through regression into the phase of the core self or the 
neonate, nor can it take place in a static state completely structured by the 
dominant ideology. Rather, the birth can only be possible in an originary 
moment when the dominant ideologized structure is rendered inoperative.  
In fact, Bond’s conception of madness as a structural constituent of 
subjectivity can be related to Derrida’s reading of Descartes’s idea of cogito. 
According to Derrida, ‘the cogito escapes madness only because at its own 
moment, under its own authority, it is valid even if I am mad, even if my 
thoughts are completely mad’ (2005: 67; origial emphasis). For Derrida, 
cogito excludes madness from reason by asserting its authority over the 
exclusion even if this authority might be based on madness. Derrida 
demonstrates that, at the originary moment, the act of the rational cogito to 
distinguish itself from madness is already an act of violence – the attained 
certainty of reason is always already ‘attained within madness itself’ (ibid.). 
The violence enforced by reason upon the indeterminable common origin of 
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reason and madness suggests the distinction between reason and madness is 
always in crisis. Therefore, for Derrida, ‘reason is madder than madness – 
for reason is nonmeaning and oblivion […] and […] madness is more 
rational than reason, for it is closer to the wellspring of sense’ (76). Due to 
the structural common origin of reason and madness, Derrida states that, 
when the speaking subject needs to conjure up madness, madness must be 
confined in the realm of fiction (66).   
According to Derrida, for the speaking subject, the realm of fiction is 
secured in order to exclude madness from the rational subject. However, it 
follows that the realm of fiction is potentially a threat to the rational order of 
reality. While the speaking subject divides reason from madness at the 
originary moment, this divide is never stabilized. Potentially, there could be 
another originary moment that undoes and rearranges the reason/madness 
divide. In this regard, Dea not only demonstrates the unstable divide 
between reason and madness but also reveals the possibility of imagining a 
new order yet to come.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have examined the relationship between trauma and tragedy 
in Bond’s theory and unravelled the structure of ‘drauma’ – Bondian 
trauma-tragedy. In order to fully grasp Bond’s dramaturgy of 
trauma-tragedy, we need to see different levels – ontological, historical, and 
structural – of trauma in operation in Bond’s theory and dramaturgy. This 
implies that, in Bondian trauma-tragedy, the dramatization of the Tragic can 
always open up a terrain in which we can encounter the trauma that can be 
acted out and worked through. In Bond’s theory, the interaction between the 
Tragic and the Comic decides the psychic reality of the core self; this 
implies that the dramatization of trauma-tragedy can provide an imaginative 
space into which the socialized self can retreat and the ideologized 
descriptions of justice, truth, and sanity can be disentangled. This 
imaginative space is a point of convergence of psychic and social reality in 
which the ontologically traumatized subject can engage with historical 
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trauma and structural trauma. In this encounter, newly described 
subjectivities and social realities can be imagined. Having examined Bond’s 
dramaturgy of trauma-tragedy, in the next chapter I will turn to Bond’s TIE 
plays, which constitute a major part of Bond’s later plays and deserves 
special attention to their dramaturgy of education.  
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Chapter Five  
Approaching Otherness: Storyability, Spectrality, 
and Hospitality in Bond’s TIE Plays 
 
In Bond’s conception of the ‘site’, theatre is regarded as an intermediate 
social site in which the dominant ideology of society can be temporarily 
suspended and questioned in a structure of self-reflexive critique. However, 
this kind of intermediate site is not limited to theatre. Although theatre is 
exemplary as a self-reflexive structure due to its theatricality based on the 
relationship between stage and spectator, any social sphere that bears 
potential to criticize the society in which it is embedded can be tantamount 
to the status of theatre. In light of this, it is not surprising that Bond regards 
school as a potential site in which this self-reflexive structure can be built. 
The fact that Bond has cooperated with Big Brum since 1995 and written 
ten plays for the group exemplifies his commitment to TIE, but Bond’s 
involvement in theatre as a means of education started much earlier.  
In 1969, as a part of the ESC’s Edward Bond season and the Royal 
Court’s Young People’s Theatre Scheme, a workshop entitled ‘Violence in 
the Theatre’ was held for young students, and several scenes from Saved 
and Early Morning were selected for the workshop to explore the ethical 
problems posed by the plays (Saunders 2014: 192-93). From 1975, Bond 
started a series of workshops with The Activists, the Royal Court’s Resident 
Youth Theatre Club, and this relationship culminated in the production of 
The Worlds, which was performed by the members of The Activists and 
directed by Bond at the Royal Court in 1979. Furthermore, in 1983 he wrote 
After the Assassinations for students at the University of Essex. During the 
same year, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of Palermo, where 
he held a workshop and developed the Palermo improvisation, which 
became the foundation of his later dramaturgy and theory of subjectivity. 
During the 1990s, Bond was invited to write not only theoretically about 
drama and young people but also in support of TIE companies that faced 
cuts in funding (Cooper 2005: 51). His collaboration with Geoff Gillham 
and support for the TIE movement later motivated him to write At the 
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Inland Sea in 1995, his first TIE play for Big Brum. 
Although Bond had been engaged with writing for students and other 
education activities prior to his cooperation with Big Brum, it should be 
emphasized that At the Inland Sea was written after he started to formulate 
his theory of subjectivity from the late 1980s and was completed nearly 
simultaneously with Coffee (1994). The two plays’ similarities in terms of 
content and structure are easily discernable: both deal with the horror of the 
Holocaust through the protagonist’s nightmarish subjective journey that 
disrupts the established order of their everyday life. As Bond states, in terms 
of dramaturgy, there is little distinction between his plays for adults and 
those for young people except for the practical concerns that determine the 
scale of his TIE plays (Tuaillon 2015: 50). Like his other later plays, one of 
the thematic concerns of Bond’s TIE plays is the engagement with 
ideological totalization epitomized by Nazism and Thatcherism.  
In a letter written to Phil Davey on 26 May 1989, Bond states:  
 
Children are going to be educated into being adroit and 
disciplined at taking instructions in school – and that means, 
in later life, orders – without the sensitivity to ask themselves 
if they ought to follow their orders and without the 
understanding of society and psychology to enable them to 
give a human answer. Really its [sic] preparing the mentality 
which makes it possible to use people as apparatuses of 
government. That is what Nazi education was about. (Stuart 
1998: 1) 
 
‘Nazi education’, for Bond, means the type of education that prepares 
conformist mentality through which authority can exert its power without 
being questioned and the individual is made to be merely a means to 
execute orders. Thus, Nazi education is not restricted to the Nazi regime but 
may possibly take other contemporary forms. In a statement given at the 
public meeting organized by Belgrade TIE on 24 February 1996, Bond 
relates this type of education to Thatcherism: ‘The reduction of education to 
training, the frenetic activity of Thatcherism, the Sisyphean task of 
maintaining the economy – these are not creative responses to the crisis’ 
(Stuart 1998: 120). Bond defines the ‘crisis’ as the combination of the 
 176 
progress of technology and instrumental rationality that could result in a 
complete catastrophe such as the Holocaust. For Bond, education after 
Auschwitz is the same as education after Thatcherism – he advocates the 
type of education that can resist ideological totalization that serves the 
interest of the state or the interest of capital. To counter the conformism of 
education, Bond states that ‘TIE performs education’s most fundamental 
duty. Today education is being reduced to learning how to make money and 
fit into the economy. These things are necessary but they will never teach 
children what a civilized society is – what moral sanity is – what 
responsibility for others is’ (Stuart 1998: 113). In other words, for Bond, a 
civilized society is based on an ethics that calls for responsibility for others, 
which also constitutes the foundation of education.  
Bond’s thoughts on education resonate with Adorno’s ideas on 
post-Auschwitz education and the TIE movement in Britain. In ‘Education 
after Auschwitz’, Adorno states that the most essential problem of education 
after Auschwitz is to cultivate autonomous self-awareness to critically 
examine how the administered society functions by subsuming the 
particular under the universal (2003: 21-23). For Adorno, the universal can 
be demonstrated either as a ‘reified consciousness’ that follows authority 
and posits the historically contingent as the unchangeable absolute or as 
psychical coldness that originates from the blind pursuit of self-preservation 
and the fetishization of technology (27-29). Although the TIE movement in 
post-war Britain is not necessarily founded on Adornian post-Auschwitz 
ideas, the emphasis on the cultivation of autonomy through education is also 
pivotal to the movement. As Roger Wooster argues, the battleground for 
education and the TIE movement revolves around the aim of education: ‘is 
education to socialize or to promote change?’ (2016: 25). The emergence of 
the TIE movement in the mid-1960s is ‘born out of an expectation of social 
reform, an implicit trust in progressive education ideas and the hope for 
prosperity after fifty years of thwarted aspirations’ (Wooster 2016: 77), but 
this optimism for change diminished in the 1980s and 1990s due to the rise 
of Thatcherism and the fall of the Berlin Wall, both of which testify to the 
decline of left-wing ideologies commonly shared by TIE practitioners 
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(Nicholson 2009: 35-36). After the 1990s, it became commonsensical to 
regard education as a way of socialization that manufactures students 
according to the needs of the neoliberal social-economic order. The 
challenge for the TIE movement after the 1990s, therefore, is how to retain 
the purpose of education to promote change and cultivate autonomy 
(Nicholson 2009: 43).  
Bond’s TIE plays should be understood both through Adorno’s 
post-Auschwitz thinking and in the context of the TIE movement in 
post-war Britain. As Helen Nicholson observes, Bond’s education work 
provides a moral education that promotes young people’s self-creativity 
through the engagement of imagination (2003: 13). Although I agree that 
Bond’s TIE works aim to promote the journey of self-creativity, in the 
following I argue that, beneath the possibility of self-creativity, lies the 
attention to the other. In order to create something different from the 
universal, the heterogeneous particular must be sought out and preserved. 
This attention to otherness creates a gap within the subject, and this gap 
makes it possible to attain self-creativity without repeating the logic of the 
violence through which the universal subsumes the particular. Following 
Bond’s definition of teaching, in this chapter I will explore how Bond 
incorporates the ethical concern for others into the dramaturgy of his TIE 
plays by interrogating three interrelated concepts that are conducive to 
addressing the problem of otherness: storyability, spectrality, and 
hospitality.  
 
5.1. Story and Storyability 
 
5.1.1. Story 
 
Considering that Bond’s theory of the neonate is formulated as a narrative 
of the self that seeks coherence, it is not surprising that Bond’s idea of the 
story is also related to his theory of subjectivity. Bond states: ‘Our 
instinctual capacities form a totality which is interconnected by the story’ 
(Stuart 2001a: 41). He further defines the story as composed of two major 
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elements: individual experience and social interaction (42). For Bond, 
human action is never instinctual but is always mediated by the story that 
integrates individual experience and social interaction. In this respect, 
storytelling is not just to construct a story but is also an essential part of the 
human capacity to understand the self as well as the world. As Bond states, 
‘stories structure our minds’ (2000b: 3). In addition, for Bond, ‘culture’ 
designates an agglomeration of stories that constitutes a plot in which the 
self can be defined (ibid.). Within this collection of stories as culture, the 
dominant and grand narratives can be apprehended as ideologies that 
determine how the self perceives and understands the world. For Bond, 
‘story can release energies and change meanings in ways that laws and 
institutions cannot’ (Stuart 2001a: 48). Thus, the significance of the self’s 
ability to tell stories lies in its potential to question narratives of ideology. 
As Bond states, the power of storytelling is ‘to conceive of justice yet 
question it’ (2000b: 4; my emphasis).  
Bond’s idea of the human subject as mediated by storyability – a 
concept refers to the subject’s ability to tell stories and the possibility of 
stories being told – is not as straightforward as it seems, because human life, 
although it can be organized by narrative, is prone to be seen as 
‘pre-narrated’. For example, Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition states 
that ‘[t]he fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can 
be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely 
improbable’ (1998: 178). Arendt further states that human action produces 
stories because human action must enter into an existing context of 
conflicting intentions, but the hero in the story is only an ‘agent’ instead of 
an ‘author’ (184). For Arendt, the agent cannot determine the outcome of 
the action, neither is the agent capable of obtaining the significance of the 
action. Only the storyteller who perceives and narrates the story can disclose 
the full meaning of the story and the essence that defines the character of the 
agent (192-93). Arendt’s idea reflects the tendency to see human action as 
unmediated by the story, and the meaning of human action can be revealed 
only when it is narrated as a story.  
In order to bridge the gap between recounted stories and lived lives, 
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Paul Ricoeur proposes the idea of ‘narrative identity’:  
 
Our life, when then embraced in a single glance, appears to us 
as the field of a constructive activity, borrowed from narrative 
understanding, by which we attempt to discover and not 
simply to impose from outside the narrative identity which 
constitutes us. (Ricoeur 1991: 32) 
 
For Ricoeur, life is already understood in terms of narrative. This narrative 
is not necessarily an external narrative through which the meaning of life 
can be discovered; instead, narrative is a constitutive part of subjectivity in 
the sense that life is lived as if it is a narrative being narrated. In addition, 
Ricoeur distinguishes narrator from author: we can narrate our own stories 
and live according to the narrative voices, but we are not the omnipotent 
author that can determine the course and outcome of the narrative. However, 
Ricoeur proposes that this difference could be partially conquered by 
applying the plots from traditional narratives as cultural symbols to the self 
(32-33).  
While Ricoeur still regards external narratives as indispensable for 
constituting self-identity, philosopher Richard Kearney furthers Ricoeur’s 
idea of narrative identity and defines storytelling as an act of the self’s 
self-definition. As he states, ‘[t]he story told by a self about itself tells about 
the action of the “who” in question: and the identity of this “who” is a 
narrative one’ (2002b: 152). For Kearney, the narrative identity of a person 
does not necessarily rely on an external narrative, although he by no means 
intends to exclude engaging with external narratives as a way for the self to 
gain the experience of selfhood defined by storyability. He emphasizes that 
the self is defined by the stories told by its self. In addition, Kearney 
complicates storytelling as an act of repetitive self-affirmation by 
considering the self’s ethical commitment for the other as an act which 
destabilizes the certainty of selfhood. He proposes that ‘for narrative 
selfhood to be ethically responsible, it must ensure that self-constancy is 
always informed by self-questioning’ (2002a: 93; my emphasis). The self’s 
‘self-questioning’ can even entail ‘the possibility of its own self-destruction’ 
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(ibid.). The possibility of ‘self-destruction’ inherent in the self’s storytelling 
is obviously reminiscent of the Levinasian subject as a substitution for the 
other. In fact, Kearney, basing his argument on Levinas’s ethics, clearly 
states that ethical imagination ‘responds to the surprises and demands of the 
other’ (1999: 111). As Levinas defines subjectivity as the-one-for-the-other, 
the ethics of imagination originates from acknowledging the other’s face 
that concerns the self, and this acknowledgement prevents the self from 
remaining indifferent to the other. This non-indifference to the other thus 
renders impossible the self’s imagination solely as a means for 
self-affirmation. Therefore, subjectivity as storyability is always connected 
with the other’s questioning of the legitimacy of the self’s story. To 
recapitulate: storytelling is not merely fabricating a fictional narrative – it 
entails the construction of selfhood and connects the self’s ethical 
commitment with the other.  
As I argued in Chapter Two, while Bond recognizes the existence of 
the other outside the self and intends to include the other in his theory of the 
self, it is contestable how significant the concept of otherness is in Bond’s 
theory, which overall emphasizes the self’s cohering process. Likewise, 
although I have argued that Bond’s idea of storyability involves the quality 
of self-questioning, that is, the possibility of the other’s interruption, 
storyability is also what makes the self coherent. In order to explicate how 
Bond bases his dramaturgy on the idea of storyability and stories, I will 
analyze At the Inland Sea and The Angry Roads.  
 
5.1.2. At the Inland Sea 
 
At the Inland Sea is Bond’s first play commissioned by Big Brum and was 
first directed by Geoff Gillham at Broadway School, Aston, Birmingham, 
on 16 October 1995. This play depicts how the Son, as a student preparing 
for his examination in his room, encounters and interacts with the Woman, 
who comes from the concentration camp and is about to be gassed. While 
the Woman demands that the Son should tell a story to save her baby, the 
Son is unable to tell the right story to change the life course of the Woman 
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and her son. Out of desperation, the Son even takes the baby away and 
makes the time in the concentration camp stand still, but this action still fails 
to save the baby. The Mother, however, cannot see the Woman and thinks 
that the Boy’s strange behaviour is caused by his anxiety towards the 
examination. At the end of the play, the Son succeeds in finishing the 
Woman’s story in his words and tells his mother that he is not a child 
anymore.  
Although Bond’s theory of subjectivity still presupposes the possibility 
of the subject being a coherent and autonomous self endowed with 
imagination and reason, his drama tends to complicate, even contradict, his 
theoretical statements. The structure of the self in At the Inland Sea is one of 
such instances. As Bond states that the Old Woman is ‘someone from the 
boy’s mind’ (Stuart 1998: 152), it is reasonable to read the Woman also as 
the Boy’s mental configuration. The emergence of the Woman and her 
demand that the Boy should tell her baby a story exceeds the Boy’s control 
– that is, if the Woman is understood to be part of the Boy’s psychic 
activities, her appearance cannot be domesticated by the Boy’s imagination. 
As Tony Coult points out, the Woman is not the product of the Boy’s 
imagination but a challenge to the Boy’s mind (1997: 47):  
 
Boy  The soldiers have guns! How will a story stop them? 
Woman  It only has to stop them for a moment. So that they 
look down at the stones – for a moment – or look at each 
other. Then I’ll reach up and put my baby in the tree. Where 
the branches fork – there. Soldiers don’t look for babies in 
trees. They’ll think it’s rags blown there by the wind. 
Someone will find it and keep it. 
Boy There’s no story! 
 
The Woman goes to the Boy. 
 
Woman  Then why did you bring us here? I don’t know you 
– this house – this room – I don’t even know your name. You 
brought us here. If you can do that you can tell a story. My 
baby will live. (Bond 1997: 11-12) 
 
The Woman seems to be one of the repressed ghosts of the traumatic past, 
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and her appearance exhibits the irreducible otherness conjured up within the 
Boy’s mind. In spite of the fact that the Woman is evoked by the Boy, he 
cannot preside over this evocation – as if he is surprised and taken hostage 
by the unknown part of his psyche. In other words, the Boy cannot resist the 
Woman’s intrusion and must take responsibility for her request.  
The unique relationship between the Boy and the Woman can be 
explained by Levinas’s idea of ‘inspiration’ in ‘Truth of Disclosure and 
Truth of Testimony’ (1972), in which Levinas asks: ‘Cannot the psychism 
be thought of as a relation with the unrepresentable? As a relation with a 
past on the hither side of every present and every representation, not 
belonging to the order of presence?’ (1996: 101). In terms of Levinas’s 
notion of psychism as inspiration, the Woman’s emergence can be regarded 
as ‘[a]n ambivalence that is the exception and the subjectivity of the subject, 
its very psychism, the possibility of inspiration: to be the author of what was, 
without my knowledge, inspired in me – to have received, whence we know 
not, that of which I am the author’ (105). For Levinas, this ambivalence 
caused by inspiration is the enigmatic trace of the infinite, the responsibility 
for the other. Levinas also designates this coming to pass of the infinite as 
‘the saying’ (104). Education scholar Clarence W. Joldersma relates the idea 
of inspiration to education by arguing that learning is both a process of 
spontaneous enjoyment and of being exposed to disturbing rupture. For him, 
if education can inspire students, students have to open themselves to 
otherness, that is, a teacher (52). Although, for Levinas, education indeed is 
more than absorption of knowledge as enjoyment, it is questionable whether 
the otherness that renders education an ethical relation necessarily derives 
from a teacher. For the Boy in At the Inland Sea, he must absorb the history 
taught by a teacher in order to pass the exam. It is therefore not the ethical 
relation of inspiration that Joldersma argues would take place in teaching 
because here history has been thematized as ‘the said’ and instrumentalized 
as materials only to serve the purpose of examination. What disturbs the 
Boy is not what is taught or what is written in the textbook but what remains 
unwritten and untaught. What disturbs him is the otherness within himself – 
or, in Bond’s terms, his radical innocence that singularizes the thematized 
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history – as well as the ethical moment of the past irreducible to historical 
accounts.  
For Levinas, history is always involved in the process of representation, 
that is, ‘[t]he assembling of being in the present, its synchronization by 
retention, memory and history, reminiscence’ (1998: 140). This process of 
representation, therefore, cannot bear responsibility for the separated entities 
beyond the grasp of retention. It evades the face of the other. Responsibility, 
Levinas argues, is only possible when ‘a traumatic hold of the other on the 
same’ (141). Levinas continues to argue that this traumatic hold is 
inspiration, which is also the saying instead of ‘the communication of the 
said’ (143). As I argued in Chapter Three, the saying as the proximity of the 
other, the exposure to the other, is another term that Levinas uses to 
describe ethical subjectivity as the-one-for-the-other. What should be noted 
is the linguistic implication: while the said is what is thematized, the saying 
is the unthematizable prior to thematization. The Woman’s demand that the 
Boy should tell a story, in this regard, is the saying just as her emergence is 
what is inspired in the Boy’s psyche. As the saying, this demand cannot be 
incorporated into history, nor can it be used to change the course of history. 
This demand is useless just as the Woman knows that stories can never save 
her baby from death. Nevertheless, it is precisely this impossibility of the 
demand that renders this demand unthematizable and makes this demand 
purely ethical. The Woman’s ghostly apparition cannot be expelled by 
telling a right story to save the baby because this story is impossible to tell.  
Despite this, at the end of the play, the Boy still completes the story the 
Woman fails to tell to her baby: 
 
Once. A man walking in a dark forest. A hut in the distance. 
He heard singing from the hut. Happy. Beautiful. He went 
towards it. Hard. Bushes and trees in the way. He came to the 
hut. He stopped outside the door. He listened. It was late. He 
was hungry and tired. He knocked. The singing stopped. The 
door was unlocked. He opened it and went in. the hut was 
empty. […] He left the hut and went on. Before he’d gone far 
the singing in the hut started again. He didn’t turn back. He 
knew what’d happen if he did. After that, starting from that 
day, whenever he met someone in the forest sick or old or 
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wounded or in need he – (Bond 1997: 34) 
 
This forest story could be read as a variation of the forest of Coffee. As the 
forest in Coffee is a liminal space uncannily governed by multiple 
imaginations, the forest in this story is also a mysterious space where a hut 
expected to be full of people, once entered, is found to be empty. While 
Bond refuses to give any definite answers so as to stimulate the spectator’s 
imagination, there are still some clues regarding the meaning of the story. 
Firstly, what happens in the hut can only be heard instead of being seen. 
However, the impossibility of witness does not prevent the man from 
careful listening. Secondly, the reason why the sound of singing appears and 
then disappears is contestable: does the sound exist as external reality, or 
does it exist as part of the man’s inner reality? Or rather, could it be the case 
that the sound is situated in-between, that is, it reveals the hidden real both 
of the hut and of the man? The logic of indeterminacy is similar to the logic 
that works beneath the transformative journeys experienced by the Boy and 
Nold, and, in this way, the story can be read as a prototypical narrative of 
how imagination works in both Coffee and At the Inland Sea. Lastly, the 
most enigmatic part of the story is the ethical decision made by the man: 
how does he achieve such ethical understanding as if it is an epiphany? In 
fact, the relation between the man and the hut corresponds to that between 
the Boy and the Woman: it is a relation of inspiration and responsibility. 
The singing from the hut can be both the irretrievable trace of the past and 
the voice of the man’s conscience – it is an ethical demand whose origin 
cannot be decided. 
 But is it possible to continue to tell the stories of the dead, especially 
those who die from premature death – those who leave so little trace that 
even their existence could be easily forgotten? Bond reformulates the 
question in a contemporary situation in The Angry Roads and explores 
further the relationship between subjectivity and conditions of storytelling.  
 
5.1.3. The Angry Roads 
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‘Is it possible? They didn’t tell me I had a brother’ (Bond 2018: 174). This 
is Norman’s last remark in The Angry Roads, produced by Big Brum in 
2015, and the whole play revolves around this possibility, or impossibility. 
This question problematizes the relationship between the source of the story 
and storytelling: is it possible to tell an untold story based on unknown facts? 
Is it possible to rely on subjective imagination when objective evidence is so 
obscure? The Angry Roads focuses on the process of Norman’s awakening 
to the truth about his father’s past; however, because of his father’s selective 
mutism, Norman must recall the past via his imagination and his 
communication with his father by table-tapping. The truth repressed by his 
father is an accident: before Norman was born, the Father killed the woman 
with whom he had affairs and her baby by driving his taxi over their bodies. 
There are two interrelated details about the accident that are important but 
not specified: one is about the reason for the ‘row’ that gave rise to the 
accident; the other is about Norman’s role in the accident. It is implied that, 
although Norman was not yet born, he was also ‘present’ at the site of the 
accident. This suggests that the Father’s wife could be pregnant at that 
moment, and Norman’s existence might make the Father decide to end his 
affairs with the woman. However, the woman might quarrel with the Father 
over their relationship and their son, so the Father, feeling unable to cope 
with the situation, decided to murder the woman and the baby deliberately. 
Norman’s mother knew about the accident, and she decided to leave 
Norman and the Father when Norman was six because she was unable to 
bear the unresolved pain of the event. According to Norman, his mother 
used to tell him about part of the accident, but she never revealed the whole 
truth to him. Therefore, he can only rely on his imagination and 
table-tapping to communicate with his father to reconstruct the truth of the 
accident.   
Norman’s quest for the truth is both a process of breaking the structure 
of egoism and a rite of passage toward maturation. Intriguingly, read in 
terms of Bond’s theory of subjectivity, The Angry Roads actually subverts 
and contradicts Bond’s theory. While Norman’s quest for the truth of his 
brother’s premature death could be propelled by radical innocence that 
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keeps asking why, it is not a quest to affirm his right to be at home in this 
world but, rather, a quest to inquire why his brother is denied the right to be 
in this world. In other words, the question is why Norman and his brother 
fail to be ‘at home’ together, and the answer is that it is because Norman 
occupies the place of his brother. Norman’s ‘right to be in this world’ 
presupposes his brother’s death. It is in this sense that the existential 
imperative of radical innocence to assert one’s own right to exist is 
suspended and self-effaced as an imperative. This process of disclosing the 
truth about Norman’s brother is analogous to the structure of inspiration that 
underlies the logic of At the Inland Sea. Norman’s recollection is not 
completely motivated by his autonomy – he is also obliged by a 
heterogeneous force to bear witness to his brother’s death. Although this 
force remains enigmatic throughout the play – as we never know how it is 
possible for Norman to fully realize the truth – it is this impossibility that 
interrupts any attempt at attaining absorbable knowledge and coherent 
interpretation. Norman’s rite of passage does not lead to an autonomous self 
but a traumatized self that acknowledges the violence inherent within the 
assertion of the self and recognizes the irreversible death of the other due to 
his existence. This rite of passage leads to the birth of an ethical subject that 
recognizes the ineradicable heterogeneity inherent in the subject.  
As Levinas states, ‘[t]o be oneself, the state of being is a hostage, is 
always to have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility for the 
responsibility of the other’ (1998: 117). It is clear that, for Levinas, the 
ethical subject as the one-for-the-other is always already a subject of 
responsibility, a subject that bears ‘guilt without fault’ (2001: 52). Therefore, 
although Norman does not directly kill his brother, this by no means 
exempts him from bearing the consciousness of guilt for his brother’s death. 
The fact that he cannot be indifferent to his brother’s death testifies to his 
being a subject that is, to use Levinas’s terms, ‘non-indifferent’ to the other. 
Norman’s final remarks are revealing:  
 
Deliberately. (Silence. He doesn’t look at Father) It was your 
son. You said your last words to him. Then you lost your 
voice. How do I know all this? They live in the past. They 
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want you to go back there and sort out their lives for them. 
You cant [sic]. I wasn’t there. How did I know it? It seeps out 
of the silence. – Tomorrow he wont [sic] know any of this. 
Wasn’t even an hallucination. He took an overdose of tablets. 
Passed out. And it didn’t happen. 
[…] 
The worst thing that can happen is not knowing it happened. 
Then it didn’t happen – so its [sic] always happening. (Lets 
the curtain fall.) I heard my father’s voice.  
[…] 
Look in in a few days when you’re out. Pick up the rest of my 
things. Last time I speak to you. You dont [sic] hear. Keep the 
toys. You should get something for them. – Is it possible? 
They didnt [sic] tell me I had a brother. (Bond 2018: 174) 
 
The incessant table-knocking that stimulates the process of Norman’s 
telepathically inspired recollection is a sign of the dead brother’s spectral 
return that ‘seeps out of the silence’. His father’s mutism, caused by the 
traumatic loss of his child, is an enigma for Norman, and it is this enigma 
that situates Norman within the structure of the familial tragedy even though 
he never experienced it in person. In spite of the fact that it is reasonable to 
suppose that Norman has communicated with his father through 
table-knocking for a long time, Norman’s recollecting process still surpasses 
rational communication. How can he hear his father’s voice? According to 
Levinas, ‘silence is not a simple absence of speech; speech lies in the depths 
of silence […]. It is the inverse of language: the interlocutor has given a 
sign, but has declined every interpretation; this is the silence that terrifies’ 
(1969: 91). Silence thus ‘appears within a relation with the Other, as the 
sign the Other delivers, even if he dissimulates his face’ (93).37 Unlike the 
silence that refuses communication, Norman can hear his father’s voice 
even in his silence – he can detect a sign of otherness that demands 
approaching and understanding. This understanding is not about the 
                                                
37 As Rudi Visker analyzes, in Levinas’s ethics silence can also be understood as an 
attempt to evade the obligation demanded from the Other (130). In my analysis, silence is 
primarily understood as the speechless demand from the Other. Both views can be found in 
Levinas’s theory. In terms of theatre, Levinas criticizes the spectator for remaining hidden 
silently in the darkness and enjoying the spectacle. The silence of irresponsible spectating 
exemplifies the silence of indifference. However, the spectacle of silence that defies 
representation and disrupts intelligibility also demands listening. The gap between 
intelligibility and unintelligibility constitutes the possibility of ethical spectating and 
listening.  
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pathological diagnosis of mutism, nor is it about discovering the traumatic 
past – both are likely to be ossified as mere knowledge. This understanding 
is about approaching the otherness that endows the subject with 
responsibility to respond to it – for Norman, this understanding is to face the 
unbearable truth about his own birth as the cause of his brother’s death. 
Norman’s own story can never be complete if he fails to tell the 
insupportable story, nor can his future be possible without basing his 
self-knowledge on this truth.  
In performance,38 Richard Holmes’s portrayal of the Father retained 
the enigmatic quality of the action of table-knocking. Although it is 
tempting for the actor and spectator to try to decipher the meaning of the 
sound, Holmes’s performance made this method of communication seem 
‘natural’ for the Father and Norman without emphasizing its peculiarity – it 
is just another language that is shared by him and Norman. In fact, this 
‘naturalness’ can be regarded as another example of Bond’s post-Brechtian 
dramaturgy of alienation without explicitly alienating the spectator or actor 
from the spectacle. This nuanced effect can be difficult to achieve, as 
Holmes admits: ‘The hardest thing I found as an actor was not to 
over-explain the story through the knocks or make the father’s silence 
mystical or menacing. I couldn’t do the audiences work for them, while at 
the same time doing enough to let them into the story and accept, quickly, 
this is how it is’ (Wooster 2015: 15). How Danny O’Grady performed 
Norman also preserved the enigmatic quality of the interaction between the 
Father and Norman, and it should also be pointed out that the discrepancy of 
age between O’Grady as actor and character had the same effect of 
‘alienation without alienating’. Instead of trying to imitate a teenager’s 
behaviour, O’Grady’s performance remained demonstrative and neutral, and 
this made it possible for the spectator to feel distanced and involved 
simultaneously. Norman’s first action in this play is to sort his toys, a 
gesture that signifies his farewell to his childhood – although is may seem 
weird at first sight to see an adult actor sorting toys, O’Grady’s neutral 
                                                
38 I attended Big Brum’s production of this play at mac Birmingham in February 2015, on 
which I based my analysis of the performance.  
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performance, which evaded the realistic identification between actor and 
character, made it possible for the spectator to contemplate the relationship 
between childhood and adulthood. Intriguingly, one of the thematic 
concerns of The Angry Roads is the transition from childhood to adulthood, 
and the image of ‘the inner child’ in an adult can also be understood through 
Bond’s concept of the palimpsest structure of the subject.  
In ‘The Storyteller’ (1936), Walter Benjamin argues: ‘If the art of 
storytelling has become rare, the dissemination of information has had a 
decisive share in this state of affairs’ (2007: 89). Benjamin contrasts 
information, the dissemination of news, with stories in terms of verifiability 
and intelligibility: while information can be easily verified and clearly 
explained, stories, the validity of which derives from their origin in foreign 
countries or tradition, cannot be verified and usually remain unexplained 
(ibid.). Like Benjamin, Bond suggests that the hyper-saturation and 
commodification of information as one of the causes that renders 
storytelling difficult. However, Bond differs from Benjamin over the source 
of the validity of stories by stating that the validity of stories originates from 
responsibility for the future, and he thinks that the insatiable consumption of 
‘the present’ nullifies the possibility of imagining the future (Tuaillon 2015: 
51). Bond argues further that, by daring to tell stories to imagine the future, 
young people can potentially be liberated from authority and the market 
(52). Moreover, different from Benjamin’s postulate about the antagonism 
between information and stories, Bond holds the relationship between 
information and stories in tension by turning information into stories. For 
Bond, the source of storytelling is not the past or foreign countries but the 
present and the local. Turning information into stories is to save from 
consumable news the inconsumable, that is, the ethical. 
 
5.2. Spectre and Spectrality 
 
5.2.1. Spectre 
 
The process of storytelling is not merely a process of revealing or creating a 
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fiction. In At the Inland Sea, the Boy is required by the Woman to tell a 
story – this external demand destabilizes the Boy’s equilibrium of self and 
implies the inherent otherness within human subjectivity. This otherness, 
always already within the subject, for Levinas, is the trace of ‘otherwise 
than being’. According to Derrida’s hauntology, this otherness can be 
termed as a present absence, an uncanny ghost, a spectre. It is thus 
unsurprising that Angel-Perez describes the Woman as a ghost that demands 
the responsibility of memory (2006: 116). However, the Woman as a ghost 
is not an apparition out of nowhere – instead, as the Woman makes clear, 
she is conjured up by the Boy. In other words, the Boy is demanded by an 
unknown part of himself as a human subject to be responsible for the past. 
The subject is always already haunted by alterity dwelling in its self. This 
return of the past, according to Angel-Perez, can be explicated as the 
outcome of the traumatic compulsion to repeat (16). Basing her argument on 
trauma theory, Angel-Perez states that the trauma of the Holocaust can be 
inherited by later generations, and part of contemporary British playwriting 
can be regarded as a response to this traumatic inheritance, including 
Bond’s At the Inland Sea (ibid.).39 However, as María der Pilar Blanco and 
Esther Peeren argue, the ghost is a figure that does not necessarily reappear 
in the manner of traumatic repetition and provokes reactions that gesture 
towards the future (13). In contrast to trauma studies, which focus on how 
the traumatic past structures the present, hauntology holds possibilities to 
engender alternatives to respond to the past in the future.  
So, what is a spectre? How do we understand our relation to spectres? 
In Derrida’s discourse on spectrality, the spectre is always related to the 
problem of justice: ‘If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts 
[…], it is in the name of justice, of justice where it is not yet, not yet 
there, where it is no longer’ (1994: xviii). Derrida further states that justice 
is impossible without responsibility – justice requires that responsibility 
                                                
39 In ‘Spectropoétique de la scène’ (2009), Angel-Perez uses the concept of spectrality to 
discuss Bond’s plays, especially the Monster in The War Plays and the linguistic spectrality 
in The Crime of the Twenty-First Century and Existence. She interprets Bond’s use of 
spectrality as a means both to confront the aesthetic aporia of representation after 
Auschwitz and to meet the ethical demand that human nature must be interrogated. I argue 
here that Bond’s other plays can also be understood in terms of spectrality.  
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should be taken for those who have been exterminated by the injustice of 
violence, war, and oppression (ibid.). By arguing that ‘[a] spectral 
asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to 
anachrony’ (6), Derrida associates his hauntology with Levinasian ethics, of 
which ‘the traces of the past’ are extended to spectres that either have 
passed away or have not yet come. For Derrida, the exemplary spectre that 
demands justice is Hamlet’s father, whose ghostly appearance endows 
Hamlet with the responsibility to adjust injustice and restore order. In 
opposition to Derrida’s Levinasian hauntology, in which the messianic 
justice is always yet-to-come, Slavoj Žižek proposes a Lacanian hauntology: 
‘symbolization ultimately always fails, that it never succeeds in 
fully “covering” the real […]. This real (the part of reality that remains 
non-symbolized) returns in the guise of spectral apparitions’ (21; original 
emphasis). For Žižek, the spectre is a residue that symbolization fails to 
incorporate into the symbolic order; therefore, the spectre demands that we 
should take a transgressive action of freedom to found a new reality: ‘The 
act of freedom qua real not only transgresses the limits of what 
we experience as “reality”, it cancels our very primordial indebtedness to 
the spectral Other’ (27-28). By nullifying our ‘indebtedness to the spectral 
Other’, Žižek’s hauntology aims to renounce the endless deferral prior to the 
impossible justice and calls for actions of freedom despite the fact that the 
founding action as a renewal of the symbolic order may produce new 
residues of symbolization and necessitate further actions.  
In fact, Žižek’s response to Derrida’s hauntology, instead of refuting 
Derrida’s argument, broadens how the spectre can be conceived: while 
Derrida’s spectre attests to the unjust oppression of ideological apparatuses, 
Žižek’s spectre as an unideologized residue calls for revolt against the 
oppressing order. Through the lens of Derrida and Žižek, I argue that, in 
Bond’s theory, although the self is always structured and ‘haunted’ by the 
unjust society, the ideological oppression of which has victimized and will 
continue to victimize, radical innocence as the Žižekian spectre can retain 
the potential of rebelling against the injustice. In this regard, the Woman in 
At the Inland Sea can be seen as a returning ghost, a victim of the Holocaust, 
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and a manifestation of the Boy’s radical innocence, which disturbs the self’s 
incorporation of history as static and transmissible knowledge. In the 
following, I will extend this analysis of the spectre and examine Bond’s 
dramaturgy of hauntology in The Hungry Bowl and A Window. 
 
5.2.2. The Hungry Bowl 
 
Many of Bond’s plays are haunted by spectres – both visible and invisible. 
In At the Inland Sea, the Woman appears as a ghost who returns from the 
gates of Auschwitz to demand a story; in Have I None, Sara is haunted by 
her ineradicable memory shared by her and her brother; in Coffee, Nold is 
haunted by Gregory, who guides him into the forest. The spectre is 
disquieting because it signals that the perceived reality may not be the only 
reality – behind the normalized reality always exists the repressed caused by 
the structural violence of reality that excludes what is forbidden. In this 
section, I examine another play that directly uses the spectre as a dramatic 
device: The Hungry Bowl, which was produced by Big Brum in 2012 under 
the title of The Broken Bowl.  
In a city towards the end of 2077, the Girl’s family live on rationing 
because of food shortage. Despite this, the Girl has an imaginary friend, and 
she keeps feeding him. While the Mother thinks the imaginary friend only 
reflects the Girl’s natural psychological need, the Father cannot bear the 
Girl’s imaginary friend, who keeps consuming their food. In the middle of 
the play, however, the Girl’s imaginary friend appears as No One, dressed 
in white jump suit with ordinary fastenings, and only the Girl can see him. 
Later, when No One reappears, he becomes starved and drained because the 
Father has eaten the food for him. In addition, this time the Father can see 
No One – this shocks him and makes him decide to escape from the house 
with his wife to find a new place to live. In fact, because of the Girl’s 
strange behaviour, their house has been marked by a red X, a mark of 
exclusion, and other neighbors have all left. The play ends with No One 
appearing again as Someone, wearing an ordinary white jump suit:  
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Someone  People ran from this house. 
Girl  (looks up) People? 
Someone  Two. Has something happened? 
Girl  I thought you –. You’re like someone I knew. 
Someone  Oh. 
Girl  You havent [sic] seen me before? 
Someone  No. – Something split? 
Girl  Accident. 
Someone  Are you all right? 
Girl  Can I touch you? 
Someone  (puzzled) Touch me? 
Girl  (touches his arm. Silence.) We have to feed the hungry 
don’t we. 
Someone  Yes. 
Girl  And shelter the poor. 
Someone  Yes.  
Girl  And bring the lost home.  
Someone  Something’s happened here. The streets are 
empty. Shall we see? 
Girl  Yes. (Bond 2018: 205) 
 
The final gesture is an ethical one, and the most extreme form of it is 
Levinas’s imperative that one should give the food in one’s mouth to others. 
In fact, Bond uses No One/Someone as a spectre not only to embody the 
Girl’s psychological need of security but also to interrogate the ethics in a 
period of precarity. Relating the Levinasian face to the precariousness of life, 
Judith Butler states: ‘To respond to the face […] means to be awake to what 
is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself’ (2004: 
134). However, the condition of being awake to the precariousness of 
another life requires that another life should be ‘recognized’ as a life. As 
Butler points out, any act of recognition presupposes recognizability that 
consists of selective norms and power operations (2009: 5). In The Hungry 
Bowl, the Girl’s family live in precarious conditions, but they are still 
recognized by the authority as living beings to whom rationing should be 
allotted. Their subsistence depends on the fact that their lives are still 
recognized by the norms of recognizability. When the Father categorizes the 
Girl’s imaginary friend as a ‘zombie’, he in fact subconsciously duplicates 
the biopolitical logic of exclusion employed by the authorities. For the 
Father, the Girl’s imaginary friend is a zombie instead of a living human 
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being that can be included within the norm of the human. However, 
dramaturgically, Bond refutes the Father’s categorization by making the 
imaginary friend appear as a living human being – it is important to note 
that by making the friend appear as a boy, Bond renders questionable the 
norms that the Father adopts in categorizing the boy as a zombie instead of a 
living being. Butler describes the figure that destabilizes the norms of 
recognizability as a ‘spectre’ that endangers the boundaries and must be 
exorcised (12). It is thus possible to posit that the boy is a living human 
being who, despite being a living being, is excluded from the norms, and 
therefore becomes a spectre.  
 Although the boy is not recognized by the authorities, the Girl is still 
capable of ‘apprehending’ him as a friend. As Butler distinguishes 
recognition from apprehension by arguing that the latter denotes the 
intelligibility to apprehend something not yet recognized (5), the boy as a 
spectre indicates the possibility of being apprehended despite being an 
unrecognized being. His spectral presence casts into relief the remainder 
outside the norms. However, the boy’s existence as a spectre also attests to 
the precariousness of the situation of the Girl’s family: by encountering the 
‘zombie’ that is excluded from the norm, the Father is reminded of the fact 
that his status of being categorized as a living being is never guaranteed. His 
anger towards the Girl and his anxiety to protect his house from outer 
danger demonstrate his inconvenient awareness of the precariousness 
inherent in the predicament. As Butler states, ‘precariousness underscores 
our radical substitutability and anonymity in relation both to certain socially 
facilitated modes of dying and death and to other socially conditioned 
modes of persisting and flourishing’ (14). The ‘substitutability’ inherent in 
precariousness is made manifest in The Hungry Bowl when the Girl’s family 
is labeled as a target of exclusion and banishment. In Butler’s view, ‘a 
specific exploitation of targeted population’ is one of the ‘contemporary 
conditions of war’ (31). However, this is not only one of the contemporary 
conditions of war, this logic of exclusion is also tantamount to what Adorno 
terms as a kind of identity logic exemplified by the Holocaust. Under this 
logic, the precariousness of life is manifest by the fact that it is deprived of 
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its right to proper death. Living is indistinguishable from death since both 
are merely instances of the operation of the systematic manufacture of 
death.  
Invoking Adorno and Horkheimer’s ‘On the Theory of Ghosts’, Avery 
Gordon argues that haunting is ‘a form of social figuration’ that reminds us 
of the historical atrocity that reduces individuals into a mere succession of 
experiences without traces (20). For Gordon, haunting is a particular social 
figure that makes us aware of what has occurred and what is occurring (8). 
In this light, engaging with haunting as a social figure directs attention to 
the historical and social conditions that determine specific hauntings and 
precarious circumstances. As I have argued, the precariousness detectable in 
The Hungry Bowl, despite the fact that this play is conceived to take place in 
a dystopian future, in fact attests to the haunting of the Holocaust. In 
‘Something of Myself’, a short autobiographical piece, Bond starts with his 
experience of being evacuated to Cornwall during the Second World War. 
He describes the last day of the war as follows:  
 
On the last day of war we ran to the sweet shop. We thought 
rationing was over. The sweetshop owner shouted. He 
accused us of not using our ration coupons at his shop in the 
war and now we expected to wallow in luxury. Anyway 
rationing wasn’t over. I went home. On the radio Churchill 
announced peace. A voice in my head told me ‘So you will 
live.’ We thought violence was at an end. Not even adults 
would be so foolish again. Later when bombs were dropped in 
the first Gulf War I spoke at a peace rally. I used an obscenity. 
I hadn’t intended to. I’d never spoken obscenely before in 
public. The word spoke itself. It was an after-shock from forty 
years before. I do not remember the sound of bombs. If I close 
my eyes and listen I hear it. In all its baroque horror. If I did 
not hear it I would have lost my self. It was my soul that 
swore. (Bond 2005b: 3) 
 
Apparently, the damaged world of The Hungry Bowl, where people have to 
depend on rationing is the same as the world that Bond describes above. 
Precariousness in life thus comes into view as ‘unhomeliness’, a condition 
of being denied the right to be at home. In German ‘unheimlich’ means 
‘uncanny’ as well as ‘unhomely’ – a haunted home is unhomely. Bond’s 
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own story is already haunted with unhomeliness and continues to be told 
and dramatized because of this unhomeliness.  
It is also evident that Bond’s conception of radical innocence based on 
the Palermo improvisation is in fact a spectral return of those who died a 
premature death during the Second World War: how can killing be justified? 
How can justice be possible in a world that still manufactures mass killing? 
This is the structure of hauntology inherent in Bond’s theory and 
dramaturgy, and this is why Bond superposes the sound of bombing in the 
first Gulf War with that of the Second World War. This ‘after-shock’ attests 
to the spectral and traumatic structure inscribed in Bond’s perception of the 
world. For Bond, the sounds of bombing even become his raison d'être in 
the post-War world. At a fundamental level, the source of the imperative of 
radical innocence to affirm its right to be at home derives from this 
inexorcisable unhomeliness. What should also be noted is that, underneath 
Bond’s narrative, is a cacophony of sounds and voices: the announcement of 
peace, Bond’s inner voice, the sounds of bombing during the Second World 
War, and the sounds of bombing in the first Gulf War. Revealingly, Bond’s 
inner voice – ‘So you will live’ – is almost the prototypical voice of radical 
innocence, but this voice cannot be heard without the sounds of bombing. 
Such is the unhomeliness of radical innocence: the inner voice of the self 
comforts itself in a safe place sheltered from the danger of being bombed, 
but through the door there always exists another voice that also demands 
shelter and claims its right to be at home.  
 
5.2.3. A Window 
 
Whereas in The Hungry Bowl the spectral boy (No One/Someone) attests to 
the haunting of the Second World War and the unhomeliness inherent in 
radical innocence that seeks the feeling of being at home, the spectre in A 
Window, instead of taking visible form, is made tangible through the 
character’s psychic imaginings. First staged by Big Brum and directed by 
Chris Cooper on 19 October 2009, A Window is subtitled ‘A Triptych’ and 
is composed with three ‘panels’. In Panel One, Liz decides to sleep on a 
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chaise longue on her own and this makes her partner, Richard, agitated and 
worried about her mental state. Liz claims that she is not ill and does not 
need any useless pills. She decides to sleep alone because she needs to ‘sort 
it out’ (Bond 2011: 183) for both her and Richard. By ‘it’ Liz refers to a 
news item about a mother who blinds her child’s eyes with scissors in order 
for the child not to know the corrupt world and for her to be able to take 
care of the child forever. This involuntary re-imagining of the violent act 
troubles Liz, but Richard only sees Liz as mad. When Liz reveals to Richard 
that she is pregnant, Richard demands that she has an abortion and 
implicitly blames her mental illness on prenatal depression.  
In Panel Two, Dan, Liz’s son, returns from the street where he has had 
a fight with his friend and brings Liz a packet of drugs. Liz, worried about 
Dan’s injury, uses a sheet of cloth as a bandage to bind up his arm while 
Dan tells her that this is the last time he buys her drugs. When Dan falls 
asleep on a chair, Liz, looking at him, begins to be haunted again by the 
news item and decides to blind Dan with scissors. Amid the process of 
reimagining how the mother blinds her child, Liz realizes the real reason is 
different from what she presumed: the mother blinds her child, not to 
protect it, but to ensure she will never be left alone. This epiphany changes 
her mind and she commits suicide instead.  
In Panel Three, Richard disguises himself as a social service worker to 
visit Dan in order to loot anything valuable left by Liz. When questioned by 
Dan about his real identity, Richard discloses that he is his father and tells 
Dan that he left Liz due to Liz’s mental derangement: ‘None a’ it ’appened. 
Never in the papers. In ’er ’ead. Thass why I left. She’s screwed’ (Bond 
2011: 201). Moreover, Richard tells Dan that Liz earned money by being a 
prostitute while he was outside robbing to get her drugs. Dan cannot accept 
what Richard says, so he ties Richard to the chaise longue and warns him 
that he will blind him. Dan also starts to talk to Liz’s clothes as if Liz was 
still alive. Finally, Richard escapes and accuses Dan of being mad.  
In this play, we can see that both Liz and Dan are haunted: while Liz is 
haunted by the mother’s violent act in the news, Dan is haunted both by the 
news and by Liz’s death. These spectres represent their need for emotional 
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connection and longing for a communal harmony. When we examine the 
relationship between Liz and Richard, it is evident that what Richard really 
cares about is materialistic satisfaction and his ‘looting’ after Liz’s suicide 
best exemplifies his logic of action. However, Liz longs for deeper 
affectionate connection and the promise of a future, both of which Richard 
is unable and reluctant to offer. While Richard may also be victimized and 
marginalized by the logic of the neoliberal world, in which the pursuit of 
profit is the supreme goal, he embodies the same logic by exploiting Liz. 
Moreover, as a more ‘rational’ man, Richard justifies his refusal to 
understand Liz by pathologizing her haunted vision. It is Richard’s logic of 
indifferent reason that alienates Liz, and this alienation makes Liz 
sympathetic to the mother in the news. Liz understands and experiences the 
same sense of alienation as the mother does, and it is this experience that 
justifies the mother’s violence to her child. Liz, however, is troubled by 
such a vision. As Bond states, ‘[s]he is above all frightened by the fact that 
the woman talked about it as if it were very normal, as if she thought it was 
a perfectly obvious thing to do’ (Tuaillon 2015: 132). She keeps returning to 
the violent act in her mind in order to understand the meaning of what 
happened to the mother and to her.  
Throughout the play, it is uncertain whether this news item actually 
exists or not – only Liz’s mental obsession with it is certain: as Bond states, 
Liz ‘is obsessed by this story because later, as a mother and a drug addict, 
she doesn’t feel able to take care of her son’ (ibid.). By discovering the real 
reason why the mother blinded her child, Liz can understand her own 
loneliness. Liz has lost Richard, and she realizes that Dan can never always 
buy her drugs, implying that he may leave her in the near future. Liz can 
only justify the mother’s violence by thinking that it is for the good of her 
child. When she realizes that this is not the case, Liz renounces her desire to 
blind Dan and decides to commit suicide out of despair. Unlike the spectre 
in The Hungry Bowl, which materializes the Girl’s constructive sense of 
justice, Liz’s haunted vision is destructive – the spectre emerges as a 
psychic residue through which the subject can define and redefine his/her 
relationship with others, whether this relationship is constructive or 
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destructive. In Bond’s theory, the potential power of radical innocence is 
based on this indeterminacy, and how the destructive force of the spectre 
can be turned constructive is demonstrated by Dan’s response to his haunted 
visions.  
After Richard tells Dan that Liz was haunted by the news event and 
that Liz used to be a prostitute, Dan denies that what Richard revealed is 
true and turns to Liz’s clothes for help as if the clothes were Liz herself: 
 
Dan  (holding up the clothes, hugging them) Look at ’er! 
Tell ’er! Ain ’er – only ’er clothes! […] Y ain’ got away 
from ’er! Tell ’er yer sorry! Tell ’er – yer can see ’er – ! 
Richard  Son son don't – yer ’arm yerself – no one’s there – 
[…] 
Dan  Look at ’er! – ’cause yer goin t’ lose yer eyes! Thass 
why yer come ’ere! Why yer come in this room! So I can put 
the room right! Yer goin t’ lose yer eyes! (Bond 2011: 206) 
 
Dan seems to be haunted by Liz’s clothes and the news simultaneously, and 
he threatens to blind Richard as the mother in the news does. However, 
unlike Liz, who cannot cope with her haunted vision and commits suicide, 
Dan struggles to find another way out of this haunting: 
 
Look! – what did the kid see – what did its ’ands do – 
(Richard’s hands rise. Jerking. Shaking. Still tied in the strips. 
Dan stamps.) – when it saw the – (Stamp.) when it saw the 
(Stamp.) comin – (Bond 2011: 207) 
 
Instead of resorting to violence towards himself or Richard, Dan tries to 
understand what the blinded ‘kid’ experiences and decides to do something 
‘for the kid’, which is what he finally murmurs while Richard escapes. 
Through the double haunted visions of Liz and the atrocious news, Dan 
encounters the spectral ‘kid’, whose spectral death functions like an ethical 
call through which Dan can understand the meaning of his death. Dan stops 
himself from harming Richard as if the suffering of the child prevents him 
from continuing the vicious cycle of violence manifest through the mother’s 
blinding her child and Liz’s suicide.  
In The Hungry Bowl and A Window, Bond uses the spectre to unsettle 
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the ostensibly untroubled reality and force the characters to confront both 
their inner desire and wider social problems. The spectre always emerges as 
‘the other’ that decenters the stability of the self, and the demand of the 
spectre for a response puts the self into a state of crisis – this crisis can 
result in either self-destruction or rebirth. How to address the spectre is in 
fact a problem of hospitality, which permeates through Bond’s TIE plays – 
in addition to the spectre, in the following I will analyze the foreigner and 
stranger as other forms of otherness. 
 
5.3. Foreigner, Stranger, and Hospitality 
 
In At the Inland Sea the problem of hospitality is conspicuous – when the 
Woman as a spectre confronts the Boy to demand a story, the Boy needs to 
decide whether he should accept this Woman. The spectre could have been 
exorcised if the Boy refuses to acknowledge the Woman, and this would in 
turn render storyability impossible. The three concepts – storyability, 
spectrality, and hospitality – decide the dramaturgical structure of At the 
Inland Sea, the first of Bond’s TIE plays. Therefore, we can observe that 
from the beginning of Bond’s TIE plays, the dramaturgy of learning already 
presupposes alterity as the necessary condition for stories to unfold. 
Hospitality requires that the spectre should be accepted even at the expense 
of making the house haunted. If the possibility of storytelling entails 
unconditional hospitality, then Bond’s dramaturgy confronts an aporia: the 
self needs to be haunted to tell a story in order to affirm its right to be at 
home. ‘Unhomeliness’ always already filters through what Bond calls the 
existential imperative that one should be at home in the world. The problem 
of hospitality also pervades Have I None, The Hungry Bowl, and A Window. 
In these plays, the acceptance of spectral others amounts to ethically 
redefining the subject. Hauntology not only reveals spectral structures of 
historical and social injustice but also demands actions at least to encounter 
and accommodate the spectre. Following the analysis of storyability and 
spectrality, in this section I will examine The Under Room and The Edge to 
discuss the presence of the foreigner and stranger that puts into relief the 
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problem of hospitality in Bond’s TIE plays.  
 
5.3.1. The Under Room 
 
First staged by Big Brum in October 2005, The Under Room starts with the 
Dummy, an illegal immigrant, who breaks into Joan’s house to escape from 
soldiers. It is important to note that Bond makes a distinction between the 
Dummy as a human effigy and the Dummy Actor who speaks the Dummy’s 
words. Throughout the play, other characters only interact with the Dummy 
and ignore the existence of the Dummy Actor. After the Dummy tells Joan 
that he has no papers, Joan asks him to stay for the sake of security. Later, 
Joan asks Jack to help them to get the necessary documents for the Dummy 
to cross the border. However, the Dummy’s money has been stolen, so he is 
unable to pay Jack. Joan promises that she will try to get the money, but 
when Jack returns, he brings the Dummy’s pass. Jack reveals that he has 
joined the army to get the pass for the Dummy and threatens Joan and the 
Dummy that they have potentially become the criminals. Despite this, the 
Dummy decides to escape with Jack while Joan kills the Dummy out of fear. 
The play ends with the Dummy Actor speaking the Dummy’s native 
language. 
As Derrida points out, the question of hospitality starts with 
language: ‘[M]ust we ask the foreigner to understand us, to speak our 
language […] before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into 
our country?’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 15). Derrida further 
distinguishes two types of language: one is linguistic operation while the 
other entails an ensemble of norms and values (133). The Dummy speaks 
two languages: he speaks English, the same language as Joan speaks when 
he is awake; however, when he falls into a coma, he speaks his native 
language, which is totally incomprehensible to Joan. In order to seek asylum, 
the Dummy must speak a foreign language that enables him to communicate 
with Joan; without this shared language, the Dummy for Joan would 
become a total foreigner. However, the Dummy that Joan speaks to is not 
the Dummy Actor that really ‘speaks’. The foreignness of the Dummy 
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effigy foregrounds the fact that it is language itself as a linguistic operation 
that communicates – Joan can communicate with the Dummy without 
knowing ‘who’ he is. The discrepancy between the Dummy who ‘is’ and the 
Dummy Actor who ‘speaks’ leads to another question: does speaking the 
same language really communicate and reduce foreignness? In the sense 
that Joan can speak to the Dummy, the Dummy is not a total foreigner. But 
this shared language also conceals the irreducible otherness embodied, in 
both figurative and literal ways, in the Dummy.  
At the end of Scene Four, the Dummy Actor puts his jeans on the 
Dummy and the knife in the pocket of the Dummy’s shirt – these gestures 
suggest that the Dummy is gradually ‘humanized’, and, in the process of 
humanization, the Dummy starts to speak his native language in Scene Five 
when he falls into a coma:  
 
 Dummy  Mnches. Mnches. Vczxq bzcvxc. 
Joan  […] Now I have an obligation to you. I wont [sic] 
abandon you. […] I’m an immigrant in my own country. This 
house is my prison. This is the last night I’ll spend in it. […] 
The things you told me haunt me. I cant [sic] get the pictures 
out of my head. […] 
  […] 
Joan  […] Get up! We’ll be here when the soldiers come! Is 
that what you want? Who are you? I know nothing about you! 
I have to run out of my house like a criminal! Then you take it 
over! […] (Bond 2006: 191-92) 
   
Joan not only expresses her obligation to the Dummy but also reveals that 
she is – or feels like – an immigrant in the country. As the end of the play 
suggests, Joan might in the past have greeted the Dummy’s grandmother. It 
is not clear whether Joan really encountered the Dummy’s grandmother or 
she just met another elderly woman who spoke the same language as the 
Dummy does. But it is possible to assume that Joan used to greet foreigners 
but, due to legal changes or other causes, immigration becomes illegal. The 
totalization of state power makes Joan feel as if she is an immigrant in her 
own country despite the fact that she is the country’s native. This is why 
Joan is haunted by the Dummy’s past because the Dummy’s story possibly 
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reminds her of the past when she encountered other foreigners. However, 
when the Dummy keeps speaking his native language to articulate his inner 
anxiety, Joan dislodges her hatred of the Dummy suppressed under her 
benevolent appearance. Once the suppressed anxiety is released, it turns into 
violence towards the Dummy, as Bond describes Joan as one who ‘contains 
in fact a lot of unexpressed aggression, probably based on fear’ (Tuaillon 
2015: 95). Joan’s fear is twofold: she fears the real foreignness embodied by 
the Dummy, but she also fears the foreignness within herself – her desires 
and anxieties repressed within the process of being civilized as a 
law-abiding citizen who must follow the legal regulations on immigration.  
After the Dummy is dead, Joan is uncertain about whether she should 
expose his body or hide it. She finally decides to hide it out of the fear of 
being punished. Joan’s morality of hospitality is revealed to be based on the 
suppression of her fear and uncertainty, and, once undone, it turns into 
brutality. In other words, not only those who are endowed with the 
executive power can exercise violence, but normal citizens can also 
internalize the fear and resort to violence. It is also important to note how 
Bond dramatizes the point at which the Dummy decides to go with Jack: 
when he confesses that he was forced by the soldiers to kill his mother or 
father and he decided to kill his mother, Joan responds with moralizing 
horror; Jack, however, understands the aporetic nature of the involuntary 
choice and the atrocious crime committed by the Dummy. As Jack decides 
to escape with the Dummy but finds that he has been killed, he states: ‘I 
never turned t’ crime out a’ weakness. I ’ad a different reason. Hope’ (Bond 
2006: 202). Unlike Joan, Jack has no consistent morality: he can be a 
comrade with the army, but he can also be an outlaw who offers help to the 
Dummy. Jack understands the nature of the state as a totalized order, and, 
ironically, his radical innocence takes the form of crime. This is also why 
the Dummy uses his knife as his identity paper, as he states: ‘The knife is 
my papers. You must have weapon when you live on street and have no 
papers’ (Bond 2006: 173). The knife has two meanings: it represents the 
violence required to resist the rules imposed by the authorities; it is also a 
reminder of how he was forced to kill his mother by the soldiers.  
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The discussion of The Under Room demonstrates that the problem of 
hospitality entails both ethical/legal conditions and psychic mechanisms. As 
Derrida states, the ethics of hospitality involves an aporia:  
 
I want to be master at home (ipse, potis, potens, head of house, 
we have seen all that), to be able to receive whomever I like 
there. Anyone who encroaches on my “at home,” on my 
ipseity, on my power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, 
I start to regard as an undesirable foreigner, and virtually as 
an enemy. This other becomes a hostile subject, and I risk 
becoming their hostage. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 
53, 55; original emphasis) 
 
Derrida’s description of the aporia of hospitality also exposes the inherent 
aporia of Bond’s idea of radical innocence. As I have argued that Levinas’s 
idea of alterity, illeity, destabilizes the constancy of the self as ipseity, the 
existential imperative of radical innocence that everyone should be at home 
can be challenged when this imperative fails to answer the demands of the 
homeless and foreigners who ask for asylum. If Joan can truly be open to 
the Dummy as an intruder who ‘breaks into’ her house and threatens her 
safety, she should unconditionally accept the Dummy without knowing his 
identity or asking for any identity documents. However, considering that the 
Dummy is an illegal immigrant, Joan asks him to stay until she can obtain 
the legal documents:  
 
Dummy  I do not want to give you some trouble. I pay for 
broken window and go. First I ask you check no soldiers 
outside. That would be kind. 
[…] 
Joan  You are an illegal immigrant. You loot shops. If the 
soldiers catch you you will be shot. I do not want you to walk 
out of my house into that.  
Dummy  […] You are a good person. You do not cause 
trouble for the authorities. […] (Bond 2006: 175; original 
emphasis) 
 
In fact, the Dummy never asks for legal documents – it is Joan who wants to 
help the Dummy to secure such documents. In addition, she does not want 
the Dummy to be shot just because she fails to take care of him. However 
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good-intentioned Joan may be, it is this problematic ‘good’ will that causes 
her and the Dummy the trouble that follows. In Derrida’s words, Joan’s 
actions implicate her and the Dummy within the logic of ‘conditional 
hospitality’ determined by the law of the state. The only true document for 
the Dummy is his knife – he is not only an illegal immigrant but also an 
outlaw who knows how the rule of the state can be destructive instead of 
protective. However, Joan cannot understand this, nor can she detect the 
irony in the Dummy’s remark that she is ‘a good person’. If Joan’s desire to 
accept the Dummy follows the logic of radical innocence, this operation of 
radical innocence is likely to be ideologized by the law of the state. As a 
result, any practice of radical innocence, once involved within the order of 
ideology, loses its radicalness as a transgressive force.  
Moreover, this distortion of radical innocence necessitates psychic 
repression. In analyzing the relationship between psychic apparatuses and 
xenophobia, Julia Kristeva argues that ‘the psychic apparatus represses 
representative processes and contents that are no longer necessary for 
pleasure, self-preservation, and the adaptive growth of the speaking subject’ 
(184). In the process of growth, the speaking subject must repress those 
elements that arouse displeasure and threats to self-preservation. While 
Kristeva’s analysis focuses on the psychic mechanism, it is notable that the 
process of ‘adaptive growth’ necessarily entails the adaptation to the social 
reality conditioned by extra-psychic rules. And this mechanism explains 
why Joan bursts into violence when she recognizes that the Dummy is a 
foreigner that threatens her self-constancy: this violence is not inherent in 
the sense that it is inborn but the result of the psychic operation conditioned 
by psychic apparatuses and extra-psychic ideologization. However, it should 
still be pointed out that Joan is not innately violent towards foreigners, nor 
is the law necessarily formulated against foreigners. The fact that Joan 
keeps a Muslim headscarf which she claims used to be owned by the 
Dummy’s grandmother implies that there used to be an era when the state 
was more tolerant of foreigners. The headscarf further betokens the 
otherness that constitutes a part of Joan’s memory and identity. Objectively, 
it is the change of the legal order that redefines whether a foreigner should 
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be perceived as a friend or an enemy, but this intensification of control over 
foreigners also subjectively affects Joan’s perception of them.  
With regard to the psychic operation of xenophobia, Kristeva reminds 
us of the importance of facing the inner otherness that in fact uncovers the 
contours that define the identity of a community (192). In a similar manner, 
Derrida also interprets the stranger as a liberating force: ‘[T]he stranger 
could save the master and liberate the power of his host; it’s as if the master, 
qua master, were prisoner of his place and his power, of his ipseity, of his 
subjectivity’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 123; original emphasis). Can the 
Dummy liberate Joan? Considering that Joan feels uneasy in her own 
country and intends to escape with the Dummy, the Dummy could be a 
liberating force for Joan in the sense that the Dummy can make Joan aware 
of the oppression the state imposes on foreigners as well as natives. 
However, since the possibility of emancipation presupposes Joan’s ability to 
alter her knowledge of the status quo, her failure to question the established 
legal order thus implies she still has to depend on the official order and even 
executes it by herself.  
 
5.3.2. The Edge 
 
While Bond interrogates the problem of hospitality and the border between 
‘the national we’ and ‘the foreign them’ on the collective level through the 
Dummy in The Under Room, in The Edge Bond interrogates the problem of 
otherness on a personal level through the character, ‘the Stranger’, whose 
presence, like the Dummy in The Under Room, is both hostile and liberating. 
Produced by Big Brum in 2012, The Edge takes place during Ron’s last 
night at home before he leaves his mother, Sal. After a night with his friends, 
Ron encounters the Stranger on his way home, who lies on the ground 
motionless. When Ron arrives home and has a row with Sal, the Stranger 
appears and accuses Ron of stealing his wallet. Although Ron denies that he 
stole the Stranger’s wallet, Sal cannot decide what really happened and 
intends to settle the problem by paying the Stranger. Sal’s decision outrages 
Ron because this implies that she does not trust him. Intriguingly, faced 
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with Ron’s denial, the Stranger states that whether Ron stole the wallet or 
not does not matter:  
 
  Ron  […] I never touch yer wallet! 
Stranger  Yer stole me wallet! Rob me! Even if yer didnt 
makes no difference. […] If ye rain got me wallet it’s ’cause 
some other young bleeder got it first! Nip round the corner ’n 
share it with ’is mates before yer will stop! Look under ’is 
bed – be full a’ me wallets ’e stole! ’E’s got me stuff under 
these floorboards! […] When did I last swaller a meal that did 
me any good? When’s the last time yer slep on the streets? 
(Bond 2011: 227) 
 
What Ron actually did to him makes no difference – the Stranger accuses 
Ron as a young man of stealing from the Stranger as an old man. While this 
accusation of generational inequity may make sense, later when the Stranger 
lies motionless on the floor, Ron and Sal soon discover that the wallet, 
loaded with money has been in the Stranger’s jacket. This revelation, 
however, by no means leads to reconciliation between Sal and Ron – Ron 
feels cheated and degraded because Sal did not believe him. This quarrel 
culminates in an emotional climax: 
 
  Ron  Too late! 
  Sal  I need yer! Please! 
  Ron  Get off! 
  Sal  Is this all I’m worth? 
  Ron  Yer lied t’ me! 
  Sal  Would yer leave me lying in the street! 
Ron  Yes! (Shocked silence.) Yes! – Get off me! (Bond 
2011: 235) 
 
It is not only Ron who is shocked by his reply, but Sal (and likely, the 
audience) are also be shocked. In fact, Ron’s ostensible indifference to Sal’s 
emotional needs should be considered along with the Stranger’s accusation 
– Ron may leave Sal lying in the street just like he left the Stranger lying on 
the street and dismissed him as trash. In other words, Ron’s response 
indirectly validates the Stranger’s accusation that intergenerational relations 
can be founded on exploitation and indifference.  
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The helpless image of ‘lying on the street’ suggests an ethical 
dimension obscured by this kind of exploitation and indifference, and this 
moment becomes the turning point of the play. After this shocking 
emotional culmination, however, the play seemingly enters another level of 
reality: when the Stranger wakes up and continues to accuse Ron of robbing 
his wallet, Sal, knowing that Ron did not steal the wallet, asks the Stranger 
whether he has any place to go and whether there is anyone who can take 
care of him. Instead of treating the Stranger as an offensive intruder, Sal 
addresses him as a neighbor, whose need is not money but care. When Ron 
comes back and finds that Sal is absent – she is preparing tea for the 
Stranger – he also realizes that he cannot abandon his mother and that the 
real problem in the house is his deceased father. At this moment, Ron wears 
his father’s jumper, and the Stranger puts on Ron’s clothes – through these 
symbolic acts, both of them enter liminal zones where they subjectively 
encounter their repressed desires.  
Ron realizes that his dead father still haunts the house. He also 
recounts how Sal used to make him imitate his father – Sal’s emotional 
attachment to the dead father is the reason why Ron needs to leave the 
house, but it is also due to Sal’s unfinished and repressed mourning that Ron 
feels he can never leave the house. After recognizing the role of the father, 
Ron is worried that his absence may prompt Sal to commit suicide, and it is 
at this moment that he acknowledges his love for Sal. As Ron undergoes 
this subjective enlightenment, the Stranger’s repressed desire for violence is 
also released – he keeps trying to kill Ron, but he eventually fails and ends 
up eating chocolate in a grotesque manner. The Stranger wants to kill Ron 
as a revenge for generational inequity, and he puts on Ron’s clothes as if 
this can make him return to childhood. However, both of these acts are 
vacuous. In the end, Sal strips Ron’s clothes from the Stranger, and she also 
rejects Ron’s decision to stay at home: 
 
 Ron  I want t’ be ’ere. 
Sal  (the backpack) Keep it steady. (Packing.) Yer cant [sic] 
stay. Look at this, look around yer. – I need yer t’ go. 
 […] 
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 Ron  Cant [sic] leave yer with ’im. 
Sal  ’E’s a child. I can manage ’im. ’E’ll sleep in your bed 
tonight. In the morning I’ll arrange somewhere for ’im t’ go. 
You’ll be far away. Somewhere safe. (Bond 2011: 242-43) 
 
Sal’s reactions to Ron and the Stranger materialize the ethics of maternity. 
As Levinas states, ‘[i]n maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others 
[…]. Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears even responsibility 
for the persecuting by the persecutor’ (1998: 75). Sal realizes that she can 
no longer treat Ron as a substitute of her husband, and she also knows that 
underneath the Stranger’s violence is his desire to be taken care of. However, 
she also states that she will find somewhere else for the Stranger – therefore, 
Sal’s attitude towards the Stranger is not only ethical but also practical.  
In fact, Bond is always aware of the practical dimension even within 
extreme ethical situations; otherwise, ethical gestures risk being empty. For 
Bond, hospitality always entails the process of calculating the incalculable, 
and only through this process can ethical situations be made concrete and 
logical. Although Derrida’s idea of absolute hospitality or Levinas’s idea of 
the subject as the hostage of the other can deconstruct any predetermined 
calculation towards the other, unconditional hospitality logically entails the 
possibility of self-destruction of the subject who encounters the other. As 
Richard Kearney argues, in order to resist this possibility of self-ruin, ‘a 
hermeneutic pluralism of otherness’ is required – ‘In ethical relation, I am 
neither master nor slave. I am a self before another self – brother, sister, 
neighbour, citizen, stranger, widow, orphan: another self who seeks to be 
loved as it loves itself’ (2003: 81). Either on the personal level or on the 
collective level, Bond does not follow the logic of the proclivity to 
demonize the other, nor does he moralize about the ethical imperative to 
welcome the other unconditionally. When a stranger, a foreigner, or a 
neighbour appears, the ethical encounter is also socially and politically 
determined – the negotiation of the nature of the other is indefinite and 
processual. In The Edge, as Bond points out, although the Stranger is 
outside the family, he can bring in wider problems of the society and 
penetrate into the emotional impasses between Sal and Ron. He also states 
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that the Stranger’s presence engenders a ‘sense of somewhere else’ that 
renders another world possible for the characters and the audience to step 
into (Ballin and Cooper 26). This territory of ‘somewhere else’ is an 
uncertain liminal zone in which the ethical dimensions of everyday 
normality can be revealed and coped with practically – that is, the sphere 
where the meaning and limits of hospitality can be interrogated.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
My analysis in this chapter points out the dramaturgical features utilized by 
Bond in his TIE plays that open the possibility of ethical learning in 
response to the post-Auschwitz neoliberal world order. In explicating how 
Bond’s TIE plays function, Cooper states: ‘In the specific site of the story 
Bond’s dramaturgy creates a gap in meaning for the audience as the site of 
the imagination to step into and fill for itself’ (Ballin and Cooper 24). In this 
chapter, I have argued that what makes a ‘gap’ possible is through the 
disposition of various forms of otherness that elicit stories to be told, 
spectres to be encountered, and guests to be accommodated. Only based on 
the experience of encountering otherness can the process of self-creation be 
imaginable.  
From Chapter Three to this chapter, I have examined Bond’s later 
plays through the perspectives of post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, 
trauma-tragedy, and the dramaturgy of his TIE plays. Alongside his 
dramaturgical development, based on his theory of subjectivity, Bond has 
also formulated a theory of theatre for practically mounting his plays on 
stage. In the next chapter, I will explore Bond’s theory of theatre and 
demonstrate how this theory applies to the performance of his plays.  
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Chapter Six 
Theatre Event: Performing Subjectivities  
 
Since the 1990s, along with his theoretical and dramaturgical inventions, 
Bond has been articulating a new method of acting and directing in order to 
effectively translate his theory and dramaturgy into theatrical practice. Bond 
invents several terms such as Theatre Event (TE), gap, centre, site, and 
situation to describe his ideal model of theatre. As Bond has used these 
terms in different contexts, the definitions of these terms have evolved and 
interacted with one another. Therefore, instead of trying to define these 
terms comprehensively, I will start with tracing the genealogy of Bond’s 
theory of the Theatre Event as a post-Brechtian theory of theatre. I will 
argue that one of the most vital theoretical tasks for Bond is to establish a 
post-Brechtian theory to accommodate his theory of subjectivity and that of 
theatre practice.  
 
6.1. Theatre Event  
 
According to Bond, his idea of the Theatre Event was inspired by a real 
incident that he saw on TV and what intrigued him was a woman’s gesture 
in a Middle-Eastern city during war. This is how Bond describes the woman 
who runs beside a stretcher on which lies an injured man:  
 
As the woman runs she screams and raises her clenched fists 
to heaven. Then she opens her hands – with the palms up and 
fingers spread – and shakes them over the body, pleading with 
the crowd to look at it. […] And then she sees – half sees – 
men pointing a TV camera and sound-boom at her. Her right 
hand – with the open, upturned palm and spread fingers – 
sweeps down to the body in a gesture of display – then 
clenches to a fist and rises to heaven. In the same instant her 
left hand glides gently to her hair and – gently, delicately, 
with a salon gesture – pats it into place: she is on TV. The gap 
is filled. That is a TE. (1998: 308)  
 
From this instance, it can be inferred that a Theatre Event designates an 
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extreme situation in which those involved are expected both to experience it 
emotionally and to be aware of the experience reflectively from a distance. 
As I will demonstrate, for Bond, the woman’s gesture epitomizes the ideal 
method of acting that is neither Stanislavskian nor Brechtian as it 
incorporates emotion and reason. In addition to psychological reactions, the 
actor must be conscious of the meaning involved in these reactions and 
explore different possibilities of acting based on this self-consciousness. In 
other words, there is no pre-established character to be replicated; on the 
contrary, the character demands that the actor demonstrate ‘the truth about 
them both’ (303). This is why Bond uses ‘enactment’ instead of ‘acting’ to 
refer to the actor’s performance because it is not simply the character to be 
acted but the meaning to be enacted through the character.  
If the Bondian actor aims to enact the meaning of the situation, the 
question remains as to how to evaluate whether the enactment is appropriate. 
In explicating the difference between the Brechtian alienation effect and the 
Theatre Event, Bond advises his readers to ‘[i]magine a poem in which 
someone says to a hungry woman: All you need is a bowl of soup and the 
works of Lenin’ (Stuart 1994a: 50). For Bond, giving a book to a hungry 
woman and her starving baby is a shocking Brechtian gesture that reminds 
us that we need both food and analytical knowledge in order to live (ibid.). 
To transform the gesture from an alienation effect into a Theatre Event, 
Bond advises the actress to consider the following questions: 
 
Does she give the baby a spoonful of soup – then read aloud 
(perhaps she cant [sic] read well) one sentence? Then how 
true, relevant, simple, earth-shattering, is the sentence? Does 
it become more important than the soup – perhaps the soup is 
put down and she reads the text to herself and the child as if it 
were a fairy story that had become true? Perhaps soup is spilt 
on the book – perhaps the child cries each time the spoon is 
taken from its mouth as the woman uses it to painfully 
underline the text. Perhaps someone comes on and kicks the 
soup away – and thrusts the book in her hand: and tells her 
she and her child will die if they dont understand the book. 
(Stuart 1994a: 51) 
 
It is clear that the nature of the Theatre Event is not so much about theatrical 
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spectacle of sensational effects as it is about a precise analysis of the 
situation the character confronts in a certain moment. This process requires 
the actor to eschew analyzing the character from a purely psychological 
point of view or using the character only to construct message-laden 
alienating gestures. On the contrary, the ideal TE-acting is the combination 
of emotion and analysis. However, the difference between Brecht and Bond 
by no means resides in whether emotion is involved in acting or not, as 
Brecht states that ‘[t]he Verfremdung effect intervenes […] in the form of 
emotions that need not correspond to those of the character portrayed’ (2015: 
154). Brecht further explains how to interrupt a coherent process of 
constructing emotions:  
 
By letting his voice rise, holding his breath and tightening his 
neck muscles so that the blood shoots to his head, the actor 
can easily conjure up a rage. In such a case, of course, the 
Verfremdung effect does not occur. But it does occur if the 
actor at a particular point unexpectedly shows a completely 
white face, which he has produced mechanically by holding 
his face in his hands with some white make-up on them. If the 
actor at the same time displays an apparently composed 
character, then his fright at this point (as a result of this 
message, or that discovery) will give rise to a V-effect. (2015: 
154) 
 
By comparing the two excerpts above, it is clear that Bond’s method of 
acting achieves ‘estrangement’ by exhausting possible reactions in a 
specific situation and choosing one that the audience might find unexpected, 
while Brecht achieves the V-effect by a deliberate theatrical gesture that 
guides the audience to notice the artificiality of the displayed emotion.  
In his documentation of Bond’s workshops with the RSC’s actors in 
1992, Ian Stuart points out that the aim of the workshops was to find a 
‘post-Stanislavsky, post-Brecht, anti-happening drama’ (1994b: 207). In the 
workshops, through breaking the usual patterns of enacting emotions, Bond 
led the actors to explore how imagination can function as the mediator 
between ‘I the imaginator’ and ‘emotion’ and how this mediating process 
can endow the actors with more choices before performing certain emotions 
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(210). By replacing emotion with imagination, Stuart observes, the actor 
was more likely to ‘stage the paradox’ that is characteristic of Bondian 
drama (214). Instead of being completely consumed by emotion, the actor 
must self-consciously observe how emotions can possibly operate in every 
situation and how the meaning can be decided by demonstrating certain 
emotions. The actor’s imagination, therefore, aims for a rationalized 
emotional reaction as well as affective reasoning.  
The distance between actor and emotion required by Bond is also 
necessary for Brecht. Brecht uses Lear’s rage as an example and states that, 
by using the techniques of Verfremdung, Lear’s rage is estranged and 
manifests itself as historicized: ‘Lear’s experiences need not produce this 
rage in all people and at all times’ (2015: 143). However, while in Brecht’s 
theatre emotions are historicized in accordance with the specific 
socio-economic conditions, in Bond’s theatre emotions are denaturalized to 
reveal other imaginative manifestations of subjectivity. In fact, Bond’s 
demand for an anti-Stanislavskian and anti-Brechtian method of acting 
based on imagination poses a challenge to the actor. In an interview with 
Peter Billingham, Chris Cooper states that his first encounter with Bond’s 
work was when he, as an actor, participated in the production of At the 
Inland Sea, directed by Geoff Gillham in 1997. Cooper acknowledges that 
his understanding of acting had been mainly Stanislavskian, but he soon 
discovered that general emotionalism failed to work in Bond’s plays, nor 
did Brechtian commentary. Gillham advised him to imagine Bond’s work as 
composed of different ‘departments’ of feelings as the signposts of the mind; 
therefore, there is no need to connect different feelings naturalistically or 
psychologically but to discover the structure of experience from one 
extreme to another (Billingham 158-59). The idea of constructing ‘the 
structure of experience’ resonates with the idea of using imagination to 
explore different facets of emotions in the RSC workshops. This process 
begins with interrupting psychological stereotypes, imagining alternative 
reactions, and ends with reconstituting a structure of psychologically real 
and self-conscious enactments.  
According to Clovis Cornillac, in rehearsals, Françon emphasized that 
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the actor should discover the way of enacting (la conduite) instead of acting 
the psychology of the character: it is ‘a road that one searches in a scene, 
mysterious and surprising, and it is a coherence of narration’ (Françon and 
Tuaillon 31). Cornillac further clarifies the importance of being ‘at the 
present’ and the establishment of the character is based on the logic of 
enactment (ibid.).40 In her interview with A.-F. Benhamou, Dominique 
Valadié describes her experience of acting the Woman in Coffee: she needed 
to perform as a dead woman, but how should she perform the Woman if she 
has never experienced being dead? The only way to do it was to use the 
body and the language to invent something that was never imagined before 
but can only be determined by the play. For Valadié, to perform the Woman 
is to plausibly and vividly incarnate something that no one has ever seen 
(Benhamou 76). Bond thus summarizes his ideal way of acting:  
 
TE-acting tends to be more graphic, direct, simple, theatrical 
and powerful than […] naturalism; and because it combines 
expression and demonstration it does not produce a false 
language of compulsion, sentiment and inflated emotion. 
(Bond 1998: 318)  
 
Another difference between Bond and Brecht is the way they relate 
their dramaturgy to theatricalization. Brecht’s V-effect is invented to 
correspond to the dramaturgy of epic theatre as Brecht makes clear that 
‘[e]xpounding the plot and getting it across with suitable means of 
Verfremdung constitutes the main business of the theatre’ (2015: 252). In 
order to facilitate the spectator’s reflection on the events on stage, Brecht 
requires that every component of the plot must be connected conspicuously 
instead of imperceptibly (251). Thus, Brecht’s epic theatre arguably 
resolves around the principle that ‘[e]ach individual event has its basic 
                                                
40 As ‘la conduite’ in French means ‘driving’ and ‘conduct’, it clarifies the meaning of 
enactment: instead of acting the character, the actor’s enactment of the character is like a 
journey of driving across a variety of dramatic situations. Like a driver, the actor knows the 
precise features of the excursion and the ways to adapt to different conditions. Instead of 
focusing on characterization, the Bondian actor is more attentive to how to reveal the 
ideologized reality to the spectator through the use of objects and the discloure of the 
‘invisible object’. In the following sections, I will elucidate these ideas in concrete 
examples.  
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gestus’ (250). That is, dramaturgically every event must be a complete unit 
in which the dramatic action bears its social significance, and theatrically 
this social point is revealed through the V-effect. Although Bond conceives 
of the Theatre Event as an alternative of acting to the Brechtian V-effect, the 
Theatre Event is closely related to this dramaturgical structure.  
 
6.2. Accident Time 
 
Another concept close related to the Theatre Event is ‘accident time’, which 
Bond thus explains: 
 
Accident time resembles the stillness at the center of the 
whirlwind. The storm protects us from the dangers of the 
storm. We are suspended in the accident. Accidents remove 
the normal connections between things, the ideological net. In 
TE the audience have to create the connections. That means 
they must take responsibility for them. (2000b: 48)  
 
In short, the Theatre Event can be understood as the dramatization of 
extreme situations during accident time. Bond believes that it is only 
through constructing extreme situations which put spectators into ‘accident 
time’ that the ideologized reason can be unsettled and self-dramatization is 
possible.  
Bond’s concept of accident time should be considered alongside with 
Brecht’s ‘street scene’ as a demonstration of epic theatre. According to 
Brecht, ‘the street scene’, regarded as a basic model for epic theatre, 
depends on the eyewitness who demonstrates to bystanders how a traffic 
accident took place. This demonstrator needs to imitate the action rather 
than the character, which means that helping bystanders form their opinions 
about the accident objectively is more important than making them 
subjectively re-experience what happened. In order to further subject the 
accident to scrutiny, the demonstrator can even focus on certain movements, 
emotions, or gestures in order to produce effects of estrangement (2015: 
176-81). Bond also uses traffic accidents to define ‘accident time’:  
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In emergencies such as a car crash the brain is flooded with 
chemicals as concentration increases. The effect is the 
apparent slowing down of time. More is seen and more 
actions become possible. Extreme drama creates this effect. 
The accident is not physical, it is a crisis in existential 
meanings. It exposes contradictions we accept in daily life in 
order to survive. (2005: 90) 
 
From Bond’s description of what happens in accident time, it is inaccurate 
to state that the concept of accident time is completely different from 
Brecht’s street scene. Both of the devices seek to construct a theatrical space 
in which the meanings buried under the surface of everyday normalcy can 
be contested. However, Bond emphasizes the importance of the experiential 
aspect – for him, the extreme emotions provoked by the accident are 
essential for the spectator to undergo the subsequent process of 
interpretation. Although Brecht by no means excludes the experience of 
emotions, he tends to emphasize that emotions can exist only insofar they 
are subject to critical scrutiny. Another difference is that, while Brecht 
intends the spectator to understand the Marxist-inflected social meanings 
within the situation, Bond’s ‘crisis in existential meanings’ hinges upon a 
broader concept of the process of subjectivation. According to Bond’s later 
theory of subjectivity, what concerns him is not how the socialization of the 
subject is determined by class or other social-economic conditions, but how 
the subject, while being structured by ideological apparatuses, still retains 
the potential for resistance and self-reflection.  
Regarding Brecht’s epic theatre, Walter Benjamin argues: ‘The thing 
that is revealed as though by lightning in the “condition” represented on the 
stage – as a copy of human gestures, actions and words – is an immanently 
dialectical attitude. The conditions which epic theatre reveals is the dialectic 
at a standstill’ (1998: 12). In contradistinction to Benjamin’s concept of 
‘dialectic at a standstill’ is Gilles Deleuze’s idea of ‘encountered signs’ – 
‘things that do violence’ (101). According to Deleuze, thought is not 
produced by cognitive recognition made possible by the correlation between 
the object and the subjective unity of consciousness but by signs that 
violently force us to think: ‘To think is always to interpret – to explicate, to 
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develop, to decipher, to translate a sign’ (97). The dramaturgy of accident 
time comprises of a conglomerate of encountered signs that firstly do 
violence to our sensibility and then force us to think. While Bond is 
renowned for his dramaturgical use of violence, the violence of encountered 
signs is by no means restricted to physical violence. 
What should also be noted is that, in Bond’s theory, aggro-effects are 
produced by the dramaturgy of accident time although he does not explicitly 
associate these two concepts. According to Bond, there are two kinds of 
aggro-effects: ‘It may shock the audience so as to disturb and bewilder them, 
disorientate them […]. Or it may set them a dilemma – an either/or which 
requires a decision’ (Stuart 2001b: 267). These ‘aggro-effects’ not only 
exert visceral impact but also provoke critical reflection. According to Bond, 
both the concepts of the Theatre Event and accident time aim to suspend the 
‘ideologized’ perception of reality in order to substantiate a new 
understanding of the world. Regarding how theatre can achieve this 
suspension and understanding, Bond uses other concepts to describe the 
process, one of which is the ‘Invisible Object’. 
 
6.3. The Invisible Object and the Use of Objects 
 
As I have analyzed, Bond’s dramaturgy revolves around a core of 
Nothingness, a gap of undecidability. In ‘Drama Devices’ (2005), Bond 
states that ‘TE invalidates received and ideological meanings and 
establishes new meanings in their place’ (2005a: 85). For Bond, the Theatre 
Event, through theatricalizing the analysis of the dramaturgical discourse of 
the play, aims to destabilize the presumed relationship between self and 
society. Regarding how the actor achieves the effects of restructuring the 
perception of the ideologized reality, Bond introduces a new term, the 
‘Invisible Object’, to describe the actor’s task. According to Bond, ‘[d]rama 
searches for the IO. It may be almost anything – the actor himself, a thing 
such as a cup, chair or button, words, a sound, a situation, an interchange 
with another’ (2004: 28). For Bond, anything can be made invisible by 
ideology, that is, a set of values and ideas that legitimatize the status quo 
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and determine how we understand reality. Therefore, searching for the 
Invisible Object means seeking to expose and make visible the ideological 
implications underneath what is perceived as usual and natural (ibid.). In a 
Theatre Event, the two most effective means to reveal the Invisible Object 
are material objects and the actor’s gestures. The focus of this section will 
be on the use of objects.  
Bond emphasizes the importance of the use of objects because, through 
the interaction between object and actor, the actor can demonstrate how 
different values are attributed to objects without resorting to psychology. In 
addition, the process of value attribution is a process of freeing the object 
from its ideologized use and reinvesting it with a new significance. In order 
to articulate the relationship between subject and object, Bond uses the term 
‘cathexis’ and often describes how one object can be ‘decathexed’ and 
‘recathexed’. In psychoanalysis, cathexis refers to ‘the fact that a certain 
amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or a group of ideas, to a 
part of the body, to an object’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 62). Although Bond 
by no means intends to approach the object psychoanalytically, his choice of 
the term ‘cathexis’ indicates his idea of how the self can subjectively attach 
certain meaning to the object.  
In fact, in analyzing British Brechtianism, Peter Holland points out that 
Bond’s Saved is exemplary of how the social analysis of the individual can 
be achieved through the use of objects as gestus. He demonstrates that, in 
the exchange between Len and Fred in Scene Six, the significance of the 
fishing rod and the cigarette oscillates between the economic value and the 
social symbol of friendship, and the shift of meaning further reveals the 
social circumstances that define them (28-29). Using objects to demonstrate 
the social and economic situation of the individual is one of the features that 
illustrates how Bond has been influenced by Brecht, and this dramaturgical 
device can also be detected in Bond’s other plays such as Shakespeare’s 
paper in Bingo.  
Therefore, Bond’s emphasis on the importance of objects in his later 
theoretical writings still retains the Brechtian influence. However, what 
makes his later theory post-Brechtian results from how he incorporates the 
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use of objects with his theory of subjectivity. For Bond, before the self 
accepts the social and economic value of the object through socialization, 
the process of value attribution is closely associated with the phase of the 
core self in his developmental model of the subject. It is a stage where the 
self can freely endow subjective significance on external objects without 
being influenced by how these objects are determined ideologically. The 
core self as the transitional stage between the neonate and the socialized self 
is closely related to D. W. Winnicott’s psychoanalytical concepts of 
‘transitional phenomenon’ and ‘transitional object’.  
According to Winnicott, when infants begin to separate from the union 
with the mother figure, that is, when they start to interact with outside 
objects, they need some specific objects like a bundle of wool to ease their 
anxiety about separation. Winnicott describes the object as a transitional 
object and the phenomenon as a transitional phenomenon (4-5). He 
proceeds to state that the meaning of a transitional object is to be gradually 
decathexed as the transitional phenomenon is diffused across the field 
between ‘the inner psyche’ and ‘the external world’ (7). In other words, the 
intermediate area of experience aims at easing the infant’s anxiety of being 
separated from the mother, who adapts to the infant’s need by providing the 
illusion that what the infant wants really exists (19). Even after transitional 
objects are decathexed, the transitional phenomenon can still be ‘retained in 
the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to 
imaginative living, and to creative scientific work’ (ibid.).  
It is noteworthy that, in Winnicott’s theory, the disappearance of the 
transitional phenomenon coincides with the time when the infant starts 
successfully to be incorporated with the external cultural field. As a result, 
the transitional area becomes the cultural field in which the inner psyche is 
cultivated according to the logic of the external world. Noticeably, this 
theoretical model corresponds to two phases of Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity: the transitional phenomenon is closely related to ‘the core self’, 
which designates a status in which the infant can freely endow objects with 
subjective meaning, and the end of the transitional phenomenon is 
comparable to the process of socialization indispensable for the birth of the 
 221 
socialized self. Therefore, the significance of objects not only reflects how 
objects are defined socio-economically, but also how the subject creates and 
recreates the relationship with the external world. It is thus understandable 
that the use of objects is essential in constructing a Theatre Event. In 
addition to the concept of the Invisible Object and the use objects, in order 
to describe how the Theatre Event operates, Bond proposes another set of 
ideas: the centre, the site, and the gap.  
 
6.4. Centre, Site, and Gap 
 
6.4.1. Centre 
 
The first time Bond explicates in detail his concept of the ‘centre’ is in his 
letter ‘“The Centre” Notes’ (1992), where he gives a response to Françon’s 
question: what is the centre of In the Company of Men? Although he was 
familiar with Bond’s previous plays, In the Company of Men was the first 
Bond play to attract Françon. Françon’s questions about Bond’s plays and 
its dramaturgy initiated a continuous and mutual dialogue between the 
director and the playwright: by answering the questions, Bond is able to 
develop and broaden his theory of dramaturgy, and by incorporating these 
ideas into practice, Françon achieves a more refined and precise 
mise-en-scène.  
In this letter, Bond introduces the idea of the centre as both an analytic 
tool to understand his plays and as a method of acting. More specifically, in 
every play, there is a central speech that ‘contains the basic theme of the 
play and also – in its utterance – the way the characters relate to the theme’ 
(Stuart 1996a: 161). According to Bond, the central speech is not a certain 
part of a speech in a play but a group of speeches spoken by different 
characters. These speeches revolve around centre situations and their 
meaning may evolve as the play unfolds. Apart from the central speech, 
there is also a ‘central line’ that is nearest to the centre (167).  
Françon’s reception of Bond’s idea is clearly reflected in an interview 
in which he states that Bond develops the theme of the central speech 
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alongside the character and that the text is not a psychological reproduction 
but a discourse (Millon 27). In practice, Françon requires his actors to seek 
the central discourse and central images in order to perform in a way that 
clarifies their understanding of the text. However, he never imposes his own 
interpretation of the text upon the actors; instead, Françon describes his 
directing as a ‘dramaturgy in process’ that incorporates the reactions of the 
actors (Françon 2010). Revealingly, Françon describes his method of 
mise-en-scène as a process that starts with one central idea through which 
all the details of the text are examined (Françon and Boiron 10). While he 
upholds the importance of the central idea of a play, this by no means 
implies that he intends to deliver a message through his mise-en-scène. On 
the contrary, Françon understands the importance of the gap in Bond’s 
theory and states that the goal of all art is to create paradoxes (1999: 100). 
He thinks that the act of choosing one central idea as the truth and excluding 
others is itself an ethical act that always results in paradoxes (Françon and 
Boiron 10). As Bond states: ‘The centre is the site of the drama’s paradox’ 
(Bond 2000b: 14). The paradoxical nature of Bond’s tragedy derives from 
the act of determining what is undecidable. In this sense, by making 
‘paradoxes’ the core idea of his mise-en-scène, Françon succeeds in 
capturing the distinctive feature of Bondian tragedy.  
Cooper also uses the idea of the ‘centre’ to approach Bond’s works, 
structure rehearsals, and devise TIE programmes. In ‘Some Notes on 
Bondian Drama’, part of the teachers’ resource for The Edge edited by 
Cooper and Ben Ballin, it is stated clearly that for Big Brum, ‘[t]he central 
problem of all drama is justice. Particularly plays deal with the centre in 
relation to specific situations. […] Its patterns or structures are extended 
from the centre’ (Ballin and Cooper 22). It is notable that, for Big Brum, 
although the centre is the governing idea throughout the process of rehearsal 
and devising, they admit that one play could possibly be defined by several 
centres. Therefore, it is their task to choose one centre as the basis from 
which to explore the central speech, the central line, central images and the 
central action. As indicated in the teachers’ resource, the idea of the centre 
is a much more useful dramaturgical tool than any other ideas such as 
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emplotment or characterization. What is decisive is how the plot delineates 
the development of the centre and how the character interacts with the 
centre. As Bond defines the central situation as ‘an aspect of society in 
which the definitions and practice of being human becomes critical and 
often contradictory’ (Stuart 1996a: 169), it is clear that the idea of the centre 
aims at unveiling the paradoxical nature of the ideological construction of 
society.  
 
6.4.2. Site 
 
Another important idea related to the centre is the idea of the ‘site’. In ‘The 
Site’ (1999), Bond refers the site to the paradox of the social situation that 
stimulates the reactions of imagination in a Theatre Event (2000b: 47). In 
‘Modern Drama’ (1999), Bond elucidates the idea of the site by stating that 
drama has four sites:  
 
A. It conforms to the socials sites (city, era, culture, etc.), which 
are self-evident to the audience.  
B. It conveys to the audience the play’s specific sites. […] 
C. It conveys the play to the audience – the audience as site. […] 
D. The audience as site of imagination. […] 
(2000b: 10; original emphasis) 
 
Site A situates drama within certain social contexts. In this sense, drama is 
not merely an art form but should be regarded as a cultural institution 
conditioned by a broader ideological network. Site B refers to the play, that 
is, the dramatic world created by the playwright. However, there is 
ambiguity in Bond’s differentiation between Site A and Site B. For example, 
Cooper thinks that Site A of The Broken Bowl is ‘the world of 2012’, which 
is also ‘present in the dysfunctional future society’ of the play while Site B 
is the specific room in the play (2013b: 133). However, in Cooper’s 
co-written chapter with David Davis, they state that Site A of the play refers 
to the world of disaster outside the room (Davis 2014: 144). If Site A refers 
to the broader social background within a play, it can hardly be ‘self-evident’ 
as Bond defines since this context can only be decoded gradually as the play 
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unfolds. Moreover, it makes more sense to differentiate the dramatic world 
from the extra-dramatic world than to distinguish the specific dramatic site 
from the broader social context within a play. In terms of theatrical 
semiotics, as defined by Anne Ubersfeld, the conditions of theatrical 
enunciation are of two orders: ‘concrete stage conditions of enunciation’ 
and ‘imaginary conditions of enunciation, conducted through performance’ 
(161; original emphasis). While Ubersfeld does not especially emphasize 
the importance of the social reality as stage conditions of theatrical 
enunciation, I argue that, for Bond, in addition to imaginary conditions of 
enunciation, the significance of any staged event must also be evaluated by 
considering drama as part of social institutions and concrete social 
conditions. It is no wonder that Cooper identifies Site A as ‘the world of 
2012’, the year when The Broken Bowl was produced, since it is important 
for a TIE practitioner to construct the dramatic world in relation to 
contemporary society in order to fulfill the sociological function of theatre.  
Site C is the interaction between stage and audience, that is, the 
theatrical process of conveying Site B to the audience. In fact, Ubersfeld’s 
idea of stage conditions is more suitable to explain the function of Site C as 
it involves the concrete decisions made by directors, actors, and designers to 
construct Site B, the imaginary conditions of performance. Therefore, it is 
clear that Bond’s Site B and Site C constitute the field of theatrical 
semiology. Site D is the psyche of the spectator, whose imagination can be 
activated by theatrical experiences. Despite the fact that Site B and Site C 
constitute the semiotic field of theatrical enunciations, Site D should not be 
regarded as the site of an ideal receiver as defined by semiotics. Rather, for 
Bond, Site D is the site of imagination, in which the production of 
significance should never be pre-determined by ideology. Therefore, in 
order to put imagination into operation, it is necessary to interrupt or 
suspend the process of signification in Site B and Site C. This explains why 
the conception of effective theatrical devices such as the Theatre Event or 
the Invisible Object is indispensable.  
As Bond states that ‘[a]ll the sites come together in the play’s centre 
and are on the stage’ (2000b: 18), the dramaturgical analysis and theatrical 
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practice which start with the idea of the centre should encompass all the 
sites of drama, that is, produce an effective theatrical experience to stimulate 
the spectator’s imagination to interrogate the relationship between self and 
ideology. While the centre could be defined as justice, as suggested by 
Cooper, or as a paradox, as indicated by Françon, the essence of the centre 
is always a void to be filled, that is, a gap.  
 
6.4.3. Gap 
 
The ‘gap’ is a complex idea that Bond returns to in different writings. In 
‘Commentary on The War Plays’, he proposes that the gap is associated 
with the actor, character, and spectator: ‘Interpretation depends on meaning 
and in drama that must be a philosophy of nature, society and self. So the 
triangle of actor, character, and audience forms a gap that only philosophy 
can fill’ (Bond 1998: 303). Therefore, the stage could also be regarded as a 
gap: ‘The empty space invokes social meaning’ (304). By this, Bond means 
that the stage functions as a starting point of interpretation and 
understanding, which should not be confined to psychological analysis but 
should extend to social analysis. The stage is a gap that needs to be filled 
with philosophy instead of psychology or theatrical effects. In addition, 
Bond also extends the idea of the gap to social reality: ‘[I]n real life, the 
“gap” exists between authority and behavior, speaking and understanding. 
Negotiating the gap is a social process’ (335). This definition of the gap as 
the discrepancy between ideology and reality is vital in understanding how 
Bond regards drama as a social institution endowed with the power to 
interrogate the legitimate status of social reality.  
In ‘The Seventh of January Sixteen Hundred and Ten’ (2000), Bond 
defines the gap as follows: 
 
The gap is in tension because of the relationship between the 
real and the ideological, and this is the tension of ‘being.’ The 
gap is also the site of our individual story, which is partly our 
specific biography and partly the events in ideology. (2000b: 
176)  
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The gap exists between the real, which is the potential of imagination 
originated from radical innocence, and the ideological, which is the 
socialized self instrumentalized by the system of rational administration. 
Therefore, such a gap is persistent inside the human psyche, that is, ‘the site 
of our individual story’. The gap, defined in this way, is almost equivalent 
to the idea of Nothingness. Nothingness is the originary void that can be 
occupied by ideology or imagination, and this structure of void constitutes a 
constant dynamic between the human psyche and society. In other words, 
the gap as an idea not only foregrounds the undecidable nature of the 
process of signification in theatre, but it also connects Bond’s theory of 
theatre with the idea of Nothingness in his theory of subjectivity.  
 To sum up theoretically: The self is a gap. Drama is a gap. Society is 
also a gap. The mimetic structure between self, drama, and society is the 
nucleus that governs Bond’s theories of subjectivity, dramaturgy, and 
theatrical practice. Defined in this way, the gap is also a ‘site’: Site A as 
social reality is a gap; Site B as the theatrical event on stage is a gap; Site C 
as the interaction between stage and audience is a gap; Site D as the psyche 
of the spectator is a gap. Moreover, the centre as the kernel that connects all 
the sites is also a gap. These Bondian terms, due to their spatial 
connotations, can be graphed as such: 
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The black dots refer to the sites of Nothingness that can be occupied either 
by ideology or by imagination. For Bond, the operation of society relies on 
a dominant ideological network that determines how values are defined. 
Therefore, the site of Nothingness in society is occupied by ideology. In 
Bond’s theory, a citizen needs to abide by the rules conditioned by such 
ideology; otherwise he or she is prone to be designated as guilty, wrong or 
insane. The theatre as a social institution provides an intermediate space in 
which the ideological centre of society can be suspended by constructing a 
dramatic sphere in which the site of Nothingness is occupied by another 
logic. For Bond, by turning the citizen into a spectator in theatre, it is 
possible for the citizen to experience and reflect on how the order of society 
is constructed and can be reimagined.  
 Having described how Bond conceives a new form of theatre through 
the concepts of the Theatre Event, the Invisible Object, the centre, the site, 
and the gap, in the following I analyze more specifically how Bondian 
subjectivity is performed through the actor’s enactment. 
 
6.5. Performing the Palimpsest of Subjectivity 
 
6.5.1. Character and Subjectivity 
 
In addition to the use of objects, how to construct a human figure is another 
major task that actors encounter in Bond’s theatre. Since Bond is suspicious 
of Stanislavski’s idea of subtext and Brecht’s idea of alienation effects, how 
to perform Bond’s ‘characters’ through his idea of ‘metatext’ is a pressing 
issue. As Patrice Pavis states, the character as a person is a historically 
specific concept that derives from the bourgeois drama, which treats the 
character as a substitute for the autonomous individual (1998: 47). The 
character cannot be merely reduced to ‘an awareness of self in which 
ideology, discourse, moral conflict and psychology coincide’ (51). 
Moreover, the process of abstraction through which theatricalized figures 
replace psychological characters is recurrent in modern and contemporary 
 228 
dramaturgy (2016: 78). Arguably, Bond’s use of ghosts and his 
dramatization of the core self can be regarded as his dramaturgical devices 
to transcend the limits of the psychologized character. Through these 
devices, Bond is able to articulate ‘the human image’ without resorting to a 
complete erasure of the human individual. Therefore, in Bond’s dramaturgy, 
at times the human image is more like a human-like ‘figure’ instead of a 
character. In her seminal study on the death of character since modernism, 
Elinor Fuchs proposes that, since character is deprived of the integration of 
human identity in the modernist theatre, ‘[t]he burden of signification […] 
begins to shift from the unfolding of character and plot to the more abstract 
interest of the play of ontological and ideological levels’ (35). ‘The play of 
ontological and ideological levels’ that Fuchs attributes to the modernist 
theatre also describes Bond’s use of character as determined by the 
palimpsest structure of subjectivity, in which the neonatal ontological quest 
for justice meets with the ideological restraints imposed by external 
authority. In this sense, Cristina Delgado-García’s definition of character as 
‘any figuration of subjectivity’ (231) can be used to describe the 
relationship between the Bondian subject, the character, and the actor’s 
performance – since Bondian characters are not merely determined by 
ideology as the socialized self but also retain the potential of radical 
innocence, the actor’s performance should also retain this subjective space 
of undecidability.  
In Alastair Macaulay’s review of the RSC production of In the 
Company of Men, directed by Bond in 1996, he accurately describes John 
Light’s performance of Leonard as ‘economical’ and ‘expressive’ with 
minimal movement. Although the production may not necessarily 
demonstrate Bond’s ideal approach to performance, Light’s restrained 
performance as Leonard was arguably illustrative of one of the possible 
methods to perform radical innocence.41 Notably, in Marvin Carlson’s 
review of the production directed by Françon in 1992, he observes that 
                                                
41 Bond’s evaluation of his experience of working with the RSC in rehearsing In the 
Company of Men is mixed. For Bond, certainly it was not a ‘disaster’ in the way The War 
Plays was in 1985 (Stuart 2001a: 140); however, the major problem resides in the actor’s 
method of performance, which he regards as having been corrupted by TV and film (135).  
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Benoit Régent’s performance as Leonard was devoid of psychological 
motives or decipherable thoughts, and this powerful sense of detachment 
made it uncertain whether this implies ‘an emotional void’ or ‘a calculated 
suppression of human emotion’ (241). While these two critics review 
different productions, both point out the detachment that characterizes both 
actors’ performances of Leonard, one of the typical Bondian characters who 
keeps searching for the meaning in an indifferent world. Without 
demonstrating any psychological motives, the eruption of Leonard’s ‘radical 
innocence’ is theatricalized through his final gesture of shooting Hammond 
after he hangs himself – an impossible gesture that both compels the 
audience to think about the situation and reveals the hidden part of 
Leonard’s psychic operation.  
Tuesday also illustrates Bond’s idea that emotions are ideologically 
coded. Tuesday was broadcast by BBC TV Education in 1993 and was 
directed by Bond and Sharon Miller.42 At the start of Tuesday, Irene is 
studying in her room. Later, her boyfriend Brian comes in and admits that 
he is running away from the army in the Gulf. Irene’s father finds out that 
Brian has run away from the army and urges him to go back. However, 
Brian is reluctant to do so and refuses to reveal why he cannot go back. 
Unable to bear the Father’s abuse of his authority, Irene uses Brian’s gun to 
shoot the Father, but she realizes that the gun is unloaded. Shocked by 
Irene’s reaction, the Father leaves the room to call the police. In the room, 
Brian tells Irene about his experience in the army and his witnessing of a 
child running away from other people in a desert. Later, the police break in 
and shoot Brian because they suspect he may use weapons to resist. At the 
end, Irene is informed that Brian is dead, and she seems to have realized and 
experienced something she never imagined before.  
Like Leonard’s shooting, Irene’s shooting of her father can also be 
defined as the violent action deriving from her radical innocence. Although 
Brian states that Irene’s facial expression is that of a killer when she shoots 
the unloaded gun at the Father, Natalie Morse’s performance as Irene by no 
                                                
42 My analysis is based on the recording archived at the BFI National Archive in London. 
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means indicated what a killer should look like – instead, Morse’s facial 
expression remained so neutral and inscrutable that it is impossible to 
decipher her feelings or thoughts. We can observe that, in Bond’s theatre, 
the character in extreme moments is usually purposefully performed as 
devoid of predictable emotions in order to emphasize the situation rather 
than the character. The fact that the character does not seem to be shocked 
by the shocking moment is also reminiscent of how Bond describes the site 
of accident time to be the peaceful centre of a storm. Although performing 
radical innocence often involves creating a moment of undecidability by 
excluding emotions or gestures with explicit social or psychological 
implications, this does not imply that all of Bond’s characters should be 
neutrally performed. Rather, in order to contrast with and create the context 
for the moment of undecidability, certain social gestures are exaggerated. 
For example, Bob Peck’s performance as Irene’s father emphasized both his 
authority over Brian and his later paranoiac bipolar reactions to Irene’s 
decision to shoot him. Also, one of the policemen shouted in excitement 
when he arrested Brian. These are moments in which the spectator is made 
aware of the ideological meanings of emotions and gestures. Overall, the 
performance of Tuesday was naturalistic, but these moments of exaggerated 
emotions and those of inscrutable tranquility demonstrated how Bond 
orchestrated the actors’ gestures and emotions to display different 
figurations of subjectivity.  
In the following, I will compare two productions of The Great Peace to 
further illustrate how subjectivity can be performed in Bond’s theatre. In 
fact, although Bond assisted directing The War Plays in the RSC production 
at first, he left during the rehearsal of The Great Peace because he was 
frustrated with not being able to explore the text and the possibilities of 
acting. Therefore, I will also compare the RSC production of The Great 
Peace, the third part of The War Plays, directed by Nick Hamm in 1985, 
with Françon’s production in 1995 to elucidate the features of Bondian 
performance.43  
                                                
43 The recording of Françon’s production is archived by INA THEQUE. The recording of 
the RSC production is archived at the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust in Stratford-upon-Avon. 
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The Great Peace can be divided into two parts: the first part (from 
scene one to scene six) deals with the Son killing the Woman’s baby, his 
own sibling, in order to fulfill the order by the army; the second part (from 
scene seven to scene twenty) illustrates the Woman’s journey through the 
ruins seventeen years after the traumatic experience. In order to illustrate the 
differences between the productions by the RSC and Françon, in the 
following I will especially focus on the parts that pose challenges to the 
director as well as the performer.  
The first major difference can be detected in the scene in which the 
Son stifles the baby. In the RSC production, through his emotional delivery 
of words and body language, Gary Oldman’s performance as the Son left 
the impression that he felt hurt and unwilling to kill the baby. In Françon’s 
production, however, Clovis Cornillac stood still throughout the scene 
except when he stifled the baby. When he killed the baby, Cornillac did not 
exhibit his emotion and acted in an unaffected manner. Françon did not 
intend to completely evade naturalistic acting; on the contrary, in the 
preceding scenes, both the Woman and Mrs. Symmons were highly 
emotional and even hysterical when they realized that their babies were 
threatened. That is, in this respect, there is no essential interpretative 
difference between the two productions. Nevertheless, by restraining from 
revealing his emotion in a moment of ethical significance, Cornillac’s 
performance was more persuasive and effective than Oldman’s performance, 
which represented predictable psychological reactions as might be expected 
from the Son.  
According to Tuaillon, Françon insisted that actors should act 
‘naturalistically’ as much as possible and that they should also perform ‘at 
the present moment’ by demonstrating how the army’s order should be 
reacted to (2009: 847). While these two methods seem at odds with each 
other, the actors’ combination of naturalistic banalization and objective 
display of the process of decision-making contributes to a much more 
nuanced performance. Since the Son’s infanticide is a reenactment of the 
                                                                                                                       
My performance analysis is based on these recordings.  
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ethical paradox of the Palermo improvisation, it is likely that the actors are 
prone to demonstrating the process of tackling the paradox in a too logical 
manner at the expense of the quotidian quality that should be incorporated 
through the whole process. Therefore, Françon tried to ‘banalise’ the scenes 
through adjustment of acting and use of objects to establish normality that 
reduces ‘artificial tensions’ (839). For example, Valérie Dréville as the 
Woman treated the Son in an infantilizing manner and at times talked in a 
gossipy way (ibid.). Cornillac even smoked when he discussed with the 
Woman about the army’s order of killing a baby in order to make this order 
one among other normal orders (844). In the RSC production, Oldman also 
smoked in the same scene, but, as has been pointed out, Françon treated 
naturalistic acting as only one of his directorial strategies and complicated 
the performance with other tactics. In order to evade naturalistic 
introspection or calculation, Françon requested that every reply should be 
enunciated ‘at the present’ to foreground the urgency of the situation and 
clarify the mechanism of the dramaturgical structure (Tuaillon 2009: 849). 
Dréville states that she had the impression that this method of acting makes 
‘things before oneself instead of being in the inside’ and consequently 
produces the quality of clarity and swiftness in performance (ibid.).  
Therefore, it can be inferred that naturalistic acting, which duplicates 
emotions as self-evident to make characters banal and tangible, by no means 
necessarily contradicts with the acting approach that highlights the logic of 
the development of dramatic action. The comparison above exemplifies why 
Bond criticizes psychological naturalism for ignoring the social and political 
dimensions of human behaviour. By demonstrating personal emotion, 
Oldman’s performance made the Son’s decision to kill the baby an 
unwilling act and may arouse the audience’s sympathy towards his situation. 
By contrast, Cornillac’s unaffectedness made the Son’s killing ‘strange’: 
how can a man being forced to kill his sibling manifest no emotional 
reaction? The Son’s coldness is the coldness of the military order, which has 
nothing to do with personal emotions and can hardly be altered. In this 
respect, the Son is only an instrument to execute one of the military orders. 
Oldman’s performance might also arouse the spectator’s awareness of the 
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social and political dimensions implicit in his infanticide despite his 
psychological approach; however, it is because Cornillac’s interpretation 
clearly circumvented explicit personal emotion to resist the spectator’s 
expectation that the social and the political aspects of his behaviour can be 
directly foregrounded.  
About his experience of rehearsals in the RSC production, Bond states 
that ‘[t]he rehearsals were painful because the actors are given two 
objectives. My co-director’s (Let’s make it work) and mine (What does it 
mean?)’ (Stuart 1996a: 88). The interaction between the Woman and the 
speaking bundle shows the difference between the directorial choice to 
‘make it work’ and that which complicates the meaning. In Scene Thirteen 
and Fourteen, the bundle speaks to the Woman and thus defies the 
assumption that it is only a bundle of rags instead of a living baby. In the 
RSC production, Magie Steed changed the pitch and volume of her voice to 
imagine and imitate how an infant might speak, and in this way, the bundle 
was understood to be the imaginative infant played by the Woman herself. 
According to Tuaillon, Françon at first also asked Dréville to produce two 
different voices directly, but they found this method ineffective. They then 
worked with the sound designer, Daniel Deshays, to design a piece of 
electronic sound equipment hidden in the bundle, which transmitted the 
voice of the infant recorded by Dréville to the audience (2009: 709-11). As 
a result, audiences might be left uncertain about the relationship between the 
Woman and the bundle: is it the voice produced by the Woman or is it the 
voice of the bundle? By retaining the ambiguity of the status of the bundle, 
Françon succeeded in translating the Woman’s experience of interacting 
with the bundle as a transitional object to a common experience shared by 
audiences. The difference between the two approaches to the bundle is vital 
since it illustrates what the ‘gap’ between actor, character, and spectator 
means: while Steed’s acting clearly defined the Woman’s relationship to the 
bundle and thus fills the gap, Dréville’s interpretation left the relationship 
indefinite and keeps the gap open for the audience to decide. In other words, 
Steed demonstrated what the meaning of the bundle is, but Dréville engaged 
the audience in the transitional area in which the meaning of the bundle is 
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not yet defined.  
In addition to the use of objects, the difference between how Steed and 
Dréville constructed the Woman’s image and gestures is also exemplary in 
showing Bond’s ideal acting method. As Valadié describes how she needed 
to ‘invent’ a ghostly female figure in Coffee, the Woman in The Great 
Peace, who has been struggling and nursing her bundle baby in the desert 
for seventeen years, is another figure that defies normal characterization and 
demands an imaginative configuration. In order to play the Woman, 
Dréville made more than three hundred pages of notes to make sure that she 
understood every word and image (Tuaillon 2009: 857). Regarding how to 
approach the text, she notes: ‘It’s not me who does everything. The 
rehearsals can help me discover the just place if this text can pass through 
me, retreat, turn transparent, bring oneself back in order to let the other pass’ 
(qtd. in Tuaillon 2009: 858). In order to let the text ‘pass through’ her, 
Dréville based the construction of the image of the Woman on materialist 
details. According to Tuaillon, Françon recommended that she imagine that 
the Woman is mad, and this simple suggestion became ‘an open door’ for 
Dréville, who was then stimulated by her encounter with some socially 
marginalized people, whose ways of speaking and body gestures became the 
base of her imagination (2009: 860). However, this by no means suggests 
that Dréville attempted to ‘imitate’ the images of the insane. As she notes, 
the Woman is a person who knows nothing other than some remnants of 
language and whose past is a void. Dréville further describes the Woman’s 
madness as the site of irrationality, where some ‘flashes of intuition’ 
traverse (ibid.). Tuaillon states that, by following the logic, Dréville was 
able to construct the process through which the Woman’s mental state 
passes from insanity to reason (ibid.). From the perspective of Bond’s 
theory, Dréville’s logic corresponds to the Woman’s psychical state, which 
is a regression into the phase of the core self due to traumatization. Her 
interaction with the bundle is one example of the transitional phenomena 
characteristic of this phase. As Winnicott states, ‘Should an adult make 
claims to on us for our acceptance of the objectivity of his subjective 
phenomena we discern or diagnose madness’ (18). In this regard, Françon’s 
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suggestion that the Woman is mad is correct because it defines how the 
Woman may be objectively diagnosed. On top of this, Dréville’s 
interpretation retained the nuisances and energies of the Woman’s 
subjective reality without resorting to any stereotypical image of madness.  
 
6.5.2. Body and Emotion in Performance 
 
From the discussion above we can observe that the figurations of 
subjectivity in Bond’s theatre require an accurate analysis of how characters 
are defined and self-defined in the situation. Based on the analysis, actors 
can then decide their gestures, emotions, ways of speaking, and their 
relation to objects. In this section, I focus on the role of the body and 
emotions in performing Bond’s plays as the human body is the point where 
the ethics in Bond’s theatre can be foregrounded. In fact, Bond’s conception 
of subjectivity is from the beginning closely intertwined with the body and 
emotions. According to Bond, the neonate’s monadic world is determined 
by corporeal feelings of pleasure and pain. Later, these feelings are 
abstracted as ideas of the Comic and the Tragic attached to emotions, and 
the emergence of consciousness is concomitant with these ideas. For the 
socialized self, instead of repeating the neonate’s experiences of pleasure 
and pain, the ideas of the Comic and the Tragic are further influenced by 
how the self confronts the ideologized world and its injustice. For Bond, the 
neonate’s primitive feelings are instructive in differentiating justice from 
injustice, and this differentiation later determines the self’s sense of 
morality. Therefore, feelings and emotions are not only physical or 
psychological reactions, but they also indicate how the self is engaged with 
the world. In this section, I will discuss the body and these two roles of 
emotions in Bond’s theatre.  
The neonate’s feelings of pain and pleasure are more than bodily 
feelings – for Bond, the feeling of pain puts the existence of the body under 
threat. This threat is the otherness that terrorizes the neonate because it may 
eradicate the existence of the neonate’s body and deprive the neonate of ‘the 
right to be in this world’. This implies, therefore, that the neonate’s body is 
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a terrain where the neonate’s identity is being questioned and claimed – 
only by expelling the otherness that threatens the body can the neonate 
establish its relationship with the external world. However, as the traces of 
this exposure to the other are registered in emotions and its attached ideas, 
the body that defines the contour of the self always bears the memory of its 
exposure to the other. As Levinas states, ‘the one-for-the-other characteristic 
of the psyche […] is not an ordinary formal relation, but the whole gravity 
of the body extirpated from its conatus’ (1998: 72; orginal emphasis). It 
should therefore be noted that Bond’s conception of the subject, the psyche 
that seeks justice by establishing its co-existence with others, is grounded in 
the neonate’s experience of bodily discomfort, and this discomfort continues 
in the self’s later development. Simon Critchley defines this exposure to the 
other as ‘the performative stating, proposing or expressive position of 
myself facing the other’ (2004: 18). Adorno also eloquently explicates the 
moral significance of the body in a post-Auschwitz world: 
 
A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler 
upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so 
that Auschwitz will not repeat itself […]. Dealing 
discursively with it would be an outrage, for the new 
imperative gives us a bodily sensation of the moral addendum 
– bodily, because it is now the practical abhorrence of the 
unbearable physical agony to which individuals are exposed 
even with individuality about to vanish as a form of mental 
reflection. (1999: 365)  
 
Therefore, the figuration of subjectivity is never abstract – the 
post-Auschwitz damaged self is intertwined with the damaged body, only 
from which new ethics can be made possible.  
According to Erika Fisher-Lichte, in theories of acting, there has 
always been ‘a tension between the actor’s phenomenal body, their bodily 
being-in-the-world, and the use of that body as a sign to portray a character’ 
(26). She further points out that, while Stanislavkian acting requires the 
actor to hide behind the character, that is, to merge the phenomenal body 
with the semiotic body, Brecht foregrounds the importance of the actor’s 
semiotic body as marking the character’s action and the actor’s stance 
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towards the character without giving account of how the phenomenal body 
should be treated (29). Pavis also contends that the body in theatre oscillates 
between being a transmitter of psychology or morality and being a 
self-referential material (1998: 34). Instead of strictly differentiating the 
body in theatre as semiotic or phenomenal, it is more important to identify 
how the body in Bond’s theatre ‘oscillates’ between these levels of 
conceptions.  
As Stanton B. Garner states, Bond’s imagination of violently tortured 
bodies in his early plays reflects ‘biological materialism that underlined 
Bond’s theatre, a materialism that grounds the political and the economic in 
human corporeality’ (158). This dramaturgy of bodily affliction permeates 
his later plays, in which the damaged body demonstrates either how the self 
is being paralyzed by the operation of power, or how the traumatized 
survivor strives to live. This also accounts for the importance of ‘correct’ 
embodiment in Bond’s theatre, which can be demonstrated through a 
comparison of how the Woman in The Great Peace was performed by 
Dréville and Steed. 
It is clear that the Woman’s appearance changes over the period of 
seventeen years in the desert. Dréville based her construction of the 
Woman’s body and gestures on very concrete questions: how to express 
happiness after twenty years of wandering? How to once again take a hand 
and caress a human head? How to eat with a shrunk stomach? (Tuaillon 
2009: 861) In addition, she varied her pace of walking in different scenes to 
suggest the passing of time and to eschew a naturalized image of the 
Woman (863). Dréville also applied the same strategy to her vocal 
interpretation: while manifesting the senility, exhaustion, and destitution of 
the Woman, Dréville tried to exhibit the heterogeneity of the Woman’s 
voice (870). In comparison, Steed’s performance did not create a sense of 
consistency or complexity as Dréville did. At times, she imitated how a 
destitute woman might walk and speak, but at other times she delivered a 
long speech in a fluent and flamboyant manner and acted in a ‘normal’ way. 
As Dréville adopted a strategy through which she could demonstrate a range 
of the Woman’s physical and vocal variations, she achieved a well-managed 
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consistency that Steed’s performance lacked. As Jenny Hughes argues, 
performances in a time of terror that evoke the experiences of unsettlement 
and disturbances by representing life in the alienated and abject form can 
unleash ‘the critical and affective force of the abject to disorder the 
beautifying schemes of an orderly, rule-bound universe’ (21). The 
consistency of Dréville’s damaged body, despite its fictionality, is powerful 
as it requires the spectator to gaze at and imagine the possible degradation 
that can take place in the human body.  
In addition to the damaged body, what may seem the ‘normal’ body 
can also be a site of domination, which can be manifested through the 
control of emotions. As Bond states that ‘[a]uthority corrupts imagination 
by making it fearful’ (2003: 104), authority can exercise its power through 
the production of fear. In Theatre & Feeling, Erin Hurley differentiates 
affect from emotion by stating that, while affect refers to an organism’s 
unconscious response to external changes which may result in emotional 
expressions, emotion situates these affective responses in a social context 
(17-21). By implication, we need to be aware of the difference between 
‘emotional expressions’ and ‘emotions’ since, as Martin Welton points out, 
emotional expressions ignited by affective feelings are undifferentiated 
across a spectrum of emotional states (27). While different emotions may be 
expressed through similar physical expressions and physiological changes, 
emotions cannot be reduced to these biological states. On the contrary, as 
Robert C. Solomon succinctly states, ‘emotions are subjective engagements 
in the world’ (77; original emphasis). This implies that emotions are 
differentiated according to how the subject interacts with the object, and 
these interactions often entail judgmental appraisals conditioned by the 
subject’s position within a wider social context.  
Bond’s theatre is concerned less with how to reproduce the character’s 
emotions than with how the character’s emotions are produced and 
ideologically conditioned. As I have explained, in Françon’s production of 
Chair in 2008, Dominique Valadié’s performance as Alice and Pierre-Félix 
Gravière’s performance as Billy demonstrated how seemingly normal 
everyday emotions are embedded within the biopolitical logic of 
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anxiety-inducing. Here I want to emphasize how the performance may 
render the spectator complicit in conforming to this logic of fear and anxiety. 
While the Woman’s body as ‘bare life’ that can be killed without breaking 
the law should arouse our sympathy and bring us into awareness of the 
precarious status of homo sacer, Léna Bréban’s performance rendered the 
Woman a ‘fearsome’ existence, which makes the spectatorial experience 
highly nuanced. Due to her appearance (a bald woman with her face looking 
downwards and her back arched), mutism, and the uncertainty of her 
reactions to external stimuli, the spectator is invited to fear her than 
sympathize with her. Moreover, the Woman attacks Alice, and this not only 
confirms her status as a threatening existence but also justifies the Soldier’s 
shooting. In other words, although Chair by no means explicitly refers to 
terrorism, this performance metaphorically reproduces the logic of 
anti-terrorist surveillance, which warrants any anti-terrorist strike and 
presupposes the structural possibility that terrorist attacks may occur 
anywhere at anytime. As Hughes argues, in a time of terror, theatre should 
‘take up performance’s capacity for affect as a possible site for working 
within and against an affect economy that mobilises terror’ (20). The 
success of Françon’s production resides in the fact that it critiques 
totalitarianism by reproducing how totalitarianism manipulates fear and 
encouraging the spectator to unconsciously identify with the logic of 
authorities.  
Although theatrical representations of the body and emotions are 
usually assumed to be embodied by the actor’s corporeal presence, some of 
Bond’s most effective scenes that engage the spectator’s attention by no 
means represent any extreme bodily conditions or emotions. As Dan 
Rebellato argues, insofar as metaphor makes us think of one thing in terms 
of another thing, theatre is metaphorical in the sense that spectators are 
invited to understand the fictional world through the particular 
representation (2009: 25). In a similar logic, the presence of the body and 
emotions can be metaphorically represented through their absence – this 
representation does not ‘replicate’ any corporeal presence but ‘evokes’ our 
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imagination. We can understand Joan’s violent reactions to the Dummy in 
The Under Room through this metaphorical relation. Sara Ahmed suggests 
that emotions, in responding to the other’s proximity, do not originate from 
the inherent attributes of others but from how others are perceived as 
possessing qualities (52-53). Therefore, when we consider someone to be 
hateful, it is not that intrinsically he or she is hateful, but that he or she is 
perceived to be hateful. This process of perception that endows others with 
certain attributes is determined through a wider network of ideological value 
attribution. Bond’s use of the Dummy implies that the object is in fact never 
endowed with inherent features. Joan’s hate towards the Dummy is 
produced by the manipulation of the state, which defines the Dummy as a 
hateful foreigner.  
 
6.6. Spectatorship  
 
‘TEs invoke the audience’s real life socio-psyche processes, so that their 
dramatized psyche works for itself’ (Bond 1998: 331). As Bond regards 
human subjectivity as a dramatic structure, he argues that the effects of 
drama derive from stimulating the spectator’s subjective reaction. More 
specifically, the Theatre Event ‘helps to teach audiences a new species of 
subjectivity appropriate to its changed world’ (Bond 1998: 298). In Bond’s 
plays, when characters are confronted with extreme moments when a just 
act is required, the undecidability of the decision by no means prevents the 
decision from being made. It is at such moments that the ‘gap’ between 
actor, character, and spectator is disclosed and spectators are required to 
respond to the decision.  
By invoking the inner potential of the spectator to mediate the process 
of tragic experience, Bond refuses to provide any external solution to the 
paradox of humanity delineated in his plays or any simplified utopian 
blueprint to replace the dystopian worldview. For Bond, the paradox of the 
imperative imposed upon a soldier to kill other human beings can only be 
solved by a world where there are no soldiers (2000b: 81). For Bond, the 
administration of injustice cannot be altered merely by changing the 
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structure of administration, which will turn out to be another system of 
injustice – the establishment of justice can only be possible when every 
individual is aware of the conflict between radical innocence and unjust 
reality.  
The production of Coffee in Paris in 2000 aroused fierce debates 
among the spectators. According to the third issue of frictions, a French 
theatre journal, during the run of 40 performances, 28 to 30 percent of the 
spectators left the theatre because of the massacre scene. Responding to this 
phenomenon, Françon explains that the power of Coffee does not derive 
from the horror of the massacre but from the way Bond connects atrocious 
violence with a banal gesture of spilling and drinking coffee (2000: 16). 
Françon argues that the reaction of the spectators who leave represents a 
way of survival by ‘escaping into the ruins’ instead of confronting extreme 
situations (18). As Helen Freshwater points out, the audience is not a unified 
community but a collective composed of differences – even the experience 
of the individual spectator during the performance may consist of a variety 
of reactions (6). She also proposes that theatre makers’ suspicion towards 
audiences results from a belief that audiences may not necessarily receive 
and appreciate what the performance tries to deliver (55). In this light, 
although Françon proposes his explanation as to why the spectators leave 
the theatre midway through the performance, it is impossible to have a 
definite answer. Even those who stay for the whole performance may not 
necessarily react to the play as expected by Bond or Françon. As Marie-José 
Mondzain observes, Françon’s representations do not refrain from shocking 
the audience, neither do they end up with hopelessness. Rather, because of 
‘a kind of uncertainty and indetermination within the representation’, 
audiences are troubled and are forced to reflect on their reactions (Françon 
and Tuaillon 20).  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that Bond’s theory of theatre can be regarded as 
post-Brechtian by analyzing how this theory is based on his theory of 
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subjectivity, and how this theory of theatre can be realized through 
performances. Although Bond proposes a variety of concepts, all of these 
different ideas address the problem of theatrically exposing both the essence 
of the subject and the basis of ideology as a gap. Since Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity suggests that both the subject and society are founded on 
‘Nothingness’ as a gap, the performance of his plays must keep the 
openness of the gap. Through performance analysis, I explained how 
directors and actors are able to achieve this openness through the actor’s 
body, control of emotions, and use of objects. I also argued that, in Bond’s 
theatre, experiences of shock and unexpectedness produced by the ‘gap’ are 
important for the spectator since these experiences can further invite the 
spectator to respond to and reflect on the meaning of the performance.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have examined the later Bond through three 
perspectives: his theory of subjectivity, the dramaturgy of his later plays, 
and how these plays have been produced and performed. The importance of 
Bond’s theory of subjectivity resides in the fact that it is pivotal in 
determining the dramaturgy of his later plays and the theatricalization of 
these plays. In Chapter One, I argued that Bond’s development of theory 
should be reconsidered both as his response to Brecht’s theory and as his 
reflection on the human condition in the post-Cold War new world order. 
Although during the 1970s and early 1980s Bond tended to define the 
subject as the product of social and economic relations like Brecht did, from 
the late 1980s, Bond started to articulate a theory of subjectivity defined 
through the psyche as well as its relation to society. For Bond, in a 
consumer society in the neoliberal era, appealing to specific political ideals 
such as socialism or endorsing any form of revolution seems inadequate and 
naïve – what is more important is to reveal how the subject is socialized and 
ideologized and how to interrupt this seemingly natural process. In order to 
account for the process of subjectivation and the possibility of 
de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation, Bond proposes the idea of ‘radical 
innocence’ – arguably the most important idea in his later theory – by 
examining the Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard in 
a Nazi camp. I pointed out that Bond’s theory of subjectivity can be 
regarded not only as a response to neoliberalist capitalism but also as a 
response to the problem of the status of the subject in the post-Auschwitz 
era. I also demonstrated how Bond’s new conception of the subject 
distinguishes the early Bond from the later Bond by examining his relation 
to Brecht in terms of theory, dramaturgy, and his evolving dramaturgy of 
the Holocaust.  
Moreover, I have drawn on Adorno, Levinas, and Agamben to 
demonstrate the significance of the later Bond in terms of aesthetics, ethics, 
and biopolitics. Bond’s theory follows Adorno’s argument that late 
capitalism and the Holocaust share the same logic of identity thinking 
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involved in instrumental rationality. Since the structural violence, 
exemplified through the camp and neoliberal capitalism, reduces individuals 
to disposable entities, Adorno argues that the individual is liquidated after 
Auschwitz. In biopolitical terms, the individual is reduced to the status of 
bare life. Despite the liquidation of the individual, the concept of the subject 
cannot be abandoned but reconceived. In this sense, Levinas’s ethics that 
questions the primacy of the ego and foregrounds the superiority of the 
other provides us with useful theoretical resources to engage in the 
reconception of the subject. Furthermore, both Adorno and Levinas contend 
that subjectivity and ethics cannot be dissociated from aesthetics – that is, 
artworks always presuppose an ethical stance of the subject towards the 
other and the world. Therefore, reconceiving the structure of the 
post-Auschwitz subject necessitates re-envisioning the aesthetic 
representation of subjectivity and its ethical implications. On the whole, I 
suggested that what concerns Bond in his later plays is how to keep 
dramatizing the post-Auschwitz liquidated subject as bare life in order to 
explore the possibility of the subject’s agency and responsibility in the 
post-Auschwitz neoliberalist era.  
Based on the arguments proposed in Chapter One, I critically 
explicated Bond’s theory of subjectivity in Chapter Two. I clarified Bond’s 
concept of ‘radical innocence’ as the existential imperative to seek justice 
by exploring its relation to Kant’s moral philosophy and the inevitable 
aporias involved in the concept of justice. Following the analysis of radical 
innocence, I proposed that Bond’s theory of subjectivity consists of two 
models: the developmental model and the structural model. The 
developmental model illustrates the process of subject formation while the 
structural model explains the interaction between reason and imagination 
within the subject. The aim of Bond’s theory is to comprehend the cause of 
the subject, which conditions the process of subjectivation and the 
possibility of re-subjectivation. For Bond, the cause of the subject is a void 
– that is, although the process of socialization experienced by the subject is 
determined by ideology, the subject still retains the potential to suspend and 
question the ostensibly natural ideological order of the world. The subject’s 
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potential to ‘re-subjectivate’ can be best demonstrated in extreme situations 
of ethical decision-making. I explored The Crime of the Twenty-First 
Century and Have I None to demonstrate how Bond dramatizes his theory of 
subjectivity and how the dramatization ineluctably involves ethical 
moments of undecidability. In The Crime of the Twenty-First Century, the 
act of justice is realized through Sweden’s homicide, whereas, in Have I 
None, the act of justice is demonstrated through Sara’s suicide. In fact, these 
dramatizations do not so much determine what acts of justice entail as 
explore the conditions that render acts of justice impossible. Although Bond 
advocates the power of radical innocence as the faculty to resist complete 
ideologization, in his plays he reveals both its potential and how it is still 
limited by objective conditions.  
Following the analysis of Bond’s theory of subjectivity, in Chapter 
Three I discussed the ethics and aesthetics of Bond’s post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy. By referring to Adorno’s and Levinas’s thinking about 
post-Auschwitz aesthetics and ethics, I argued that Bond’s post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy can be epitomized in the Palermo improvisation and the story of 
the Russian guard in the sense that both episodes not only reveal the process 
of de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation in extreme situations of 
decision-making but also aesthetically retain the aporetic nature of the 
dilemmas without removing the ethical complexities and nuances. This 
dramaturgy can be described as ‘post-Auschwitz’ because it responds both 
to Adorno’s demand that post-Auschwitz artworks should keep the 
expressive power of the non-identical and to Levinas’s claim that 
post-Auschwitz artworks must retain the traces of the proximity to the other. 
Based on this post-Auschwitz dramaturgical model, I analyzed Coffee and 
Born, both of which include references to the Holocaust. However, what 
concerns Bond is not the accuracy of historical references but the 
preservation of the expressive power of the non-identical. In Coffee, Bond 
dramatizes a series of moments wherein Nold is forced to decide how to 
treat the other – these are moments in which the ethical relationality of 
Levinasian face-to-face encounters confronts social norms defined by 
authority and ideology. In Born, Bond focuses on Luke’s encounter with the 
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Woman, a Muselmann, and the impossibility of bearing witness to what the 
Muselmann experiences. In both plays, instead of faithfully representing 
historical events related to the Holocaust, Bond’s post-Auschwitz 
dramaturgy is demonstrated through the way he scrutinizes the ethical grey 
zone involved in extreme situations epitomized at Auschwitz.  
In addition to the model of post-Auschwitz dramaturgy, in Chapter 
Four, I examined the later Bond through the idea of trauma-tragedy. I 
argued that Bond’s dramaturgy of tragedy derives from the concept of ‘the 
Tragic’, which he deploys in his theory of subjectivity. According to Bond’s 
theory, ‘the Tragic’ and ‘the Comic’ are the ideas used by the core self to 
interact with the external world. Moreover, ‘the Tragic’ is also the idea that 
associates with the neonate’s experiences of pain and the socialized self’s 
imaginative ability to dramatize tragedy. I also contend that, in order to 
expose the complexities of Bond’s conception of tragedy, it is necessary to 
delve into the concept of trauma. By spelling out how three dimensions of 
trauma – ontological, historical, and structural – operate in Bond’s theory of 
subjectivity in relation to tragedy, I proposed that Bond’s trauma-tragedy 
revolves around three essential concepts – justice, truth, and madness. 
According to Bond, the subject is ontologically traumatized by 
‘Nothingness’, a site wherein the subject experiences the process of 
subjectivation that involves the seeking of justice, truth, and sanity. In 
Bond’s tragedy, ‘Nothingness’ can be invoked through historical trauma 
events or through traumatizing structures. The subject’s encounter with 
Nothingness makes it possible to engage with traumatic events and 
structures by examining the subject’s search for a redistribution of meanings 
around the ideas of justice, truth, and madness. In Chair, Bond imagines a 
totalitarian state where the state of exception has become the norm and 
constituted a permanent anxiety-inducing traumatizing structure, which is 
made tangible by Alice’s suicide and Billy’s death. I argued that, in Chair, 
Bond demonstrates that freedom and justice can be imagined only through 
suspending the violence of political order and foregrounding the ethical 
dimension of human life. In People, Bond analyzes different types of 
traumatized subjectivity and probes how the search of ‘truth’ can be an 
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event of re-subjectivation. I argued that, in Bondian tragedy, truth is not 
determined by objective facts, but it designates a subjective event in which 
the traumatized subject interrogates the conditions of truth and learns to 
accept the truth even though this process can be difficult or even futile. In 
Dea, Bond examines the divide between sanity and insanity and situates his 
analysis within the context of the ‘War on Terror’ by adapting Euripides’s 
Medea and The Bacchae. Bond exposes the instability of the divide between 
reason and madness by demonstrating the paranoiac nature of rational order 
and interrogating the subjectivity of the soldiers who fight in the ‘War on 
Terror’. Bond also explores the aspect of rationality embedded in madness 
by delineating Dea’s physical and mental journey. I suggested that, in this 
play, Bond indicates that the foundation of rationality resides in the 
exclusion of madness, and, through the traumatized Dea, Bond questions the 
traumatizing effects of the order of rationality and upholds the imaginative 
power of madness that evinces the possibility of conceiving an alternative 
order of rationality.  
In Chapter Five, I focused on Bond’s TIE plays, which constitute a 
major part of Bond’s later plays. I argued that, for Bond, education in 
theatre as an ethical experience can be made possible through a dramaturgy 
of approaching otherness. Specifically, I used three concepts – storyability, 
spectrality, and hospitality – to analyze Bond’s dramaturgy of otherness in 
his TIE plays. In At the Inland Sea and The Angry Roads, Bond foregrounds 
the importance of storyability – the self’s ability to tell stories and the 
possibility of stories being told – for the subject to approach the other. 
Storytelling is not an act of self-affirmation but an ethical experience in 
which the relation between self and other can be imagined and constructed. 
In The Hungry Bowl and A Window, Bond uses the spectre to disturb the 
seemingly untroubled reality and compels the characters to address their 
inner desire and wider social problems. The spectre that appears as ‘the 
other’ always disquiets the self and puts the self into a state of crisis, which 
can result in rebirth or self-destruction. In The Under Room and The Edge, 
through dramatizing encounters with the foreigner and stranger, Bond 
interrogates the limits and conditions of hospitality. Throughout this chapter, 
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I argued that the dramaturgy of Bond’s TIE plays presupposes that the 
possibility of ethical learning is based on the experience of otherness in 
which the relationship between self and other can be reimagined.   
In Chapter Six, I analyzed Bond’s theory of theatre, which is based on 
his theory of subjectivity, and how this theory of theatre can be realized 
through performances. I proposed that, although Bond proposes a variety of 
concepts such as the Theatre Event, the site, the centre, the gap, accident 
time, and the Invisible Object, all of these ideas aim to explain how to 
expose both the nature of the subject and the foundation of ideology as a 
gap. Since Bond’s theory of subjectivity presupposes that both the subject 
and society are founded on ‘Nothingness’, indicating that the subject and 
society are changeable, the staging of his plays must retain the ambiguity of 
implied dramaturgical gaps. Through performance analysis, I explained how 
directors and actors achieve this ambiguity by demonstrating the structure of 
subjectivity through physical embodiment, control of emotions, and use of 
objects. I also contended that, based on these theatrical devices, the implied 
spectatorship in Bondian theatre often involves experiences of shock and 
unexpectedness produced by the ‘gap’, through which the spectator is 
invited to actively respond to and reflect on the meaning of the 
performance.  
On the basis of the findings summarized above, I maintain that this 
thesis contributes to Bondian scholarship in five ways. First, this thesis is 
the first thorough attempt to investigate Bond’s later theory of subjectivity 
and explicate how this theory is pivotal in determining the dramaturgy of 
Bond’s later plays and how these plays should be performed. Although there 
have been academic attempts to formulate Bond’s later theory, they tend to 
reformulate Bond’s ideas without critically contextualizing and 
problematizing these ideas.44 In contrast, in this thesis, I contexualize 
Bond’s theoretical development historically within the post-Cold War era 
and theoretically within the post-Auschwitz philosophy of ethics and 
aesthetics. In addition, I problematize the ambiguities and aporias involved 
                                                
44 See Allen David and Agata Handley’s ‘“Being Human”: Edward Bond’s Theories of 
Drama’ (2017) and Bill Roper’s ‘Imagination and Self in Edward Bond’s Work’ (2005).  
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in Bond’s theory and argue that, intriguingly, these aporias constitute the 
basis for Bond’s dramaturgy. Second, based on Bond’s explication of the 
Palermo improvisation and the story of the Russian guard, this thesis is the 
first attempt to theorize Bond’s concept of ‘post-Auschwitz drama’ in 
relation to his theory of subjectivity. I argue that this theorization not only 
explains the dramaturgical logic of plays that directly refer to the Holocaust 
like Coffee and Born but also clarifies why plays that do not include 
references to the Holocaust can be described as ‘post-Auschwitz’. Third, 
this thesis is the first to chart the structure of Bondian trauma-tragedy. I 
develop Bond’s theory of tragedy from his theory of subjectivity – 
especially the concept of ‘the Tragic’ – and incorporate the idea of trauma 
within my analysis. Additionally, I propose that justice, truth, and madness 
are three pivotal concepts that support the structure of Bondian 
trauma-tragedy. Fourth, this thesis delineates the theoretical foundation of 
the educational aspect of the later Bond by analyzing Bond’s TIE plays in 
terms of otherness. Fifth, this thesis analyzes Bond’s theory of theatre 
through his theory of subjectivity. Based on archival recordings, live 
performances, and other documents, I also investigate the productions of 
Bond’s later plays in order to demonstrate how his ideas of subjectivity can 
be theatricalized and how this theatricalization conditions the implied 
spectatorship.  
Finally, I want to add a few comments on the legacy of the later Bond. 
In the introduction to Dea, Bond states that it is a mistake to create 
documentary and verbatim theatre because drama is not an imitation of 
reality but an integral part of it (2016a: viii). Arguably, documentary and 
verbatim theatre can never be reduced to ‘an imitation of reality’ because 
how the materials are assembled, edited, and presented always presupposes 
ideological and aesthetic frameworks, the complexity of which surpasses the 
simplified idea of imitation. However, Bond’s comment emphasizes that 
what seems ‘fictional’ compared to documentary and verbatim theatre in 
fact cannot be reduced to a ‘fiction’ unrelated to reality. For Bond, the 
dichotomy between reality and fiction is problematic because reality is 
always already established on a fictional foundation. The power of theatre 
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derives from its function to expose both the fictionality of reality and the 
potentiality of fiction, and this is also where the force of the later Bond 
resides. 
The most important legacy of the later Bond is his theorization of 
human subjectivity in relation to drama. In this theory, dramatization is a 
process in which the human psyche, social reality, and artistic creation 
converge – drama is a site in which human imagination can suspend, 
interrogate, and redescribe social reality. In Bond’s theatre, dramatic 
mimesis is not about imitation but about creation – the efforts to create a 
space in which humanity can be defined and redefined. Bond never defines 
humanity theoretically since the definition of humanity can only be possible 
in concrete dramatized situations. According to Agamben, we are still living 
in a world determined by the biopolitical logic of the camp, and Bond’s 
theory of subjectivity and his later dramaturgy should be situated in this 
context. While Bond’s definition of ‘radical innocence’ as ‘the existential 
imperative to be in this world’ or ‘the right to be’ is rather ambiguous, we 
can consider what this ‘right’ means. Human rights are never self-evident – 
they are always politically defined and unevenly distributed. Moreover, the 
political institutions that endow people with human rights can also deprive 
them of these rights. In this sense, Bond’s insistence on ‘the right to be’ 
should not be conflated with the idea of human rights – it is a ‘right’ that 
cannot be given or deprived legally. This right conditions how we approach 
the other and is also conditioned by this ethical relationality. This is the 
point where the most basic form of human subjectivity meets the most basic 
form of drama – the right to be defines the self-other relationship and is 
defined by this relationship. It is the exploration of the fundamental 
relationship between the human subject and drama that constitutes the 
theoretical and dramaturgical legacy of the later Bond.  
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